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1. General Abstract 
The present thesis taps into the field of neuropsychological decision-making research. In this field it is common 
to distinguish between decisions under ambiguity and decisions under risk. In situations under ambiguity the 
decision maker has no information about the consequences and their probabilities of occurrence, which is why 
she/he has to rely on her/his intuitions and experiences with the situation (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & 
Anderson, 1994). In contrast, in situations under risk information about consequences and probabilities is given 
and the decider can process them to make a decision (e.g., Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006). In their 
model of decision making under risk, Brand and colleagues (2006) postulated the involvement of cognitive and 
affective processes. Over the years, several studies supported this assumption. However, little was known about 
the interaction between the underlying cognitive and affective processes and the associated neural correlates. 
The research for this thesis was conducted to fill this gap. The first study aimed to investigate the neural 
correlates of the interaction between decision making, additional cognitive demand, and stress. It was found that 
stress appears to trigger a shift from serial to parallel processing brain regions to prevent decision-making 
performance from decreasing, supporting the assumptions made in previous studies (Pabst, Schoofs, 
Pawlikowski, Brand, & Wolf, 2013; Plessow, Schade, Kirschbaum, & Fischer, 2012). The second study 
concentrated on the possibility that cognitive functions might have an important role in facilitating decision 
making in situations when both processing routes (affective and cognitive) are demanded at the same time. The 
results revealed that although affective stimuli (especially those of positive valence) interfere with the decision-
making performance, participants with superior executive functioning seem to be unaffected and were still able 
to decide advantageously. In contrast, participants with inferior executive functions were affected and showed 
disadvantageous decision making. In the third study the focus of investigation was which subcomponents of 
executive functioning might be involved in decision-making situations with additional cognitive demand. The 
findings suggest the involvement of higher-level executive functions and lower-level executive functions in 
decision making when the cognitive route is additionally loaded by another cognitive demanding task 
simultaneously. In order to measure the additional cognitive load, a dual task consisting of a decision-making 
task and an additional cognitive task was used in each study. In conclusion, the findings suggest that in decision-
making situations with additional cognitive and affective demand, underlying affective and cognitive processes 
interact in a way that they prevent a decrease of decision-making performance. The findings and the therefrom 
derived assumptions are discussed in detail and perspectives for future outcomes are given. 
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2. General introduction 
Everyday life consists of many challenging situations and demands. People have to make decisions constantly. 
Some decisions are easy to make and rather random, for instance when to drink from a cup of tea next to you on 
the table. Most of these decisions can easily be done while doing other cognitive, even challenging things 
simultaneously. For example, deciding to take a sip of tea while writing a demanding essay will easily be done. 
However, there are decisions that need more cognitive resources, need to be thought through carefully, for 
example to decide which job offer to take or where to invest money. Decisions of this nature are hardly 
performed in parallel with other cognitive, challenging assignments. Moreover, a situation provoking a decision 
can be affective-hued, for example the decision to get married. Others have to be done under stressful 
conditions. An extreme example would be the actions of a doctor in an operating room that can leave to a 
decision about life or death. These are only a few examples demonstrating the importance and variety of 
decisions and decision situations in human everyday life. Hence, it is not surprising that decision making is also 
a topic in the field of research.  
Today, there are many different research fields investigating the topic of decision making. In total, they 
can be assigned to one of two theoretical approaches: the normative/prescriptive and the positive/descriptive 
approach (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993). The normative approach engages in explaining the 
best decision-making process by trying to maximize the optimal decision for individuals, organizations, and 
public relations. In contrast, descriptive approaches investigate the actual decision-making process. Here, it is of 
interest how humans make their decisions, how they process and use information and which limitations and 
systematical biases influences the decision-making process (Kleindorfer, et al., 1993). Due to the fact that 
decision situations differ in the amount of information offered, decisions can be placed on a continuum from 
complete ignorance on the one side of the continuum (where no information, not even about the possible 
outcomes of a decision, are known) to certainty of the other side of the continuum (where it is known that only 
one deterministic outcome will result). Between those endpoints lay uncertainty or ambiguity (where the 
outcome may be known, but the probabilities of occurrence are not precisely specified) and risk (where the 
outcome distribution is specified) (Weber & Johnson, 2009).  
To the field of descriptive research belongs the neuropsychological approach of decision-making 
research. Neuropsychological decision-making research tries to identify the underlying neural, cognitive, and 
affective correlates of decision making (e.g., Brand, et al., 2006; A. R. Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop, 1996; 
Kahneman, 2003). In this field, it is common to distinguish between decisions under ambiguity and decisions 
under risk. Decision making in ambiguous situations is characterized by the fact that even though the person 
making the decision may have information about the possible consequences of a decision, he/she has no 
information about their probability of occurrence. The person has to make a decision by relying on hunches and 
guesses. He/she has to trust in his/her gut feelings concerning the decision (Bechara, et al., 1994; Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). This is mostly true for personal and social decisions. For example, the 
decision to start a relationship with a significant other is usually made because of feelings and not because of 
rational deliberation. To start a relationship may have the consequence to live happily ever after or to be forever 
miserable, but before making the decision to start a relationship or not, there is no information about how likely 
one or the other consequence will occur. However, based on her/his feelings regarding the significant other the 
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person will still be able to make a decision. In contrast, in decisions under risk the consequences are well known 
and the situation provides information about the probabilities of occurrence (Brand, et al., 2006). For example, 
in case of prescription for a certain medication the patient information leaflet states the probabilities of diverse 
side effects. Based on this information the patient can deliberate whether he/she is willing to take this medicine. 
The present thesis is located in the field of neuropsychological decision-making research and should 
contribute to broaden the knowledge of the underlying neural, cognitive, and affective processes of decision 
making. Therefore, a theoretical background about neuropsychological decision making under ambiguity and 
risk will be given (see chapters 3 to 3.5), whereby the focus of the thesis is on decision making under risk. 
Since, decision making under risk conditions involves affective and cognitive processes (Brand, et al., 2006) the 
interaction between these processes will be of special interest. Several studies already demonstrated that a 
simultaneous demand on either the cognitive route, for example by an additional executive task (Starcke, 
Pawlikowski, Wolf, Altstötter-Gleich, & Brand, 2011) or on the affective route, for example due to a stressful 
situation in which a decision has to be made (Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2008), leads to diminished 
decision-making performance. Indeed, real life decision situations appear to be more complex by demanding 
both routes while making a decision additionally. For example: A student is on his/her way to a very important 
exam at the university. This situation itself might be stressful. Additionally, the train he/she wanted to take is 
canceled. The student needs to reschedule the train, while simultaneously deciding if it will still be possible to 
arrive in time or if it might be better to skip the exam and retake it another time. In respect of the findings above 
it appears obvious to assume that an additional demand on both routes would lead to an even increased 
impairment of decision-making performance. However, a recent study displayed that in a decision situation in 
which participants were stressed (load on the affective route) and had to perform an additional executive task 
simultaneously (load on the cognitive route); the decision-making performance did not decrease. Instead, these 
participants demonstrated analogues decision-making performance to non-stressed control participants making a 
decision without additional cognitive demand (Pabst, Schoofs, et al., 2013). This appeared to be a paradoxical 
finding, which the authors explained by a possible cognitive processing shift from serial processing to parallel 
processing, triggered by stress (for a detailed discussion see section 3.4.4). Nevertheless, this was the first study 
investigating the interaction between additional cognitive demand and stress in decision making under risk. To 
broaden the knowledge about such interaction and the underlying neural correlates in particular, the first study 
of the current thesis was conducted. Due to the fact that some studies gave first hints in the direction that 
cognitive functions seem to moderate the influence of affective processes in decision making (e.g., Brand, Laier, 
Pawlikowski, & Markowitsch, 2009; Pabst, Schoofs, et al., 2013), the second study investigated whether 
cognitive functions could prevent decision-making performance from decreasing when both processing routes 
(affective and cognitive) are demanded. The third study was conducted to get a better understanding of the 
cognitive functions involved in situations in which a person needs to make a decision while performing an 
additional cognitive task simultaneously. In order to measure the additional cognitive load, a dual-task 
consisting of a decision-making tasks and an additional cognitive task was used in each study.  
The present thesis is structured as follows: At first a theoretical overview about decision making under 
ambiguity and risk (chapter 3), the underlying affective (section 3.1) and cognitive processes (section 3.2) as 
well as the underlying neural correlates (section 3.3) will be given. This is followed by a theoretical background 
of situational influences on decision-making performance (section 3.4), such as additional cognitive demand 
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(section 3.4.1), affective influences (section 3.4.2), stress (section 3.4.3), and the interaction between them 
(section 3.4.4). The theoretical part closes with a conclusion from theoretical background. Thereafter, the reports 
of the three studies are presented (chapter 4 to 6). Each of the reports consists of a separate theoretical 
introduction, in which the core notions for the specific study and the consequent hypotheses are laid out. At this 
point it has to be mentioned that each research report is supposed to be readable as an independent manuscript. 
Accordingly, some information which has already been addressed in the general theoretical background will 
again be subject of the theoretical introduction. Furthermore, each study ends with a separate discussion of the 
results. However, at some points the studies are adjusted to provide the readability of the thesis. Therefore, the 
studies may slightly differ from the original versions of the manuscripts (see publication notes). After the third 
study the main results of the three studies are summarized (section 7.1) and will be discussed in the light of the 
current theoretical and empirical findings and an impulse for future studies will be suggested (section 7.2 and 
7.3). 
3. Theoretical background: Decision making from a neuropsychological perspective 
In neuropsychological decision-making research it is distinguished between decisions under ambiguity and 
decisions under risk. While in ambiguous decisions no or less information is given and the decider has to rely on 
hunches and guesses to make a decision (Bechara, et al., 1994; Bechara, et al., 1997), in decisions under risk the 
decider is provided with probabilities of possible outcomes of a decision and might calculate which decision 
will be best (Brand, et al., 2006). Over the years of research two decision-making models, describing the 
underlying processes of either decision making under ambiguity or decision making under risk, were postulated. 
In their model of decision making under ambiguity (see Figure 1) Bechara and colleagues (1997) 
assumed that the sensory representation of a decision situation leads to two parallel, but at some points also 
interacting chains of events.  
 
 
Figure 1 The model of decision making under ambiguity adapted from Bechara and colleagues (1997). 
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In one chain the sensory representation of the situation activates “neural systems [ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that activates further regions, see section 3.1.2] that hold non-declarative 
dispositional knowledge related to the individual’s previous affective experience of similar conditions” 
(Bechara, et al., 1997, p. 1294). The subsequent non-conscious signals from the body or their mental 
representation (somatic markers, see section 3.1.2) act as covert biases on cognitive processing (e.g., reasoning 
or evaluation of facts etc.) or on the decision itself. In the other chain of events the representation of the decision 
situation leads to an overt recall of pertinent facts (e.g., options for decisions or associated future outcome) and 
to the application of reasoning strategies. Bechara and colleagues assumed that the activation of the covert 
biases precedes overt reasoning and thereby may support the reasoning process underlying conscious decision 
making.  
Inspired by the model of decision making under ambiguity Brand and colleagues (2006) postulated a 
model of decision making under risk (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2 The model of decision making under risk modified from Brand and colleagues (2006). 
 
The authors assumed that the various features of a decision situation are represented in working 
memory. In relation to these situational features information from long-term memory (e.g., knowledge about 
probabilities, previous experiences with comparable decision situations, and problem solving strategies) is 
recalled. This recall of information is triggered and controlled by executive functions (e.g., categorization, 
monitoring, and cognitive flexibility; for detailed information about executive functions see sections 3.2). The 
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combination of current, situational and recalled information occurs in working memory and results in a current 
decision strategy that guides the decision. At this point, the covert biasing signals (somatic markers, see section 
3.1.2) can be involved in the selection process of a decision-making strategy. However, similar to decision 
making under ambiguity the biasing signals may also guide the decision directly without applying a specific 
strategy. The decision itself is followed by a positive or negative feedback evoking biasing signals that in 
combination can be stored in long-term memory or as a representation of the biasing signals. Moreover, Brand 
and colleagues assumed that for decisions under risk the cognitive route, i.e., without usage of the feedback and 
biasing signals, can lead to an advantageous decision alone. But the reliance on the biasing signals associated 
with affective experiences will also lead to a decision, resulting in the assumption of two parallel but interacting 
ways: an affective and a cognitive route (Brand, et al., 2006).  
In order to operationalize decision-making situations under ambiguity and risk, neuropsychological 
research often uses decision-making tasks. Those tasks differ in the amount of information given concerning 
rules, potential outcomes like gains and losses, and the possibility to calculate the probabilities for a gain/loss. 
Ranging from no information about gain and losses and no possibility to calculate the probabilities (Iowa 
Gambling Task, IGT; Bechara, et al., 1994), to a gambling task with stable rules, amounts of gain and losses, 
and probabilities (Game of Dice Task, GDT; Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005). In between are ranked: the Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002) that provides more information about the amounts for gain and 
losses than the IGT, but still offers no possibility to calculate the probabilities; followed by the Cambridge 
Gamble Task (CGT; Rogers, Everitt, et al., 1999) and the Probability Associated Gambling task (PAG-task; 
Sinz, Zamarian, Benke, Wenning, & Delazer, 2008; Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, Gamboz, & Delazer, 2008) that 
both provide changing probabilities and amounts in each trial. While the IGT taps into the field of ambiguity 
and thus studies using this task will be discussed in sections of decision making under ambiguity (sections: 
3.1.2.1, 3.2.2.1, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.2.2.1, and 3.4.3.3.1) all other tasks display a certain amount of risk and studies 
using these tasks will be addressed in the sections of decision making under risk (sections: 3.1.2.2, 3.2.2.2, 
3.4.1.4.2, 3.4.2.2.2, and 3.4.3.3.2). Table 1 gives an overview about the five commonly used decision-making 
tasks and displays the layout, the rules, the information given in each task, the information not known by the 
participants, and the measures used to evaluate the decision-making performance. 
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Table 1 Overview about five commonly used neuropsychological decision-making tasks. 
Decision-making tasks 
IGT BART CGT PAG-Task GDT 
Layout 
Four decks of 
undisclosed cards 
Balloon and a 
balloon pump  
Ten red or blue 
boxes and a hidden 
yellow token 
24 red and blue 
cubes  
Dice cup and a single 
virtual die  
Aim  
Maximization of 
starting capital by 
choosing one card 
of the decks per trial 
Maximization of 
starting capital by 
pumping up a 
simulated balloon  
Maximization of 
starting capital by 
betting a certain 
percentage of the 
capital on which 
box will reveal a 
yellow token 
Maximization of 
starting capital by 
deciding to gamble 
in a lottery or to 
take a fixed amount 
of loss/gain  
Maximization of 
starting capital by 
betting which number 
will be thrown next 
Given rules and information 
Starting capital of 
$2,000 
No starting capital Starting capital of 
100 points 
No starting capital Starting capital of 
€1,000 
Each card which 
participants have to 
choose leads to a 
gain, sometimes 
additionally to a 
delayed loss which 
is added or 
subtracted from the 
displayed starting 
capital and 
accompanied by a 
happy or sad smiley 
face 
Participants can 
switch between the 
decks each trial and 
are told that some 
decks are better 
than others 
Participants earn 
five cents each time 
they decide to pump 
up a balloon which 
is added to the 
temporary amount 
of money displayed 
on the screen; they 
are presented with 
90 balloons and the 
explosion point 
varies across 
balloons 
Participants can 
decide how many 
times they want to 
pump up the 
balloon: Either they 
stop in time and 
collect the earned 
money and transfer 
it to a permanent 
bank (displayed on 
the screen) or the 
balloon explodes 
and the temporary 
earned money is 
lost 
The probability 
under which box (a 
red one or a blue 
one) the token 
might be hidden is 
equal; however, the 
ratio of red and blue 
boxes varies from 
trial to trial and is 
pseudo-randomized 
The amount of 
points to win/loose 
(displayed on the 
screen) changes 
from trial to trial 
and is displayed in 
a sequence of five 
consecutive bets; 
participants can 
chose one amount 
to bet 
It is emphasized 
that the decision 
might involve 
conservative or 
risk-taking behavior 
 
During each trial 
the participants 
have 10 s to decide 
whether they want 
to gain / lose a fixed 
amount of €20 
displayed on the 
screen or whether 
they want to gamble 
for €100; if the time 
limit is over the 
fixed amount is 
chosen 
automatically 
If they decide to 
gamble, a cube is 
pulled out of 24 
cubes (number is at 
least countable); the 
ratio of red and blue 
cubes changes 
every trial, a red 
cube leads to a win 
of €100, a blue cube 
to a loss of €100; 
the current capital is 
displayed 
In each of the 18 
trials, participants 
have to choose 
between different 
numbers of 
combinations, each 
associated with a 
different amount 
gain/loss: one number 
(€1,000), combination 
of two numbers 
(€500), of three 
numbers (€200), and 
of four numbers 
(€100) 
Gain/loss is displayed 
on the screen, added 
to or subtracted from 
the displayed current 
capital  
Number of round is 
presented on the 
screen 
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Note. IGT = Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, et al., 1994); BART = Balloon Analogues Risk Task (Lejuez, et al., 2002), CGT = Cambridge 
Gamble Task (Rogers, Everitt, et al., 1999); PAG-task = Probability-Associated-Gambling Task (Bonatti et al., 2008; Zamarian, et al., 
2008); GDT = Game of Dice Task (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005). 
Decision-making tasks 
IGT BART CGT PAG-Task GDT 
Information not (explicitly) given to the participants 
Deck A and B are 
the disadvantageous 
decks, leading to 
loss in the long run: 
high gains but also 
even higher losses; 
deck C and D are 
advantageous decks, 
leading to gain in 
the long run: low 
gains but also low 
losses 
Task consists of 100 
trials 
The underlying 
probabilities of 
explosion: Blue 
balloons have 
averaging explosion 
point at 64 pumps, 
the yellow balloons 
at 16 pumps, and 
the orange balloons 
at 4 pumps  
The ratio between 
red vs. blue boxes 
varies between 9:1, 
6:4, 7:3, and 8:2 
Five bets were 
offered on each trial 
and represent a 
fixed percentage of 
the current capital: 
5 %, 25 %, 50 %, 
75 %, 95 %; 
depending on the 
condition bets were 
presented in a 
descending or 
ascending order 
Number of trials 
The explicit ratio of 
red and blue cubes 
and thus the 
winning 
probability: varying 
according to 
pseudo-randomized 
order between 3:21, 
9:15, 15:9, and 21:3  
Task consists of 40 
trials 
One number and two 
number combination 
are associated with a 
winning probability 
less than 34 % 
(disadvantageous 
/high-risk decisions) 
and the three and four 
number combination 
with a winning 
probability of 50 % 
and up 
(advantageous/low-
risk decisions); they 
are at least calculable 
Main measures of decision-making performance 
Net score: Number 
of advantageous 
decisions minus 
number of 
disadvantageous 
decisions; a positive 
score displays good 
decision-making 
performance 
To measure risk 
taking the number 
of pumps is 
counted: High 
number of pumps 
displays high risk 
taking 
Number of choices 
of the most likely 
outcome, a high 
number displays 
good decision-
making 
performance, speed 
of decision making 
in ms  
Risk-adjustment, 
the percentage of 
points a participant 
put at risk despite a 
high probability to 
lose 
The frequency of 
choices of the fix 
sum in the low 
winning 
probability; high 
frequency displays 
good decision-
making 
performance  
Frequency of 
gambles in the high 
winning 
probability; high 
frequency displays 
good decision-
making 
performance 
Net score: Number of 
advantageous/low-risk 
decisions minus 
number of 
disadvantageous/high-
risk decisions; a 
positive score displays 
superior decision-
making performance  
Frequency of the 
riskiest choice (one 
single number); a high 
frequency indicates 
disadvantageous 
decision making 
Frequency of 
disadvantageous/high-
risk choices (one 
single number and a 
combination of two 
numbers); a high 
frequency indicates 
disadvantageous 
decision making 
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For a detailed description of the decision-making tasks please be referred to the original papers 
mentioned above.  
So far, this chapter gives a short overview about neuropsychological decision-making models and tasks 
used in this field of research. A detailed discussion about the assumed underlying affective and cognitive 
processes of decision making, the associated neural correlates of decision making, and the situational influences 
on it, will be presented in the following chapters (chapters 3.1 - 3.4). 
3.1 Affective processes in decision making  
Before going into more detail on this subject, it seems to be appropriate to describe and differentiate the terms 
emotion, mood, feeling, and affect, as they are often used synonymously in everyday life. Since, due to different 
tradition of languages these terms have differential definitions depending on the language used (Sokolowski, 
2008). For example, while the term affect is understood as an intensive emotional state in the German language 
area, it is often used as synonym for the term emotion or as genus of emotion, mood, and feelings in the English 
language area (Ewert, 1983; E. Fox, 2008; W.-U. Meyer, Schützwohl, & Reisenzein, 2001; Sokolowski, 2008). 
Occasionally, affect is even used to describe the aspect of experiencing emotions (Lazarus, 1991b). In some 
textbooks (e.g., W.-U. Meyer, et al., 2001; Sokolowski, 2008) emotions are often described as time-limited, 
discrete reactions to internal and external incidents and they are manifested in physiological, psychological, and 
behavioral mechanisms. Furthermore, emotions are mostly described as object-related. In contrast, mood is a not 
object-related, affective state, which is often described to be diffuse and of less intensity but of longer duration 
than emotions. Feelings are understood as the subjective experience of emotions. However, none of these 
definitions is popularly accepted (W.-U. Meyer, et al., 2001) and probably differ between language areas (see 
above). The present thesis includes international papers which will differ in the use of the emotion terminology. 
In order to hinder possible content confusions, the term affect will be used in this thesis as genus of emotion, 
mood, and feelings as it is often done in the English language area (Ewert, 1983; E. Fox, 2008; W.-U. Meyer, et 
al., 2001; Sokolowski, 2008). 
To dwell on the theories of emotions and the origins of emotion would go far beyond the constraints of 
this thesis. At this point interested parties should be referred to the works of famous theorists of emotion for 
example, Darwin (1872, 1965), James (1890, 1950), Schachter (1964), McDougal (1908,1960), Plutchik (1962), 
A. R. Damasio (1994). However, one theory associated with the affective processes underlying decision making 
will be discussed in details in section 3.1.2, the somatic marker hypothesis. At first, a general overview about 
the brain regions involved in affective processing will be given in the following sections.  
3.1.1 Neural correlates of affective processing 
One of the first assumptions concerning the neural correlates of affective processing was made by Cannon 
(1927, 1931). He postulated that the thalamus is involved in the affective response to stimuli. This was based on 
experiments with decorticated cats, which still showed affective reactions like intense fury, until the removal of 
the lower posterior portion of the thalamic region. After the removal such reactions subsided. This led the author 
to the assumption that the thalamus is a region which dispatches impulses that evoke an extreme degree of 
affective activity, although cortical government appears to be absent. However, over the years of research it 
became clear that there is not only one single structure involved in affective processing, but that there are rather 
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different networks consisting of various cortical and subcortical structures and fiber pathways (Pritzel, Brand, & 
Markowitsch, 2003). The limbic system (initially proposed by MacLean, 1949) is one of those networks 
proposed. Since then, the brain regions supposed to be involved in the MacLean’s model were continuously 
adjusted to contemporary findings. Markowitsch (1999, 2000) described a current version of the limbic system 
that includes the limbic cortex, the limbic nuclei of the tel-, di-, and mesencephalon, and the fiber tracts 
interconnecting the structures. Here, the core of the limbic system is proposed to consist of two sub-circuits 
(Markowitsch, 1999, 2000): The Papez circuit (Papez, 1937) and the basolateral limbic circuit (Sarter & 
Markowitsch, 1985). According to Markowitsch (2000), the Papez circuit proceeds from the hippocampal 
formation via the fornix to the mammillary bodies. It continues via the mammilothalamic tract to the anterior 
thalamus. At this point the circuit proceeds either directly back to a part of the hippocampal formation 
(subiculum) or it goes indirectly via the cingulate gyrus into the hippocampal formation. Markowitsch (1999) 
described this circuit as “primarily engaged in the transfer of information from short-term to long-term memory” 
(p. 473). The second circuit, the basolateral limbic circuit, is assumed to be involved in the affective estimation 
of perceived information and decides about the valance transferred into long-term memory (Markowitsch. 
2000). This circuit is suggested to be associated with brain structures such as the amygdala, the mediodorsal 
thalamic nucleus of the thalamus, and the basal forebrain region, as well as interconnecting fiber pathways (e.g., 
the ventral amygdalofugal pathway, anterior thalamic peduncle, and the bandeletta diagonalis) (Markowitsch, 
1999). Rolls shared the opinion that there is a more affective and a more memory associated system (Rolls, in 
press). To be more precise, Rolls stated that there exists no single limbic system, but rather two limbic systems 
operating independently of each other. One system includes the amygdala, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and is involved in affect, reward valuation, and reward-related decision 
making. This is because the OFC and the amygdala are engaged in decoding and encoding of primary 
reinforcers (e.g., taste and touch) as well as in reward-related and punishment-related behavior (e.g., Rolls, 
2000). In contrast, the second limbic system includes the hippocampus and a circuit involving the fornix, the 
mammillary bodies, the anterior thalamus, and the posterior cingulate gyrus, and is associated with memory 
(Rolls, in press). However, he further assumed that an interaction between these two systems is possible, in 
particular when affect provides a component of memory.  
The assumption of an interaction between affective and cognitive processes in the brain has a long 
history. LeDoux (1989) was one of the first researches proposing interactions between cognition and affect 
based on the neuronal connections between the amygdala (above described as part of the affective processing 
systems) and the hippocampus (above described as part of the memory-associated systems) as well as the 
neocortex (evolutionarily recently developed cortex). Since then, many studies have occurred demonstrating the 
interaction between affective and cognitive processing, suggesting various brain structures to be involved 
depending on the context reviewed (for reviews see Dolan, 2002; Dolcos, Iordan, & Dolcos, 2011; Pessoa, 
2008). Besides the studies demonstrating the involvement of the OFC and the amygdala in reward-valuation 
processes (e.g., Rolls, 1990, 2000), the amygdala was also found to be involved in studies investigating the 
relationship between perception and attention (e.g., Anderson & Phelps, 2001; M. Davis & Whalen, 2001; 
Dolan, 2002; Holland & Gallagher, 1999; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). Additionally, it seems that the amygdala is 
also involved in implicit learning (Büchel, Morris, Dolan, & Friston, 1998; LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, & 
Phelps, 1998) as well as encoding and recall of affective stimuli (Cahill et al., 1996; Canli, Zhao, Brewer, 
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Gabrieli, & Cahill, 2000). Some studies, assumed that the amygdala works automatically (Dolan, 2002; Öhman, 
2002) and independent of awareness, while others demonstrated that the amygdala functions are tied to top-
down processes (Ishai, Pessoa, Bikle, & Ungerleider, 2004; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002). 
However, Dolcos and colleagues demonstrated that in addition to the amygdala also the medial temporal lobe 
was activated during encoding of affective stimuli (Dolcos, LaBar, & Cabeza, 2004) and recall of affective long-
term memory information (Dolcos, LaBar, & Cabeza, 2005). Other studies have shown that the recall of 
affective states associated with past affective experiences engages the upper brainstem nuclei, the hypothalamus, 
the insular cortex, the somatosensory cortex, and the OFC (A. R. Damasio et al., 2000). More recently, the ACC 
was postulated to be involved in regulation of affect (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Davidson et al., 2002), and 
conscious affective experience (Lane et al., 1998).  
In his review Pessoa (2008) gave a comprehensive overview about the brain regions involved in 
affective processing (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). Based on an informal assessment of the frequency with which 
they appeared in the literature, he distinguished between core and extended regions: The core regions are those 
which were reported more frequently in the literature: They involve subcortical (see Figure 3) the amygdala, the 
nucleus accumbens (part of the basal ganglia), and the hypothalamus.  
 
Figure 3 The subcortically brain regions involved in affective processing modified from Pessoa (2008). 
The core regions involved in affective processes are highlighted in black, while the extended regions are displayed in grey color. NA = 
nucleus accumbens; VTA = ventral tegmental area; PAG = periaqueductal grey.  
 
The cortical core regions (see Figure 4) are the OFC, the ACC (especially the rostral part), and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Extended regions were reported less frequently and include 
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subcortically (see Figure 3) the brainstem, the ventral tegmental area, the hippocampus, the periaqueductal grey, 
the septum, and the basal forebrain. Cortically (see Figure 4), they include the anterior insular cortex, the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC), the anterior temporal lobe, the posterior cingulate cortex, the superior temporal sulcus, 
and the somatosensory cortex.  
 
Figure 4 The cortically brain regions involved in affective processing adapted from Pessoa (2008). 
The core regions involved in affective processes are highlighted in black, while the extended regions are displayed in grey color. PFC = 
prefrontal cortex; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; PCC = posterior 
cingulate cortex. 
 
Moreover, Pessoa (2008) argued that especially the lateral PFC seems to be a region for the integration 
of cognition and affect. With regard to this assumption he referred to studies in which the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (dlPFC) and the lateral PFC showed changes in neural activity only when participants had to do cognitive 
and affective processing simultaneously. For example, in the study by Perlstein, Elbert and Stenger (2002) 
participants were asked to maintain in mind neutral and affective stimuli. The authors were interested whether 
the maintenance-related activity in the PFC was influenced by the affective tone of the stimuli. Using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; see section 4.3.4 for detailed information about this technique) they found 
that the maintenance-related activity in the dlPFC especially was modulated by the valance of the stimuli: 
Compared with neutral stimuli, pleasant stimuli increased the activity while unpleasant stimuli decreased it. 
Interestingly, when participants had only to detect the stimuli without maintaining the information in mind the 
dlPFC was not affected. This indicates that the modulation of the activity in the dlPFC by the affective valence 
was particular to the experimental context of the maintenance task. Similar, in a second fMRI study participants 
had to watch short video clips with differential affective content after which they performed a working memory 
task (Gray, Braver, & Raichle, 2002). The authors demonstrated a bilateral activity in the lateral prefrontal 
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cortex associated with the affective and working memory tasks components. This activation pattern could not be 
predicted by information either of the affective or working memory task in isolation. Therefore, they assumed 
that this activation reflects both components equally. Furthermore, a recent study revealed that the performance 
of a cognitive task (2-back with neutral words) was accompanied by increased activation in cognitive-related 
brain areas and a decrease of activity in affect-related areas (Grimm, Weigand, Kazzer, Jacobs, & Bajbouj, 
2012). In contrast, processing of affective words (independent of valence) in the 2-back task increased the 
activation of cognitive-related regions. This supports the assumption that lateral prefrontal areas appear to be a 
platform for affective and cognitive interaction.  
Overall, those studies demonstrate that many different brain regions are involved in affective 
processing, which are also involved in cognitive processing, leading to an interaction between affect and 
cognition (Dolan, 2002; Dolcos, et al., 2011; Pessoa, 2008; Rolls, in press). In this context it is not surprising 
that affective processes are involved in decision making, as postulated by Rolls (for an overview see Rolls, 
2014; Rolls, in press). At this point one theory has to be mentioned, which had a tremendous influence on the 
neuropsychological decision-making research: the somatic marker hypothesis (A. R. Damasio, 1994). In 
comparison to Rolls who especially highlighted the reward-valuing processes in decision making associated 
with the OFC, A. R. Damasio concentrated on the somatic states/ gut feelings (somatic markers see section 
3.1.2) which modulate human decision making. The next section will discuss the somatic marker hypothesis in 
more detail. 
3.1.2 Underlying affective processes in decision making: The somatic marker hypothesis 
In both decision-making models (see Figure 1 and Figure 2) the underlying affective processes are postulated to 
be associated with somatic markers. The somatic marker hypothesis describes those processes as somatic (i.e., 
bodily) and able to regulate decision-making behavior (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; A. R. Damasio, 1994; A. R. 
Damasio, et al., 1996; A. R. Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991). The hypothesis is based on various 
remarkable observations in neurological patients with local lesions in the frontal brain (A. R. Damasio, et al., 
1996). One of those patients was Phineas Gage who suffered from frontal brain lesions due to an accident at 
work (Harlow, 1848, 1868): He was a blasting foreman at the American railroad construction company. On the 
day of his accident the blast started premature and the iron rod (with that he tamped the blasting powder with 
sand into the whole of the rock which was to blast) entered Gages head through his left maxillary bone and 
passed completely through the frontal brain to exit afterward with high speed through the cranium (c.f. Bigelow, 
1850; A. R. Damasio, 1994; Harlow, 1848). Even though Phineas survived this accident, he suffered from a loss 
of vision of his left eye. Moreover, as time went by his whole personality changed: While he was described as a 
smart business man with a well-balanced mind before the accident, henceforth he was capricious and 
disrespectful. Furthermore, it appeared that from now on Phineas often had fits of temper and often changed his 
mind regarding his plans for the future (c.f. A. R. Damasio, 1994; Macmillan, 2000). However, his change did 
not include motoric, language, and cognitive functions such as intelligence, memory, and new learning (H. 
Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994). Five years after Phineas’ death, 1861, Harlow got 
the family’s approval to exhume the skull. Since then the skull and the iron rod, which was buried with Phineas 
Gage, are exhibited in the Warren Anatomical Medical museum at Harvard University (A. R. Damasio, 1994). 
Although Harlow (1868) had already assumed that the personality changes were associated with the focal 
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damage in the frontal region, and Ferrier (1878) postulated that those lesions do not involve brain areas 
associated with motor and language functions, only 1994 these assumptions could be supported. In this year H. 
Damasio and colleagues were able to create a three-dimensional reconstruction of Phineas’ skull and simulate 
the trajectory of the iron rod, using a new neuroimaging technique named Brainvox (H. Damasio & Frank, 
1992). They could prove that neither the supplementary motor area nor Broca’s area suffered from lesions. 
However, the authors found that especially the ventral and medial part of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) was 
damaged. H. Damasio and colleagues (1994) argued that these lesions were the reason why Phineas was not able 
to plan his future, to stick to social rules which he once learned, and to choose course of actions which would be 
advantageous for his own good.  
A second prominent case was patient EVR who demonstrated antisocial traits after an ablation of a 
tumor in bilateral orbital and lower mesial frontal cortices (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985). After this surgery EVR 
also demonstrated a change in personality: from an esteemed member of a business community to a man who 
made only sort-sighted business and financial decisions. Despite his average to outstanding cognitive functions 
he made risky and disadvantageous decisions again and again. Moreover, the assumption that he had lost his 
knowledge and ability to behave correctly in social situations could not be supported (Saver & Damasio, 1991). 
Instead, it was recognized that EVR and patients with lesions in the vmPFC and the OFC in general have 
problems with the anticipation of the consequences of their actions and in recognizing and describing their 
affects (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Stuss, Gow, & Hetherington, 1992).  
Due to the fact that those patients showed unimpaired cognitive ability A. R. Damasio (1994) assumed 
that rational thinking is obviously not sufficient enough to make a decision. Furthermore, he argued that in a 
social decision-making situation too many information are given and too many outcomes are possible as that a 
person may be able of capturing them all before a decision is made. It would take a long time until a person 
finally decides. This is rarely the case in social decision-making situations. Therefore, A. R. Damasio (1994) 
postulated that in order to make a decision in such situations, affect has an important role. He supposed that 
before a person has made a cost-benefit analysis he/she has a gut feeling when thinking about the possible 
outcomes and alternatives to react. Moreover, he assumed that it is this gut feeling that guides the decision into a 
certain direction. Due to the fact that those gut feelings affect the body and mark certain mental representations 
he named them somatic markers. These markers may act as an alarm signal when a negative outcome is 
associated with a certain alternative and may lead to a refusal of this alternative and to a choice of another one. 
However, they may also act as a start signal in case the alternative is associated with a positive outcome. On a 
neural level it was suggested that especially the vmPFC is involved. The vmPFC has various afferent pathways 
to sensory and bioregulatory brain regions for example, the amygdala, the hypothalamus, the cingulate gyrus, 
the nuclei of the brainstem, and the basal forebrain. Through this connection it is possible that information of a 
given situation and the affect recently experienced in this kind situations are linked and may be modified and 
reactivated in similar situations (A. R. Damasio, 1989a, 1989b). Overall, A. R. Damasio described two 
alternative routes of how the reactivation of the somatic markers may proceed (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; A. R. 
Damasio, 1994): the body-loop and the as-if-body-loop. Within the body-loop the vmPFC and the amygdala 
initiate the body through the brainstem nuclei to adopt a certain somatic state. In turn the somatic state is then 
processed by the insular cortex and the somatosensory cortex. Within the as-if-body-loop the body is left out 
and the vmPFC along with the amygdala activate the somatosensory and the insula cortex directly. Both cortices 
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work as if they have received the signals from the body. Even though this pattern of activity is not the same as 
the one produced by the body, it is still able to influence the decision-making process. The enacted somatic state 
(independent of the loop by which it was activated) then acts consciously or unconsciously. Moreover, it is 
postulated that somatic markers reinforce the activation of attention and working memory processes, which are 
associated with the dlPFC (see also section 3.2.1) and other high order association cortices (Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005). This again enables the preselection of information, so that in a complex and uncertain decision-
making situation only profitable alternatives are represented in the brain. (For a more detailed description of the 
somatic marker hypothesis and the associated neural processes, please see Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; A. R. Damasio, 1994; A. R. Damasio, et al., 1996; A. R. Damasio, et al., 
1991; Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006; Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 2006; Schiebener, Staschkiewicz, & Brand, 
2013).  
A. R. Damasio concluded that in certain situations healthy subjects i.e., without neurological and 
psychiatric illness, are able to recall composite memories formed by facts and somatic body states that were 
evoked in the individuals’ experience with the facts (A. R. Damasio, et al., 1996). While the facts need to be 
held permanently in a dispositional form in the association cortices, somatic states can be retrieved on demand 
and do not need to be stored. Regarding the patients with lesions in the vmPFC for example, Phineas Gage and 
EVR, A. R. Damasio assumed that while they are able to retrieve the facts, they fail to evoke the somatic states 
accompanied with those facts (A. R. Damasio, et al., 1996). This again may lead to odd behavior in situations 
where people need to rely on somatic states, for example, social situations and decisions under ambiguity which 
might explain the non-social behavior of Gage and EVR. Studies investigating the affective response of patients 
with lesions to the vmPFC supported the assumptions (A. R. Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990; A. R. 
Damasio, et al., 1991; Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995). A. R. Damasio and colleagues (1991) demonstrated 
affective and neutral pictures to patients with lesions to the vmPFC, to patients with lesions outside the PFC, 
and to a control group with healthy participants. In order to measure a potential change in the somatic state 
(affective response) the authors used the skin conductance response (SCR). The SCR measures temporary 
changes in the electrical conductance of the skin in relation to specific stimuli and thoughts (Pinel, 2001). 
Therefore, electrodes are placed at the hands of the participants to derive the electrodermal activity (for detailed 
information about SCR refer to Boucsein, 1992; Bouscein, 1988). The results of the study by A. R. Damasio and 
colleagues (1990, 1991) are straightforward: While the two groups without lesions to the vmPFC showed 
standard SCRs to the affective pictures and little or no response to the neutral stimuli, the patient group with 
lesions to the vmPFC did not show any reaction to the affective stimuli, too. Although, all three groups 
demonstrated normal SCRs to startling stimuli such as loud noise or deep breath, which indicates that the 
patients with damage to the vmPFC are able to evolve SCRs, they did not show these reactions to stimuli with 
affective components. Further on, Trane and colleagues (1995) demonstrated that lesions to the vmPFC enable 
patients to retrieve facts (e.g., this is a familiar face), but that this lesions impair SCR discrimination. Those 
findings led the authors to the suggestion that the missing development of somatic markers may be the reason 
why patients with lesions to the vmPFC are unable to make advantageous decisions in uncertain situations. 
Overall, the findings show that somatic markers seem to be an inherent part of the decision process and 
influence the decision as covert biases, which is in line with the decision-making model of Bechara and 
colleagues (1997). 
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Studies investigating the potential role of somatic markers as part of the underlying affective processes 
are summarized in the following section.  
3.1.2.1 The role of affective processes in decision making under ambiguity 
In order to operationalize personal, ambiguous, real-life decision making in the laboratory and thus, to have the 
opportunity to test the assumption of the somatic marker hypothesis, the IGT was developed (Bechara, et al., 
1994; for a brief description of the IGT see also Table 1). Nowadays, the IGT is mostly used in its computerized 
version (c.f. Bechara et al., 2001; Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000). The first study using the IGT revealed 
that patients with lesions in the vmPFC chose the disadvantageous card decks more often than participants with 
no brain lesions (Bechara, et al., 1994). In order to test whether this may be due to missing somatic markers, in 
another study the SCRs were additionally measured during the IGT performance (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 1996). Results demonstrated that control participants with no lesions to the brain and no psychiatric or 
neurological disorders as well as patients with lesions to the vmPFC developed SCRs after they received a gain 
or a loss. During the course of the game the control participants also developed SCRs before they made a 
choice, i.e., anticipatory SCRs. In particular, the SCRs were higher before a disadvantageous decision than 
before an advantageous decision. In contrast, the patients did not develop anticipatory SCRs. On a behavioral 
level, the control group demonstrated additionally better IGT performance than the patient group. This led the 
authors to the assumption that the missing SCRs may be a correlate of their insensitivity to future outcomes (for 
more detailed information see also Bechara, Tranel, et al., 2000), which again supports the suggestion that 
somatic markers biases the decision-making process by marking a decision option as positive or negative (also 
found in following studies: Suzuki, Hirota, Takasawa, & Shigemasu, 2003; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Further 
support for the somatic marker hypothesis comes from a subsequent study (Bechara, et al., 1997): In this study, 
control participants and patients with lesions to the vmPFC were asked every 10 cards (starting at card 20, 
where participants had already made some experiences with the IGT) whether or not they already know what is 
going on in the task and how they feel about the task. Additional SCRs were measured. The authors found that 
control participants started to make advantageous decisions before they had any conscious knowledge about the 
task (second block of the IGT, i.e., card 20-40, called pre-hunch phase). Moreover, control participants 
generated anticipatory SCRs whenever they thought about making a risky choice, even though they did not had 
any explicit information about what constitutes a risky decision. In contrast, patients did not develop 
anticipatory SCRs at all and even though they knew which strategy was the best, they still decided 
disadvantageously until the end of the game. Bechara and colleagues (1997) concluded that in healthy 
participants, the unconscious biases/somatic markers (anticipatory SCRs) precede the conscious knowledge and 
guide the decision-making behavior. Furthermore, the subsequent reasoning/working memory process (in which 
the knowledge is retrieved and processed, see the decision-making model under ambiguity in Figure 1) may be 
facilitated by those biases/somatic markers. A study of the year 1999, additionally demonstrated that besides the 
vmPFC also the amygdala appears to be involved in the somatic states (Bechara, et al., 1999). Patients with 
lesions to the amygdala were not able to develop SCRs as a response to feedback given in the decision-making 
task. Likewise, they demonstrated impaired decision-making performance. Due to the fact that patients with 
lesions in the vmPFC developed feedback SCRs, but also demonstrated impaired decision-making performance 
the authors concluded that both areas are differently involved in the development of somatic markers. Bechara 
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and colleagues (1999) assumed that while the amygdala attaches affective attributes to stimuli, the vmPFC 
processes the information coming from the amygdala. Thus, lesions to either one of these structures lead to an 
impairment of somatic markers and therefore to decreased decision-making performance.  
Other studies investigating decision-making performance in different patient groups support the 
assumption of impaired affective processing due to missing SCRs, which leads to disadvantageous decision 
making, for example, in substance dependent individuals (Bechara & Damasio, 2002), in patients suffering from 
Urbach-Whiete disease (Brand, Grabenhorst, Starcke, Vandekerckhove, & Markowitsch, 2007), Huntington’s 
disease (Campbell, Stout, & Finn, 2004), multiple sclerosis (Kleeberg et al., 2004), obsessive compulsive 
disorder (Starcke, Tuschen-Caffier, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2009), and anorexia nervosa (Tchanturia et al., 
2007). Furthermore, studies investigating patients with anxiety disorder (Maner et al., 2007; Miu, Heilman, & 
Houser, 2008), major depression disorder (Must et al., 2006; Smoski et al., 2008), or narcolepsy with cataplexy 
(Bayard et al., 2011; Delazer et al., 2011) demonstrated that the patients’ decision-making behavior appears to 
be associated with altered affective processes. Overall, the studies present two different approaches trying to 
explain these affective alterations. Some authors argued that it is an altered modulation of somatic signals 
(somatic markers), which is associated with the patients’ decision-making performance: Miu and colleagues 
(2008) assumed that such an alteration (in their study: increased anticipatory SCRs before advantageous instead 
of disadvantageous decisions) is associated with impaired decision-making performance. Maner et al. (2007) 
and Smoski et al. (2008) found risk-avoidant decision-making behavior in their patient groups, which might 
reflect an alteration of somatic signals (in this case: a faster or stronger acquisition of somatic markers in 
response to negative feedback; c.f. Smoski, et al., 2008). In contrast, other authors discussed altered reward 
processing to be associated with the patients’ decision-making performance (Bayard, Abril, et al., 2011; 
Delazer, et al., 2011; Must, et al., 2006): That means that these patients seem to be hypersensitive to reward and 
therefore, choose alternatives with high immediate reward/gain more often than control participants, regardless 
of the even larger punishment/loss in the future. It is argued that such a hypersensitivity of reward might be due 
to a general blunting of affective reactivity: To compensate their reduced reactivity to affective stimuli, the 
patients choose higher immediate affective valence, irrespective of the amount of future punishment or reward 
(Bayard, Abril, et al., 2011; Must, et al., 2006). Even though there are no consistent findings regarding the 
decision-making performance in certain patient groups [anxiety disorder: impaired (Miu, et al., 2008) vs. non-
impaired (Maner, et al., 2007); major depression disorder: impaired (Must, et al., 2006) vs. non-impaired 
(Smoski, et al., 2008)], all studies suggest affective processing to be involved in decision making under 
ambiguity. Thus, these studies are in line with the decision-making model of ambiguity (see Figure 1) and the 
somatic marker hypothesis (see section 3.1.2). 
Overall, these studies support the assumption of affective processes in decision making under 
ambiguity, which appear to be associated with unconscious somatic reactions (e.g., SCRs). However, there were 
repeatedly studies questioning the extent of their involvement and supplying different explanatory approaches 
for the deficits in the IGT (for reviews see Buelow & Suhr, 2009; Dunn, et al., 2006). For example, in their 
review Dunn and colleagues (2006) criticized that the psychophysiological findings connecting the generation of 
somatic markers with successful decision-making performance is only of correlative nature. Therefore, it cannot 
be said whether the anticipatory SCRs developed in the decision-making process are the end product of a 
decision or whether they are involved in the development of a decision as a key feature. Attempts to yield causal 
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evidence by investigating for example, patients with impairments to the vagus nerve or the spinal cord led to 
contradictory findings. The assumption was that those patients who are not able to get feedback of the somatic 
states due to the impairments, should demonstrate decreased decision-making performance. However, while one 
study could only demonstrate trends in the assumed direction (C. O. Martin, Denburg, Tranel, Granner, & 
Bechara, 2004), a second study did not find deficits in IGT performance (North & O'Carroll, 2001). North and 
O’Carroll suggested that the good decision-making performance may be due to the fact that patients with lesions 
to the vagus nerve or the spinal cord have adapted to the loss of peripheral feedback (body loop) and 
compensate it by the extensive use of the as-if-loop. Dunn and colleagues (2006) argued that it seems to be 
impossible to create a scenario in which the body loop is disturbed and the as-if loop cannot be used, making it 
difficult to test the causality of the somatic markers. Other authors assumed that the deficit in IGT performance 
in patients with lesions in the vmPFC may rather be due to impaired reversal-learning than due to impaired 
development of somatic markers (Fellows & Farah, 2005). Fellow and Farah (2003) demonstrated that patients 
with lesions to the vmPFC had problems in changing their choices from a previous positive card deck that 
emerged to a disadvantageous deck, to a previous negative card deck that now is rather advantageous. 
Moreover, patients with lesions to the vmPFC performed as well as healthy control participants when the 
contingencies of the IGT were changed, so that the disadvantageous deck does not lead to an initial gain. 
Overall, it is often mentioned critically that there may be an underestimation of cognitive processes in the 
decision-making process in ambiguous decisions (Dunn, et al., 2006; Maia & McClelland, 2004). However, 
regarding the model of Bechara and colleagues (1997) cognitive processes are postulated to be involved. Studies 
investigating such an involvement are discussed in chapter 3.2.2.1.  
At this point it should be summarized, that the given data adumbrate a clear pattern of the involvement 
of affective processes in decision making under ambiguity. Although, the involvement of somatic markers in 
decision making under ambiguity still appears to be unclear and leaves space for other explanations. The next 
section will discuss their involvement in decision making under risk. 
3.1.2.2 The role of affective processes in decision making under risk 
Affective processes associated with somatic markers are postulated to be involved in decision making under 
risk, too (c.f. Brand et al.’s decision-making model in Figure 2). Studies investigating the underlying affective 
processes in decision making under risk mostly used the GDT (for a brief description of this task see Table 1. 
Only one study, analyzing affective processing in terms of feedback processing, used the BART (Euser, Meel, 
Snelleman, & Franken, 2011; for a brief description of the BART see Table 1 ) and will also be shortly 
presented. However, the involvement of brain regions associated with affective processing (e.g., the 
vmPFC/OFC) was also found for the CGT (Clark et al., 2008) and the PAG-task (Bonatti, et al., 2008) as will be 
addressed in detail in section 3.3 (for a brief description of the CGT and PAG-task see Table 1). In the current 
section, only studies are summarized which explicitly examined underlying affective processes of decision 
making under risk.  
Studies scrutinizing the potential role of somatic markers (in terms of SCRs) in decision making under 
risk using the GDT revealed heterogeneous findings. Brand, Grabenhorst, and colleagues (2007) found 
diminished decision-making performance in patients suffering from Urbach-Wiethe disease (associated with 
impairments of the amygdala) in comparison with a healthy control group, i.e., participants without psychiatric 
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or neurological impairments. Moreover, the authors showed that SCRs were reduced in the patient group 
compared with the control group, especially before (anticipatory SCRs) and after (feedback SCRs) a high-risk 
decision was made. Within the control group SCRs were higher before and after a high-risk decision than before 
and after a low-risk decision (Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007). However, after correction for multiple 
comparisons the differences for anticipatory SCRs failed to reach significance, indicating a clearer pattern for 
feedback SCRs (differences survived the correction for multiple comparisons) than for anticipatory SCRs in the 
GDT. This appears to be in contrast to the IGT, in which the feedback and the anticipatory SCRs indicated a 
similar pattern: Higher SCRs before and after disadvantageous decisions than before and after advantageous 
decisions (even after correction for multiple comparisons). Brand, Grabenhorst, and colleagues (2007) argued 
that this displays the different role of feedback in each task: In the IGT the use of feedback appears to be 
especially involved in finding out how to make an upcoming advantageous decision. In contrast, in the GDT the 
feedback seems rather to be used, in order to evaluate whether the current strategy of decision making is 
advantageous than to influence an upcoming decision. Varied feedback SCRs were also found in two other 
studies measuring SCRs during GDT performance (Euteneuer et al., 2009; Starcke, et al., 2009). Euteneuer and 
colleagues (2009) found reduced SCRs after losses, but not after gains in Parkinson patients as compared with 
healthy control participants. Additionally, the patient group chose disadvantageous/high-risk decisions more 
often than the control group. In contrast, patients suffering from compulsive disorder did not show diminished 
decision-making performance (Starcke, et al., 2009). However, SCR analyses across both groups (patients 
suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder and healthy control participants) demonstrated a comparable 
pattern to that found in control participants in the study by Brand, Grabenhorst, and colleagues (2007): Higher 
feedback SCRs after high-risk decisions than after low-risk decisions. Comparable findings were found in a 
study using the BART and an electroencephalogram (EEG) to measure event-related brain potentials (ERPs) 
associated with feedback processing in decision making under risk (Euser, et al., 2011). The authors were 
interested whether or not alcohol affects the neural mechanisms of feedback processing and outcome evaluation 
during risky decision making. Therefore, one group received a moderate dose of alcohol (0.65g/kg alcohol) 
while the other group received a non-alcoholic placebo beverage. Euser and colleagues (2011) assumed that 
drunken participants revealed a hyposensitivity to negative feedback with reduced ERPs leading to risky 
decision making. In order to measure the ERPs, electrodes were placed at the fronto-central region of the 
participants’ head during the performance of the BART. Results revealed that alcohol consumption does not 
impair the ability of feedback evaluation but the integration of feedback, in particular negative feedback (i.e., 
loss). This was indicated by a reduction of feedback-related amplitude (P300). This amplitude (P300) is 
associated with later, more elaborated appraisal of outcome evaluation. In contrast, the feedback-related 
negativity reflects an early, rapid evaluation of the affective outcome and is associated with larger amplitudes 
after negative feedback than for positive feedback (c.f. Euser, et al., 2011). This finding is in line with the 
assumption of Brand, Grabenhorst, and colleagues (2007) that in decision making under risk feedback 
processing may be more essential in the evaluation process. Overall, the represented studies demonstrate the 
involvement of SCRs or ERPs (both associated with feedback processing) in decision making under risk which 
is associated with somatic markers. However, the engagement of the somatic markers seems to be at another 
moment in the decision-making process than in decisions under ambiguity: They may be more involved in 
feedback evaluation processes than in anticipated processes of an upcoming decision. 
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Further studies investigated the involvement of affective processes in decisions under risk in different 
patient groups each associated with impairments to frontal brain regions (e.g., the vmPFC). At the first glance, 
the findings appear to be inconsistent: The first group of studies found relationships between affective 
processing in terms of impairments in utilization of (affective) feedback and diminished decision-making 
performance, for example, in patients suffering from pathological gambling (Brand, Kalbe, et al., 2005; 
Labudda, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2007), Korsakoff’s syndrome (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; Brand et 
al., 2009), borderline personality disorder (Svaldi, Philipsen, & Matthies, 2012) and Parkinson’s disease (Brand 
et al., 2004). In contrast, the second group of studies did not find such impairments, for example, in patients 
suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder (Starcke, et al., 2009), bulimia (Van den Eynde et al., 2011), 
temporal lobe epilepsy (Labudda et al., 2009), and schizophrenia (Fond et al., 2012). However, the difference 
between those two groups of studies is the fact that patients of the first group, who demonstrated impaired 
utilization of the feedback, additionally demonstrated impaired cognitive functions. On the contrary, the patients 
of the second group of studies performed all well on cognitive tests. Those findings in combination with the 
findings concerning feedback processing suggest that deficits in feedback processing may be compensated by 
cognitive processing, explaining the inconsistent pattern of findings mentioned above. To some extent such 
cognitive compensation was also found in a subgroup analysis in the study by Brand and colleagues (2004): On 
a descriptive level the analysis revealed that patients with cognitive dysfunctions (i.e., executive dysfunctions; 
for more information about executive functions see chapters 3.2) but unimpaired feedback processing, choose 
the disadvantageous decisions more often than patients with disturbed feedback processing but unimpaired 
cognitive functions. However, those who had impairments in both, cognitive functions and feedback processing, 
showed the worst decision-making performance. This suggests that cognitive dysfunctions seem to lead to more 
inferior decision-making performance than disturbed feedback processing, but that an impairment of both is 
even worse. In line with this assumption are further findings of the research group of Brand and colleagues 
(Brand, 2008; Brand, Laier, et al., 2009): They investigated the influence of a disrupted (affective) feedback 
route on decision making under risk. Therefore, the research group invented a modified version of the GDT, in 
which the feedback is withheld and compared the performance in this task with the decision-making 
performance in the original version of the GDT. While the first study (Brand, 2008) demonstrated that decision-
making performance is diminished when the (affective) feedback route is disturbed (i.e., missing feedback in the 
GDT), the second study (Brand, Laier, et al., 2009) revealed that cognitive functions such as cognitive 
intelligence and strategy application moderate this effect: Participants with superior cognitive functions 
performed the GDT without feedback as well as participants who received feedback in the GDT, while 
participants with less superior cognitive functions displayed impaired decision making. A recent study aimed to 
investigate the underlying processes of GDT performance (Schiebener, Zamarian, Delazer, & Brand, 2011) and 
to give further information about the constitution of the (affective) feedback route in decision making under risk. 
Among other results, which are discussed in section 3.2.2.2, Schiebener and colleagues (2011) found in their 
second experiment that implicit learning from feedback, measured by the first 40 trials in the IGT, seemed to be 
involved in GDT performance. However, it explained less variance of the GDT performance than executive 
functions did (for more information of executive functions and their role in decision making see section 3.2 and 
3.2.2.2) in their first experiment. The authors pointed out that this is another hint in the direction that (affective) 
feedback processing in the GDT appears to have an executive component; probably because it is used to 
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evaluate whether the current decision behavior or strategy is efficient or not as was assumed by Brand, 
Grabenhorst, and colleagues (2007) before (see also the discussion in Brand, Heinze, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 
2008). However, for individuals with impaired cognitive abilities, to whom the contingencies of the task are not 
that clear, the feedback is essential to learn the rules (Brand, 2008; Brand, Laier, et al., 2009).  
Overall, the results of the studies emphasize that affective processing is also involved in decision 
making under risk. In contrast to decision making under ambiguity, in which the affective processes in terms of 
somatic markers are essential for anticipatory processes of a decision, in decision making under risk somatic 
markers seem to be more involved in evaluative feedback processes. That means, in decisions under ambiguity 
somatic markers are involved in the guidance of a decision. In contrast, in decisions under risk they are involved 
in for example, the evaluation of a certain decision strategy whether it leads to advantageous decisions or not 
(for more information about decision strategies see Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008). So far, it was already pointed 
out repeatedly that cognitive processes are involved in decision making under risk but also under ambiguity and 
appear to interact with affective processes. Hence, the next section will go into detail on underlying cognitive 
processes in decision making, in particular on executive functions. 
3.2 Cognitive processes in decision making with a focus on executive functions and working memory 
The decision making models of ambiguity and risk postulate the involvement of several cognitive processes 
such as working memory, executive functions, reasoning, and the application of decision strategies (see section 
3, Figure 1 and Figure 2). Due to the fact that the majority of studies examined the role of working memory and 
executive functions in decision making under ambiguity and risk, the following sections will focus on these 
functions in particular.  
Working memory is described as a platform where information is maintained and/or manipulated (e.g., 
Baddeley, 2003; Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996). It provides an important link between perception and controlled 
action (Baddeley, 1998b). In contrast, the “concept of executive functions still awaits a formal definition” 
(Jurado & Rosselli, 2007, p. 213). On one hand there is a collective understanding that executive functions adapt 
humans action and cognition to changing situations in order to demonstrate goal-directed behavior (e.g., Alvarez 
& Emory, 2006; Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008; Collette et al., 2005; Hobson & Leeds, 2001; Jurado 
& Rosselli, 2007; Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). On the other hand, there is 
still a debate on the exact definition of executive functions (Eslinger, Lyon, & Krasnegor, 1996; Stuss & 
Alexander, 2000). Moreover, it is still unclear whether they are organized as one united executive function or as 
diverse executive functions: Some researchers assumed a unitary approach (Barkley, 1997; Pennington, 
Bennetto, McAleer, & Roberts, 1996) with inhibition and working memory as underlying mechanism, while 
others suggested a non-unitary approach with various distinguishable executive functions (e.g., Alvarez & 
Emory, 2006; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Lehto, 1996; Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 2003; Stuss & Alexander, 
2000). A combination of both is suggested by Miyake and colleagues (2000). They assumed that there are 
clearly distinguishable executive functions that share some underlying commonality.  
In order, to get a better understanding of executive functions and the connection with working memory, 
the following four popular approaches or rather conceptions of executive functions will be summarized. 
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Thereafter, the potential role of executive functions and working memory in decision making under ambiguity 
and risk will be discussed (see section 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2).  
The supervisory attentional system (SAS) model by Norman and Shallice (Norman & Shallice, 1986; 
Shallice & Burgess, 1991a, 1991b) postulates two systems that are responsible for different processes. It is 
suggested that the contention scheduling (CS) system is involved in demanding but routine actions (e.g., 
dropping of the kid at the kindergarten before driving to work). It is assumed that situational influences trigger 
more than one schedule of action and that the CS-system is responsible for the selection of one proper schedule 
that is activated automatically (e.g., at first driving to the kindergarten, dropping of the kid and afterward, 
driving to the office and start working). In contrast, the SAS is suggested to be involved in non-routinized 
situations (e.g., the kid is ill). In this kind of situations, it is assumed that this system evaluates the current 
schedule and adapts it to the changed circumstances (e.g., the parent need to reschedule the daily plan, by 
driving to the doctor and cancel work or find a babysitter). In subsequent versions of the SAS-model the 
generation and selection of strategies as well as the evaluation and monitoring of actions are described as the 
important processes of the SAS (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; c.f. Drechsler, 2007; Shallice, 2002).  
A second model often described in the literature of executive functions is the working memory model, 
first suggested by Baddeley and Hitch (1974). In this model, working memory is understood as a limited 
capacity system, temporarily maintaining, and storing information. It is assumed that it moreover allows the 
manipulation of stored information by providing a link between perception, long term memory, and action 
(Baddeley, 1998b, 2003; Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996). Furthermore, it is suggested that it facilitates complex 
tasks such as reasoning, comprehension, and learning (Baddeley, 2003, 2010). The advanced version of the 
working memory model (see Figure 5), the multicomponent model, comprises four specific functional 
components and was advanced in order to specify the proposed control mechanisms (SAS-system) by Norman 
and Shallice (1986). The first component is the phonological loop that is assumed to enable language acquisition 
in two ways: First, the phonological store holds representations of phoneme sequences for a few seconds before 
they fade. Second, the articulatory system facilitates learning by rehearsal and thereby refreshing the phoneme 
sequences in the store (Baddeley, 2003, 2010). The second component the visuo-spatial sketchpad is suggested 
to be important in evolving semantic knowledge about the appearance and utilization of objects. However, it is 
limited in capacity to about three or four objects. Moreover,, it is postulated that it is crucial for spatial 
orientation and geographical knowledge (Baddeley, 2003, 2010). The third functional component is the central 
executive that is assumed to be an attentional control instance. Hereby, it is backed up by the other two sub-
systems, which are therefore also called slave systems (Baddeley, 1998b). The later added episodic buffer 
(fourth component) is seen as a temporary store of the central executive, which has a limited capacity. It is 
suggested to be multi-dimensional coded and therefore can integrate different systems (e.g., phonological loop, 
visuo-spatial sketchpad and long-term memory), and combine the information (Baddeley, 2003, 2010). In this 
model the central executive is assumed as one system, but Baddeley and colleagues suggested that it may 
contain various subcomponents (Baddeley, 1996, 2003; Baddeley & Logie, 1999): the coordination of more than 
one task, switching between strategies, selective attention to one stimuli, inhibition of the irrelevant ones, and 
holding and manipulating information in long-term memory (Baddeley, 1996). Studies demonstrating 
dissociation in performance among various executive tasks are in line with this assumption (e.g., Burgess, 
Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998; Godefroy, Cabaret, Petit-Chenal, Pruvo, & Rousseaux, 1999). 
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Moreover, Miyake and colleagues demonstrated that the intercorrelations among different executive tasks of 
different studies are low (r = .40 or less) and often not statistically significant (see Miyake, et al., 2000, p. 52). 
This is a further support for the assumption that executive functions may be fractionated. 
 
Figure 5 The multicomponent working memory model adapted from Baddeley (2003, 2010).  
 
Therefore, E. E. Smith and Jonides (1999) as well as Miyake and colleagues (2000) investigated the 
fractionation of the central executive. E. E. Smith and Jonides (1999) postulated a fractionation of the central 
executive into five subcomponents. After reviewing neuroimaging studies that used different executive tasks, 
the authors assumed following five subfunctions: Attention and inhibition that is understood as the ability to 
focus attention to relevant stimuli, information, or processes while inhibiting irrelevant ones; Task management 
that encompasses the scheduling of processes in complex tasks, for example, flexibly shifting the attention 
between two component-tasks in order to work serially on them; Planning that describes the ability to 
coordinate a sequence of subtasks in order to achieve a certain goal; Monitoring that involves the evaluation and 
the updating of the current working memory content in order to keep track of the next steps in a sequential task. 
Finally, encoding new information into working memory and link this information with the place and time of 
appearance, describes the fifth executive function named coding. The authors assumed that task management as 
well as attention and inhibition are the rudimentary functions involved in all cognitive processes.  
In contrast, Miyake and colleagues (2000) focused on three basic executive functions (see also Miyake 
& Friedman, 2012): Firstly, shifting that is understood as the ability to switch back and forth between tasks, 
mental sets, and cognitive operations (Monsell, 1996). Secondly, updating that outlines the appropriate revising 
of information maintained in working memory, by replacing no longer relevant contents with new ones (Morris 
& Jones, 1990); Thirdly, inhibition that is understood as the conscious suppression of automatic and dominant 
actions. Each function was operationalized by three different tasks, known to tap into the respective executive 
function. The aim of the study was to investigate the separation of those three functions. Therefore, a large 
sample of healthy participants was asked to perform nine executive tasks (three of them tap into one executive 
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function) as well as four complex tasks (encompassing multiple executive functions). Miyake and colleagues 
(2000) computed a confirmatory factor analysis and a structural equation model and compared multiple possible 
models (e.g., all three executive functions represent one latent dimension, two executive functions but not the 
third function share one latent dimension, and each executive function is independently from each other) with 
the full postulated model (i.e., three latent variables, each representing one of the three executive functions, 
correlating with each other). The authors found that the full model fitted the data best compared with the other 
models. This indicated that the three executive functions are separable from each other, but share some 
underlying commonality. However, Miyake and colleagues (2000) pointed out that those three executive 
functions are rather basically and it is assumable that there are more higher-level executive functions, for 
example, the complex concept planning, which should be investigated. 
In summary, different approaches of executive functions exist. Some of them are more generally 
(Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice & Burgess, 1991a, 1991b) assuming a fuzzy control instance, while others 
are more specific and describe exact executive subfunctions (Miyake, et al., 2000; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1999) 
or at least suggest the existence of several subcomponents of the central executive (Baddeley, 1996, 2003; 
Baddeley & Logie, 1999). However, these approaches are not contradictory, but rather reflect a broad concept of 
executive functions and working memory: There seems to be a central executive that supervises human behavior 
and can be fractionated into several subcomponents. Over the years a large number of various tasks have been 
developed to measure the diverse components of executive functioning. Some often used measures are: the 
Wisconsin Task Sorting Test (WCST; Berg, 1948) or the modified version of it (MCST; Nelson, 1976; see also 
sections 5.3.2.3 and 6.3.2.2 for a detailed description ), measuring set shifting, categorization, rule detection, and 
cognitive flexibility; the Color Word Interference Test (also known as Stroop Test; Bäumler, 1985; Stroop, 
1935) which measures inhibition/interference control and processing speed; modified versions of the n-back task 
mostly applied to measure updating working memory contents, but this task requires also inhibition of false 
reactions (Conway et al., 2005; Owen, McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005; see also section 5.3.2.2 for a 
description of a 2-back task); the digit span test which is a subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale (Härting et al., 
2000) and measures short term memory (forward span) and working memory (backward span); the Go/No-Go 
task (Mesulam, 1985) measuring attention, inhibition, categorization, and reaction speed (for an overview see 
Jurado & Rosselli, 2007); the Trail Making Test (TMT) part A and B, whereby part A measures processing 
speed and part B cognitive flexibility/set shifting; and the Tower of London (TOL) or the Tower of Hanoi 
(TOH) measuring planning abilities (for a description of the last two tasks see Lezak, et al., 2004; Strauss, 
Sherman, & Spreen, 2006). These tasks were used, among others, in studies investigating executive functions 
and working memory. Moreover, they are used in order to analyze the associated neural correlates of executive 
functions and working memory. The following section will now give an overview about those studies. 
3.2.1 Neural correlates of executive functions and working memory 
It is generally accepted that executive functions and working memory are associated with frontal lobes (Burgess 
& Shallice, 1996; Cabeza, Dolcos, Graham, & Nyberg, 2002; Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Müller & Knight, 2006; 
Owen, Downes, Sahakian, Polkey, & Robbins, 1990; Shallice, 1982; Stuss & Benson, 1984). Especially studies 
with patients suffering from lesions in prefrontal areas demonstrated impairments in functions associated with 
the SAS (Shallice, 1982; Shallice & Burgess, 1991a, 1991b). However, over the years research revealed that 
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different brain areas are involved in working memory and executive functions (for detailed reviews about neural 
correlates of working memory and executive functions see Baddeley, 2003; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Royall et 
al., 2002; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1997).  
Based on the working memory model of Baddeley and Hitch (1974) and its further development 
(Baddeley, 2003, 2010), it was found that the phonological loop is more associated with the left hemisphere and 
the tempoparietal region while the visuo-spatial sketchpad is associated with both sides: on the right with the 
occipital and inferior frontal region during spatial processing and on the left side with the inferotemporal regions 
during object processing (E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1997; E. E. Smith, Jonides, & Koeppe, 1996; E. E. Smith et 
al., 1995). Concerning the central executive there seems to be an allocation between the buffering component 
(i.e., encoding and retrieval of information into working memory; c.f. Baddeley, 2000) and the executive 
component (which maintains and processes the information; c.f. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974): The buffering 
component is associated with posterior parietal regions and the executive component is associated with 
prefrontal regions (Awh et al., 1996; J. D. Cohen et al., 1997; Gathercole, 1994; Paulesu, Frith, & Frackowiak, 
1993). Besides those brain regions several studies found other specific brain regions to be involved in certain 
working memory processes: Studies using fMRI (see section 4.3.4 for detailed information) and EEG (for 
measuring ERPs) in patients and healthy control samples demonstrated the general involvement of the basal 
ganglia in conjunction with the PFC in filtering irrelevant information (Baier et al., 2010; McNab & Klingberg, 
2008; Voytek & Knight, 2010); whereby in particular the basal ganglia seem to be responsible for hindering 
irrelevant information to enter working memory, while prefrontal regions are engaged in maintaining 
information available (Baier, et al., 2010). Thus, it is reasonable that the conjunction of both regions is relevant 
in working memory capacity (McNab & Klingberg, 2008). Regarding the association of prefrontal regions with 
working memory, the meta-analyses of Wager and Smith (2003) revealed a detailed allocation of prefrontal 
regions: Superior prefrontal regions seem to be more involved in maintaining the information over a certain 
timeframe, while ventral prefrontal regions may be more activated during manipulation of information. 
Moreover, Cools, Gibbs, Miyakawa, Jagust, and D’Esposito (2008) demonstrated that besides the general 
involvement of the basal ganglia, in particular the striatum (composed of caudate nucleus and putamen), appears 
to be involved in working memory capacity. The authors found that subjects with high working memory 
capacity have a high dopamine synthesis in the striatum, whereas low dopamine synthesis was found in subjects 
with low working memory capacity. The involvement of the cerebellum in working memory processes was also 
demonstrated (Hautzel, Mottaghy, Specht, Müller, & Krause, 2009; Thürling et al., 2012). Using a 7-Tesla (T) 
fMRI system Thürling and colleagues (2012) supported the findings by Hautzel and colleagues (2009) that the 
cerebellum is not only activated in the phonological loop as was suggested before (E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1997; 
E. E. Smith, et al., 1996) but also in processes of the central executive. Further research groups revealed the 
involvement of the hippocampus, which establishes semantic associations by binding multiple information 
(Henke, Weber, Kneifel, Wieser, & Buck, 1999; K. J. Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, & D’Esposito, 2000; Schacter & 
Wagner, 1999). Some studies found also the amygdala to be integrated in working memory processes (Schaefer 
et al., 2006; Schaefer & Gray, 2007). However, a recent study found that paradoxically damage of the amygdala 
leads to better working memory capacity (Morgan, Terburg, Thornton, Stein, & Van Honk, 2012), questioning 
the possible role of the amygdala in working memory.  
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Besides studies investigating the underlying neural correlates of working memory in general, there are 
also studies examining the brain regions activated during certain subcomponents of the executive functions. 
Commonly the dlPFC is associated with executive functions (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Cummings, 1995; 
Royall, et al., 2002; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1997). Additionally it was found to be activated in several 
subfunctions, such as planning (e.g., Lazeron et al., 2000 using the TOL), attentional control (e.g., Kaufmann et 
al., 2005 using the Stroop test), in verbal or non-verbal fluency (Frith, Friston, Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1991; 
Jahanshahi, Dirnberger, Fuller, & Frith, 2000), and in cognitive flexibility (e.g., Lie, Specht, Marshall, & Fink, 
2006; Nagahama et al., 2001 using the WCST); whereby Lie and colleagues (2006) point out that the activity in 
the dlPFC might be related to the executive demand of a task. The subfunction inhibition was found to be 
associated with orbitofrontal regions: Patients with lesions in this area seem to be impaired in inhibition of 
inappropriate behavior (Barkley, 1997; Cummings, 1995). Moreover, studies found the ACC (Lie, et al., 2006) 
as well as subcortical structures, such as the thalamus (Paulesu, et al., 1993) and the dorsal part of the striatum 
(Fassbender et al., 2004; Owen, Doyon, Petrides, & Evans, 1990) to be activated in various subfunctions. The 
ACC as well as the striatum, as part of the basal ganglia, are additionally known to be involved in neural circuits 
connecting frontal, posterior, and subcortical areas (Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986; Collette & Van der 
Linden, 2002), demonstrating the interplay of different brain areas in executive functions (c.f. Alvarez & 
Emory, 2006). 
In summary, it was shown that frontal, as well as parietal, and subcortical regions are differentially 
involved in working memory and executive processes, supporting the multicomponent model by Baddeley 
(2003, 2010). It appears that even though neural networks connecting frontal, parietal, and subcortical areas are 
activated during executive processes, a prominent role belongs to the dlPFC. The following sections will now 
present studies examining the role of cognitive processes, in particular working memory and executive functions 
in decision making. 
3.2.2 Underlying cognitive processes in decision making 
Cognitive processes are postulated to be involved in decision making under ambiguity and risk (see section 3, 
Figure 1 and Figure 2). However, the role of cognitive processes seems to differ between both kinds of decision 
making. In decision making under ambiguity a close connection with affective processes is suggested: Somatic 
markers are assumed to reinforce the activation of working memory and attention, which facilitates the 
preselection of information, leading to a representation of only profitable options for decision making (Bechara 
& Damasio, 2005). In contrast, Brand and colleagues (2006) assumed that even though affective and cognitive 
processes might interact in decisions under risk, an advantageous decision can also be made by relying solely on 
cognitive processes. Over the years of research many studies were conducted to investigate the potential role of 
working memory, executive functions, and further cognitive processes in both kinds of decision making. The 
following sections will summarize the findings (decisions under ambiguity: section 3.1.2.1, decisions under risk: 
section 3.1.2.2).  
3.2.2.1 The role of cognitive processes in decision making under ambiguity 
In order to determine the role of working memory in decision making under ambiguity, Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, and Anderson (1998) compared the performance in working memory tests (two kinds of delayed tasks) 
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as well as in the IGT (for a brief description of this task see Table 1) between patients with lesions in the dlPFC 
(a brain region which is associated with working memory functions, see section 3.2.1) and patients with lesions 
in the vmPFC (a brain region which is especially associated with decision making under ambiguity, see sections 
3.1.2 and 3.3). The results revealed an asymmetrical relationship between working memory and decisions under 
ambiguity: For the performance of working memory it is negligible whether or not the subjects have 
impairments in decision making; but decision-making performance is negatively influenced by impairments in 
working memory. Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney (2002) supported the assumption that working memory is 
involved in decision making under ambiguity: They demonstrated that the performance of the IGT diminished 
under additionally working memory load (see also chapter 3.4.1.4.1 for detailed information and other dual-
tasking studies) and that anticipatory SCRs were only developed in non-load conditions. However, according to 
Baddeley and colleagues (2003) working memory is a multicomponent system (c.f. section 3.2) and thus it 
stayed unclear which aspects of working memory may have been involved in IGT performance: The load task 
used by Hinson and colleagues (2002) consisted of remembering a mixed sequence of digits while making a 
decision. This task could have used resources of the central executive and therefore led to diminished decision-
making performance. Otherwise, it could have occupied the phonological loop due to the rehearsing of the digits 
(Jameson, Hinson, & Whitney, 2004). To estimate whether all or a part of the working memory load was due to 
the disruption of the phonological loop, Jameson and colleagues (2004) used in addition to the digit maintaining 
task an articulatory suppression task. In this task participants had to say the word “the” while making a decision, 
which leads to an occupation of the phonological loop. The authors found that the performance of the IGT was 
only diminished when the digit-maintaining condition was performed in parallel. Consequently, they suggested 
that the cognitive resources required for the IGT affect the central executive and not the phonological loop. A 
study by Bechara and Martin (2004) supported those findings by demonstrating the involvement of working 
memory in the IGT. The authors found again the asymmetry of decision making under ambiguity and working 
memory, as it was suggested by Bechara and colleagues (1998). Beyond these findings, Bechara and Martin 
(2004) assumed that poor working memory capacity influences decision making under ambiguity not because of 
problems with the storage (buffering) processes of working memory but rather with executive processes of 
working memory (see section 3.2 for detailed information of the concept of working memory).  
Findings of studies analyzing the relationship between executive functions and ambiguous decision 
making are heterogeneous: Some studies demonstrated relations between executive functions (e.g., set-shifting 
and inhibition) and IGT performance (e.g., Labudda, et al., 2009; Verdejo-García, Rivas-Pérez, Vilar-López, & 
Pérez-García, 2007), others did not (e.g., Barry & Petry, 2008; Euteneuer, et al., 2009; Sinz, et al., 2008). The 
study by Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst, and Bechara (2007) offers another possible explanation. The authors 
supposed that executive functions become more relevant for advantageous decision making in the IGT when the 
rules of this task become more explicit due to implicit learning (i.e., during the conceptual period, the last 20 
trials of the IGT; c.f. Bechara, et al., 1997). Therefore, they divided the IGT into five separated blocks of 20 
trials and analyzed whether each block correlated differentially with specific executive functions as measured 
with the WCST (e.g., categorization, cognitive flexibility, and set-shifting; for a description of this task see 
sections 5.3.2.3 and 6.3.2.2). Brand, Recknor, and colleagues (2007) found that the last three blocks of the IGT 
correlated positively with the WCST. Moreover, there was a positive relationship between the last three blocks 
and the GDT performance. These findings may implicate that in the last blocks of the IGT the conditions change 
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and approach progressively decision making under risk. In these conditions the rules are well known and 
executive functions are involved (Brand, et al., 2006). In order to enlighten the heterogeneous findings 
concerning the relationship between decision making under ambiguity, executive functions, working memory, 
and cognitive ability, a recent review analyzed several studies in regard to this topic (Toplak, Sorge, Benoit, 
West, & Stanovich, 2010). The authors concluded that although the analyzed studies are heterogeneous about 
the relationship between executive functions, working memory, cognitive ability, and decision making under 
ambiguity, the majority of the analyzed studies reported a non-significant relationship. Furthermore, even the 
reported “significant associations were modest in size with wide confidence intervals” (Toplak, et al., 2010, p. 
577), indicating that the variance of decision-making performance in the IGT is little captured by executive 
functions and working memory. 
Overall, the pattern of the role of executive functions and working memory in decision making under 
ambiguity is not clear: While working memory performance seems to affect decision making, the relationship 
with executive functions lacks of distinctness. However, it seems that executive functions may be less involved 
in decisions under ambiguity but more under risk (Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007; Toplak, et al., 2010). Thus, the 
next section will address the role of executive functions and working memory in decisions under risk. 
3.2.2.2 The role of cognitive processes in decision making under risk 
A great number of studies interested in decision making under risk presented an involvement of working 
memory and executive functions. An overview of exemplarily studies demonstrating relationships between 
decisions under risk and working memory or executive functions will be given in Table 2. Please note that this 
table has no claim of completeness. This table is arranged according to the cognitive functions measured by the 
tests mentioned in the studies and in respect to the decision-making task used. As can be seen in Table 2 various 
studies found support for the assumed positive relationship between working memory and decisions under risk 
(c.f. Brand, et al., 2006). Moreover, the correlations between executive functions and decision making are 
moderate to high and support the assumption that superior executive functions are associated with advantageous 
decision making under risk. This is in contrast to the only modest size of correlations between decision making 
under ambiguity and executive functions found by Toplak and colleagues (2010).   
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Table 2 Correlations between decision-making tasks and working memory or various executive functions. 
Decision-making task Task used to measure 
facets of executive 
functions 
Correlation between 
both tasks 
Study 
Working memory (updating, manipulating, or maintaining of information) 
BART 
 
adjusted average pumps 
(without pumps leading 
to an explosion) 
 
post failure mean 
pumps 
Digit span  
 
total score 
In heavy drinkers: 
 
r = .345, p < .001 
 
 
r = .318, p < .001 
Ashenhurst, Jentsch and 
Ray (2011) 
GDT 
 
high-risk choices (12 
rounds of GDT) 
 
high-risk choices (18 
rounds of GDT) 
2-back task  
 
omissions 
In the control group: 
 
r = -.539, p = .008 
 
 
r = -.718, p ≤ .001 
Drechsler, Rizzo, and 
Steinhausen (2007) 
GDT 
 
 
one single number 
Digit span  
 
 
backwards score 
In patients with TLE: 
 
r = .46, p = .04 
Labudda et al. (2009) 
GDT 
 
net score 
3-back task 
 
percentage of correct 
responses 
In the control group: 
 
r = .47, p = .01 
Schiebener, Wegmann, 
Pawlikowski, and Brand 
(2013) 
GDT 
 
net score 
n-back tasks 
 
percentage of correct 
responses in 1-back and 
2-back task 
In the GDT group: 
 
r = .23, p < .05 
 
Starcke et al. (2011) 
PAG-task 
 
frequency of gambles 
in the low probability 
condition 
Digit span  
 
backwards score 
 
In one subgroup (patients 
with RTLE): 
 
r = -.671, p = .024 
 
Bonatti et al. (2009) 
PAG-task 
 
frequency of strategy 
changes on probability 
decreasing trials 
Digit span  
 
backwards score 
 
In older people: 
 
r = .429, p = .011 
 
Zamarian et al. (2008) 
Attention and inhibition (interference susceptibility/control) 
CGT 
deliberation time 
PASAT 
number of correct 
answers 
In patients with MS: 
r = -.364; p = .002 
Simoni et al. (2012) 
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Decision-making task Task used to measure 
facets of executive 
functions 
Correlation between 
both tasks 
Study 
Attention and inhibition (interference susceptibility/control) 
GDT  
 
 
one single number 
CWIT 
 
 
time needed on the 
interference trial 
In the GDT non-feedback 
group: 
 
ρ = .37, p = .04 
Brand (2008) 
GDT 
 
 
high-risk choices  
CWIT 
 
 
time needed on the 
interference trial 
In patients with BN: 
 
r = .594, p = .042 
Brand, Franke-Sievert, 
Jacoby, Markowitsch, 
and Tuschen-Caffier 
(2007) 
GDT 
 
 
net score 
CWIT 
 
 
time needed on the 
interference trial 
All participants included 
(healthy participants): 
 
ρ = -.376, p < .05 
Brand, Heinze, et al. 
(2008) 
GDT 
 
 
financial outcome (12 
rounds of GDT) 
Continuous performance 
task of the TAP 
 
commission errors 
In patients with ADHD: 
 
 
r = -.49, p = .026 
Drechsler et al. (2007) 
GDT 
 
 
low-risk choices 
HCST 
 
 
errors 
In patients with paranoid 
schizophrenia: 
 
r = -.36, p = .019 
Fond et al. (2012) 
PAG-task 
 
frequency of gambles 
in the low probability 
condition 
Go/No-Go task  
 
number of correct go 
trials 
In the control group: 
 
r = -.475, p < .05 
Bonatti et al. (2008) 
Cognitive flexibility (set-shifting and perseveration tendency) 
BART 
 
adjusted average pumps 
(without pumps leading 
to an explosion) in the 
third block (trial 30-45) 
WCST 
 
non-perseverative 
errors
a
 
 
correct responses 
 
 
 
non-perseverative 
errors
a
 
 
perseverative errors
a
 
 
correct responses 
In patients with AA: 
 
r = .54, p < .05 
 
r = .45, p < .01 
 
 
In the control group: 
 
r = .65, p < .01 
 
 
r = .60, p < .05 
 
r = .61, p < .01 
J. A. Campbell, 
Samartgis, and Crowe 
(2013) 
  
Theoretical background                   Cognitive processes in decision making 43 
 
  
Decision-making task Task used to measure 
facets of executive 
functions 
Correlation between 
both tasks 
Study 
Cognitive flexibility (set-shifting and perseveration tendency) 
GDT 
 
one single number 
MCST 
 
non-perseverative errors 
In the GDT group: 
 
r = .41, p = .023 
Brand (2008) 
GDT 
 
high-risk choices 
TMT B 
 
time needed  
In patients with BN: 
 
r = .572, p = .033 
Brand, Franke-Sievert, et 
al. (2007) 
GDT 
 
high-risk choices 
MCST 
 
correct responses 
 
non-perseverative errors 
In patients with KS: 
 
ρ = -.76, p < .001 
 
ρ = .71, p < .001 
Brand, Fujiwara, et al. 
(2005) 
GDT 
 
 
one single number 
MCST 
 
 
correct responses 
 
non-perseverative errors 
All participants included 
(healthy participants): 
 
ρ = -.315, p < .05 
 
ρ = .319, p < .05 
Brand, Heinze, et al. 
(2008) 
GDT 
 
high-risk choices 
MCST 
 
correct responses 
 
non-perseverative errors 
 
perseverative errors 
In patient with PG: 
 
r = -.515, p = .009 
 
r = .499, p = .011 
 
ρ = .501, p = .011 
Brand, Kalbe, et al. 
(2005) 
GDT 
 
high-risk choices 
MCST 
 
non-perseverative errors 
In patients with PD: 
 
r = .51, p = .021 
Brand et al. (2004) 
GDT  
 
net score 
MCST
 
 
non-perseverative errors 
 
TMT B 
 
 
time needed 
In the GDT group: 
 
r = -.27, p ≤ .05 
 
In the GDT non-feedback 
group: 
 
r = -.37, p ≤ .01 
Brand, Laier, et al. 
(2009) 
GDT 
 
 
 
one single number 
MCST 
 
 
 
perseverative errors
a
 
In patients with KS 
(independent of task 
version): 
 
r = -.33, p = .02 
Brand, Pawlikowski, et 
al. (2009) 
GDT 
 
one single number 
MCST 
 
perseverative errors 
In the control group: 
 
r = .480, p < .05 
Brand, Roth-Bauer, 
Driessen, and 
Markowitsch (2008) 
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Decision-making task Task used to measure 
facets of executive 
functions 
Correlation between 
both tasks 
Study 
Cognitive flexibility (set-shifting and perseveration tendency) 
GDT 
net score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
one single number 
MCST 
 
 
 
categories 
 
non-perseverative errors 
 
perseverative errors 
 
 
Including a subgroup of 
(healthy) participants 
performing the MCST:  
 
r = .21, p ≤ .001 
 
r = -.26, p ≤ .001 
 
r = -.24, p ≤ .001 
 
 
r = -.35, p ≤ .001 
 
r = .38, p ≤ .001 
 
r = .35, p ≤ .001 
Brand and Schiebener 
(2013) 
GDT 
 
frequency of shifts 
between high-risk and 
low-risk choices 
TMT B 
 
time needed 
In patients with AD 
 
r = .697, p = .012 
Delazer, Sinz, Zamarian, 
and Benke (2007) 
GDT 
 
net score 
 
 
 
 
final outcome 
MCST 
 
correct responses 
 
perseverative errors 
 
 
correct responses 
 
non-perseverative errors 
 
perseverative errors 
In patients with PD: 
 
r = .51, p = .018 
 
r = -.50, p = .021 
 
 
r = .56, p = .008 
 
r = -.48, p = .029 
 
r = -.45, p = .042 
Euteneuer et al. (2009) 
GDT 
 
 
low-risk choices 
TMT B 
 
 
time needed 
In patients with paranoid 
schizophrenia: 
 
r = -.434, p = .005 
Fond et al. (2012) 
GDT 
 
net score 
 
one single number 
VLMT 
 
frequency of 
perseverations 
In patients with TLE: 
 
r = -.62, p < .01 
 
r = .48, p = .04 
Labudda et al. (2009) 
GDT 
high-risk choices 
WCST 
categories 
perseverative errors 
In patients with WD: 
r = -.784; p = .002 
r = .718; p = .006 
Ma et al. (2013) 
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Decision-making task Task used to measure 
facets of executive 
functions 
Correlation between 
both tasks 
Study 
Cognitive flexibility (set-shifting and perseveration tendency) 
GDT 
 
 
one single number 
MCST 
 
 
non-perseverative errors 
In the GDT with goal and 
anchor group: 
 
r = .57, p ≤ .001 
Schiebener, Wegmann, 
Pawlikowski, and Brand 
(2012) 
GDT 
 
net score 
 
 
 
one single number 
MCST 
 
non-perseverative errors 
 
 
 
categories 
 
non-perseverative errors 
 
perseverative errors 
 
 
TMT B 
 
time needed 
In healthy participants: 
 
r = -.24, p ≤ .05 
 
 
 
r = -.35, p ≤ .01 
 
r = .38, p ≤ .01 
 
r = .28, p ≤ .05 
 
 
 
 
r = .23, p ≤ .05 
Schiebener et al. (2011) 
GDT 
 
one single number 
MCST 
 
correct responses 
 
non-perseverative errors 
 
 
 
 
correct responses 
 
non-perseverative errors 
In patients with OCD: 
 
r = -.43, p ≤ .05 
 
r = .45, p ≤ .05 
 
 
in the control group: 
 
r = -.47, p ≤ .05 
 
r = .59, p ≤ .05 
Starcke, Tuschen-Caffier, 
Markowitsch, and Brand 
(2010) 
GDT 
 
 
 
net score 
TMT B 
 
 
 
time needed 
In the pooled group 
(patients with BPD and 
control participants): 
 
r = -.358, p = .006 
Svaldi, Philipsen, and 
Matthies (2012) 
PAG-task 
 
 
 
frequency of gambles 
in the low probability 
condition 
WCST 
 
 
 
number of categories 
In the pooled group 
(patients with TLE and 
control participants): 
 
r = -.295, p = .042 
Bonatti et al. (2009) 
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Decision-making task Task used to measure 
facets of executive 
functions 
Correlation between 
both tasks 
Study 
Cognitive flexibility (set-shifting and perseveration tendency) 
PAG-task 
 
frequency of gambles 
in the low probability 
condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
frequency of gambles 
in the high probability 
condition 
TMT B 
 
time needed 
In patients with TBI 
 
r = .599, p < .05 
 
In the control group: 
 
r = .491, p < .05 
 
 
In patients with TBI: 
 
r = -.498, p < .05 
Bonatti et al. (2008) 
PAG-task 
 
frequency of gambles 
in the low probability 
condition 
 
 
 
frequency of gambles 
in the high probability 
condition 
TMT B 
 
time needed 
 
OMO  
 
errors 
 
OMO  
 
errors 
In patients with PD: 
 
r = .473, p = .041 
 
 
 
r = .675, p = .001 
 
In patients with PDD: 
 
r = -.523, p = .026 
Delazer, Sinz, et al. 
(2009) 
PAG-task 
 
frequency of gambles 
in the low probability 
condition 
 
 
 
 
 
frequency of gambles 
in the moderately low 
probability condition 
MCST 
 
categories 
 
non-perseverative errors 
 
perseverative errors 
 
 
 
perseverative errors 
In healthy participants: 
 
r = -.24, p ≤ .05 
 
r = .22, p ≤ .05 
 
r = .30, p ≤ .01 
 
 
 
r = .23, p ≤ .05 
Schiebener et al. (2011) 
PAG-task 
 
frequency of gambles 
in the low probability 
condition 
TMT B 
 
 
time needed 
In older people: 
 
r = -.414, p = .017 
Zamarian et al. (2008) 
CGT 
 
time taken to chose 
 
bet size 
TOL 
 
time to first response  
In patients with HD: 
 
r = .55; p < .01 
 
r = -.59; p < .01 
Watkins et al. (2000) 
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Decision-making task Task used to measure 
facets of executive 
functions 
Correlation between 
both tasks 
Study 
Planning 
GDT 
 
one single number 
TOH 
 
time needed 
 
moves 
In the GDT group: 
 
r = .66, p < .001 
 
r = .49, p = .006 
Brand (2008) 
GDT 
 
net score 
 
 
 
 
one single number 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
one single number 
TOH 
 
time needed 
 
moves 
 
 
time needed 
 
moves 
 
errors 
 
 
 
 
moves 
In patients with OD: 
 
r = -.689, p ≤ .01 
 
r = -.603, p ≤ .01 
 
 
r = .734, p ≤ .01 
 
r = .749, p ≤ .01 
 
r = .494, p ≤ .05 
 
 
In the control group: 
 
r = .643, p ≤ .01 
Brand, Roth-Bauer, et al. 
(2008) 
PAG-task 
 
 
frequency of gambles in 
the low probability 
condition 
 
 
frequency of gambles in 
the high probability 
condition 
FAB 
 
 
subtest of motor 
programming  
 
 
 
subtest of motor 
programming 
 
In patients with mild 
DAT: 
 
r = -.502, p < .05 
 
 
 
 
r = .594, p < .01 
Sinz et al. (2008) 
Note. The MCST and the WCST are both complex executive functions tasks that measure a broad range of executive functions (see e.g., 
Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Miyake, et al., 2000). In this table, it is assigned to cognitive flexibility, the most named executive function in 
relation with WCST/MCST in the papers. Decision making tasks: BART = Balloon Analogue Risk Task; CGT = Cambridge Gamble Task; 
GDT = Game of Dice Task; PAG = Probability-Associated Gambling task. Tasks associated with executive functions: ACT = Auditory 
Consonant Trigram (for a description of this task see Brown, 1958); Cued Go/No-Go task (for a description of this task see Derefinko et al., 
2008); CWIT = Color Word Interference Test; FAB = Frontal Assessment Battery (for a description of this battery see Dubois, Slachevsky, 
Litvan, & Pillon, 2000); HCST = Hayling Sentence Completion Task (for a description see Belleville, Rouleau, & Van der Linden, 2006); 
MCST = Modified Card Sorting Test; OMO = Odd-Man-Out (for a description of this task see Flowers & Robertson, 1985); TAP = Test of 
Attentional Performance (see Zimmermann & Fimm, 2002); TMT B= Trail Making Test part B; TOH = Tower of Hanoi; VLMT = Verbal 
Learning and Memory Test (for a description of this task see Helmstaedter, Lendt, & Lux, 2001); WCST = Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. 
Psychiatric and neurological disorders: AA = alcohol abuse; AD = Alzheimer’s disease ADHD = attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder; 
BED = binge eating disorder; BN = bulimia nervosa; BPD = borderline personality disorder; DAT = dementia of Alzheimer’s type; HD = 
Huntington’s disease; KS = Korsakoff’s syndrome; LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy; MS = multiple sclerosis; PD = Parkinson’s disease; 
PDD = Parkinson’s disease dementia; PG = pathological gambling; RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy; TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy. 
Further abbreviations: n.s. = not significant; at-scores of the MCST data. Note that higher t-scores represent better MCST-performance. 
Besides those studies providing a correlation between decision making under risk and executive 
functions, studies demonstrating that patients suffering from impairments in executive functions (compared with 
healthy control participants) have increased problems in making advantageous decisions, too, support the 
assumption that superior executive functions are important for decisions under risk (e.g., Brand, et al., 2006). 
This was shown for example, in patients with alcohol dependence (e.g., Y.-T. Kim, Sohn, & Jeong, 2011), 
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schizophrenia (Reddy et al., 2014), borderline personality disorder (e.g., Bazanis et al., 2002), Parkinson’s 
disease (e.g., Torta, Castelli, Zibetti, Lopiano, & Geminiani, 2009), binge eating disorder (e.g., Svaldi, Brand, & 
Tuschen-Caffier, 2010), Urbach-Wiehte disease (e.g., Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007), hoarding behavior (e.g., 
Grisham, Norberg, Williams, Certoma, & Kadib, 2010), mild cognitive impairment (e.g., Zamarian, Weiss, & 
Delazer, 2010), and in patients using cannabis (e.g., Grant, Chamberlain, Schreiber, & Odlaug, 2012) or 
suffering from sleep deprivation (e.g., Ståhle et al., 2011).  
Although the pattern of involvement of executive functions and working memory in decision making 
under risk appears to be more clear than in decisions under ambiguity, there are also studies which did not find 
such a relationship (e.g., Bogg, Fukunaga, Finn, & Brown, 2012; Fishbein et al., 2005; Matthies, Philipsen, & 
Svaldi, 2012; Passetti, Clark, Mehta, Joyce, & King, 2008; Roiser et al., 2009; Wu, Liu, Hallett, Zheng, & Chan, 
2013). Some of these studies argue that no relationship was found because the patient group investigated, 
appears to have affective dysfunctions rather than executive ones, which supports again the assumption of the 
involvement of cognitive and affective processes in decision making under risk: For example, Fishbein and 
colleagues (2005) found impaired decision making, as measured with the CGT (for a brief description of the 
task see Table 1), in drug abusers, although no impairments on executive tasks were obvious. The authors 
argued that the additional changes in affect-regulation, which were found during decision making (i.e., lower 
increase in SCRs), appear to be associated with risky decisions. Similar, Pacetti and colleagues (2008) 
investigated opiate dependent people demonstrating impairments in the CGT and IGT (for a brief description of 
these tasks see Table 1) but not in executive measurements. The authors discussed those findings relying on the 
fact that both decision-making tasks are more associated with the OFC (neural correlates of decision making are 
discussed in section 3.3), an area also known to be involved in breakdown of self-control processes in drug 
abusers (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002) and affective processing (see section 3.1.1). Roiser and colleagues (2009) 
investigated cognitive functions in patients with bulimia nervosa. They divided the cognitive functions in rather 
hot (affective-dependent) functions involved in the CGT and rather cold (affective-independent) functions, for 
example, planning and working memory. The authors revealed that patients with bulimia nervosa had 
impairments in hot but not in cold cognitive functions. To these findings and assumptions that affective 
processes in decision making seem to be impaired resulting in inferior decision-making performance, matches 
also the study by Wu and colleagues (2013). They demonstrated no impairments on the GDT (for a brief 
description of this task see Table 1) in patients with bulimia nervosa and binge eating disorder, but in executive 
functions such as motor inhibition. Wu and colleagues (2013) argued that these patients did not show impaired 
decision making because of their higher sensitivity to punishment (negative affective feedback).  
On the contrary, other studies that did not find a relationship between executive functions and decision 
making under risk provide other cognitive functions to be involved. For example, Bogg and colleagues (2012) 
investigated “cognitive control via reward-seeking medial prefrontal cortex activity as a common neuro-
functional marker of excessive alcohol consumption, trait inhibition, and reduced cognitive capacity” (Bogg, et 
al., 2012, p. 116). The authors used the BART (for a brief description of this task see Table 1) to operationalize 
reward-seeking during fMRI, the sensation seeking scale (Zuckerman, 1979) to measure trait inhibition, and a 
working memory and intelligence task to measure cognitive capacity. They found that increased alcohol 
consumption in young adults, accompanied by increased disinhibition and decreased logical reasoning but not 
lower working memory, leads to down-regulation of cognitive control via the medial prefrontal cortex during 
reward-seeking choices, in case the probability of a loss increases. Using the GDT Matthies and colleagues 
(2012) did not find a relationship between decision making and executive functions in patients with ADHD. 
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However, they revealed that patients, who chose more often the high-risk options in the GDT, also had impaired 
strategy application and were not able to learn from feedback.  
The involvement of further cognitive processes in decisions under risk, such as logical reasoning and 
the application of cognitive strategies was also found in various other studies (Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008; 
Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; Deakin, Aitken, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2004). Brand, Heinze, and colleagues (2008) 
were interested in the question whether participants who apply calculative decision strategies perform the GDT 
superior to participants applying intuitive decision strategies. The authors found that subjects, who pursued 
calculative strategies, chose the low-risk options more often in that task. In contrast, subjects who decided more 
intuitively chose the disadvantageous options more frequently. Moreover, intuitive deciders switched between 
the high-risk and low-risk options more often compared with deciders applying a calculative strategy. Thus, 
Brand, Heinze, and colleagues concluded that subjects who already have calculated which options are the 
advantageous ones do not need to try each option in order to learn from feedback which options are the low-risk 
options. Additionally, the authors found that applying calculative strategies was associated with executive 
functions, supporting their important role in decision making under risk and their connections with other 
cognitive functions. In the study by Brand, Laier, and colleagues (2009) the important role of cognitive 
strategies but also of logical reasoning for advantageous decision making was again found. In this study the 
original GDT and a GDT without feedback was administered. In this modified version participants had to decide 
without the opportunity to learn from feedback. Comparing the performance of the two tasks Brand, Laier, and 
colleagues (2009) found that subjects decided more advantageously in the original version of the GDT, which 
provides feedback. However, subjects with superior logical reasoning abilities and subjects who applied 
calculative strategies still demonstrated superior decision-making performance even though no feedback was 
provided. Those findings emphasize the superior role of cognitive abilities compared with feedback processing 
in risky decision making: Even though both routes (cognitive and affective) are involved in the decision-making 
process (Brand, 2008; Brand, et al., 2006), the cognitive route is able to compensate the missing or impaired 
(affective) feedback route.  
A further interesting finding was that different cognitive functions may compensate each other in order 
to provide superior decision-making performance. This means that participants with impairments of one 
cognitive function may still be able to decide advantageously as long as other important cognitive functions 
remain intact (Schiebener, et al., 2011). Schiebener and colleagues (2011) found that besides superior executive 
functions, both logical thinking and probability processing abilities (as measured in the PAG-task, for a brief 
description of this task see Table 1) led to advantageous decision-making performance. Furthermore, in a 
moderated regression analysis it was demonstrated that if two cognitive functions (e.g., executive functions and 
probability processing or logical thinking and probability processing) were low, participants chose the high-risk 
options more often. In contrast, if one cognitive function was still high, participants chose advantageously. 
Thus, the authors assumed that “impairments in only one component […] are likely to be compensated and to be 
evident in performance in the GDT” (Schiebener, et al., 2011, p. 14). 
Moreover, cognitive functions in particular executive functions seem to be capable of compensating 
negative external influences such as goal setting and anchors (Schiebener, et al., 2012). Schiebener and 
colleagues (2012) investigated the possible influences of anchor effects (e.g., comparison values of possible but 
improbably high final outcomes) and self-set goals (i.e., participants had to set final outcome goals before
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performing the GDT) on decision-making performance in the GDT. The authors found that those anchors 
caused riskier decision making, but that only high self-set goals correlated negatively with decision making (for 
a detailed information about the influence of self-set goals on decision making under risk please be referred to 
Schiebener, Wegmann, Pawlikowski, & Brand, 2014). Furthermore, Schiebener and colleagues (2012) showed 
that participants with superior executive functions, who strived for goals, were less impaired by external anchors 
than participants with low executive functions. Those findings imply that it depends on the cognitive abilities (in 
particular executive functions) whether situational influences affect decision making under risk. This applies 
also for positive situational influences like explicit and factual advice (Schiebener, Wegmann, Pawlikowski, & 
Brand, 2013). In the study by Schiebener and colleagues (2013) participants had the opportunity to purchase one 
of four different advices before performing the GDT: getting expanded information about the GDT, obtain 
information about the probabilities associated with each alternative, receiving advice about the advantageous 
options, or acquire two test trials of the GDT. The authors found that those advices itself supported decision 
making advantageously. However, it depended on the cognitive abilities whether such advice was needed: 
Participants with high executive functions and working memory abilities did not need advice to decide 
advantageously, but in participants with low executive functions and working memory abilities advice improved 
decision-making performance.  
Overall, the studies emphasize the important role of executive functions, working memory, and further 
cognitive abilities in decision making under risk. In particular, it seems that executive functions are connected to 
various cognitive abilities with which they work in concert or compensate each other in order to enable the 
subject to decide advantageously. Compared with decisions under ambiguity the essential involvement of 
executive functions in decision making under risk seems to be clearer and less doubtable (c.f. section 3.2.2.1). 
So far, the chapters gave an overview about the underlying affective and cognitive processes in decision making 
under ambiguity and risk as postulated in the decision-making models (c.f. section 3, Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
The following section will summarize neuroimaging studies investigating the underlying neural correlates of 
decision making.  
3.3 Neural correlates of decision making 
Affective and cognitive processes, which are associated with various different brain regions (c.f. sections 3.1.1 
and 3.2.1 for brain regions involved in affective and cognitive processing and also section 3.1.2 for brain regions 
associated with the origin of somatic markers), are involved in decision making under ambiguity and risk. Thus, 
it is assumable and in line with lesion studies mentioned in several sections before (see sections 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.2, 
3.2.2.1, and 3.2.2.2) that these brain regions are, at least in parts, also involved in decision making under 
ambiguity and risk. In the following exemplarily neuroimaging studies investigating activated brain regions 
during decision-making performance in healthy participants are discussed.  
Investigating the neural correlates of decision making under ambiguity Ernst and colleagues (2002) 
used positron emission tomography (PET) with 
15
O-labeled water in male and female healthy participants 
during IGT performance (see Table 1 for a detailed description of this task). PET provides three-dimensional 
images of brain activation. In contrast, to fMRI (see section 4.3.4), in PET radioactive tracers are used to detect 
blood flow, glucose consumption or neurotransmitter (e.g., dopamine) receptor binding (for detailed information 
about PET see Wager, Hernandez, Jonides, & Lindquist, 2007). Ernst and colleagues (2002) revealed activation 
during the IGT compared to a control task without the decision making aspect in the OFC, the dlPFC, the ACC, 
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the insular cortex, the parietal cortex, the thalamus and the cerebellum. In a subsequent fMRI study by Fukui, 
Murai, Fukuyama, Hayashi, and Hanakawa (2005) it was shown that in particular the net score of the IGT 
positively correlated with the magnitude of the activation in the medial PFC during disadvantageous decisions. 
Northoff et al. (2006) revealed a correlation between an increase in activity in particular the vmPFC (specific 
part of the medial PFC) IGT performance. The vmPFC was activated during a task which was associated with 
unexpected affective judgments. The positive correlation between this activation and IGT performance indicates 
that an increased activation in an area associated with unexpected affective judgments is associated with 
advantageous decisions under ambiguity. In contrast to these studies, which investigated the IGT as a whole, 
Lin, Chiu, Cheng, and Hsieh (2008) examined neural correlates of certain phases of the IGT and found 
following associations: The insula cortex and the lentiform nucleus (part of the basal ganglia, comprised the 
putamen and the globus pallidus) were activated during the anticipation phase (decision driving) and may 
therefore play an essential role in long-term guidance of a decision. The inferior parietal lobule in contrast was 
activated during the outcome phase (value representation) and thus might participate in evaluation processes of 
consequences. In the study by Chiu and colleagues (2008), the medial PFC was again activated during the high 
punishment contingencies (i.e., disadvantageous decisions; which is comparable with the findings by Fukui, et 
al., 2005). This was also found in the study by Lawrence, Jollant, O’Daly, Zelaya, and Phillips (2009). 
Moreover, the authors found also the lateral OFC and the insular cortex associated with the anticipation of 
punishment in disadvantageous trials. In contrast, striato-thalamic regions (e.g., caudate nucleus, nucleus 
accumbens, and thalamus, which are all parts of the basal ganglia) were rather associated with reward (win) than 
punishments (loss). Beyond that Lawrence and colleagues (2009) revealed an involvement of the lateral OFC 
and the pre-supplementary motor area in learning processes, whereas the vmPFC appears to be associated with 
more general task components such as monitoring of rewards and response-reinforcement over trials. 
Furthermore, they found that these activated brain regions (except the striato-thalamic regions) along with the 
secondary somatosensory cortex correlated positively with IGT performance. The insular cortex as well as the 
secondary somatosensory cortex are moreover, associated with the generation or processing of somatic markers, 
which supports the assumption of the activation of somatic markers in decision making (e.g., Bechara, et al., 
1999). This was also demonstrated in the study by Li, Lus, D’Argembeau, Hg, and Bechara (2010) who set out 
to investigate the underlying neural circuitry of somatic markers and decisions under ambiguity. Besides the 
involvement of the insular cortex they also reported activation in the dlPFC, the vmPFC, the supplementary 
motor area, and the ventral striatum. The authors defined the ventral striatum as “striatum below the anterior 
commissure” (Li, et al., 2010, p. 415), which in humans comprises the nucleus accumbens and is part of the 
basal ganglia (c.f, Pritzel, et al., 2003, p. 26). Li and colleagues (2010) suggested that these areas are all 
associated with different parts of the decision-making process: the dlPFC with working memory, the insula 
cortex with the representation of affective state, the vmPFC with the coupling of the two previous processes, and 
the ventral striatum and the supplementary motor area with the implementation of decisions.  
Most of the brain regions activated in decisions under ambiguity were also found to be involved in 
certain phases of decision making under risk. For example, Rogers, Owen, and colleagues (1999) using the CGT 
(for a description of the task see Table 1) reported increased blood flow in the OFC (in particular the anterior 
part of the middle frontal gyrus and the orbital gyrus) and the rather inferior convexity of the PFC (i.e., anterior 
part of the inferior frontal gyrus), when participants resolve the conflict that inherent a risky decision (i.e., the 
most likely outcome is associated with a reduced reward compared to the less likely outcome). The authors 
argue that the area activated in the inferior PFC receives information from diverse cortical and limbic inputs, 
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whereas the OFC may rather be involved in reward processing. In a subsequent study using a modified version 
of the CGT (Rogers et al., 2004), they revealed that the neural activity within the ACC, the OFC, and the 
striatum (part of the basal ganglia comprising the caudate nucleus and the putamen) mediates the representation 
of reward information at different stages during a decision process. Rao, Korczykowski, Pluta, Hoang, and 
Detre (2008) were interested in the different activation during voluntary and involuntary risk-taking in decision 
making. Therefore, the authors compared activation during a BART version, in which participants had the 
choice do decide when to discontinue inflating and a version, in which the computer stopped inflation 
automatically. Overall, they reported that decision making (i.e., active choice condition) compared to the passive 
condition led to increased activation in the dlPFC. When taking the parametric risk levels into account, the 
following regions were activated during the active choice condition contrasted with the passive choice condition 
and thus co-varied with voluntary risk: the ventral tegmental area, several nuclei of the basal ganglia (the 
striatum, the nucleus accumbens, and the globus pallidus), the anterior insular cortex, the dlPFC and the ACC. 
Fukunaga, Brown, and Bogg (2012) examined in particular the contribution of the anterior insular cortex and the 
ACC to decision making under risk using also the BART. It was shown that both regions were involved in loss 
aversion (i.e., activated when participants discontinue to inflate the balloon). In contrast, reward seeking 
robustly activated the vmPFC. A recent study concentrated on the role of a fronto-striatal network (including 
e.g., the striatum, nucleus accumbens, amygdala, the hippocampus, and the PFC) in decision making and found 
an involvement of such a network in the modulation of risk-taking in the BART (Kohno et al., in press). The 
involvement of the dlPFC and the ACC was additionally found in an fMRI study using a paradigm similar to the 
GDT (Labudda et al., 2008). In this study, Labudda and colleagues contrasted a decision situation with potential 
incentives with a decision situation without incentives. They reported increased activation in the dlPFC, the 
ACC, and the posterior parietal lobe, and the lingual gyrus; an activation pattern suggesting the involvement of 
executive functions, conflict detection, and arithmetic operations. Due to the fact that no feedback was given 
potential activation of feedback processing areas could not be announced.  
Overall, brain regions involved in decisions under ambiguity are also involved in decisions under risk. 
It rather appears to depend on the focus of the study which exact regions are in particular activated in decision 
making: whether the study investigated a single decision process (e.g., feedback/outcome phase vs. decision 
phase) or the whole decision processes not further specified or separated into phases. Figure 6 summarizes the 
brain regions found to be activated in decision-making performance irrespective of the decision situation (i.e., 
ambiguity or risk) and phase. These regions were found to be activated differentially in various patient groups 
compared to healthy control participants. Such activation differences were mostly associated with impaired 
decision making in these patient groups, for example: The activation in the medial part of OFC during high 
incentive trials of a card cueing task was negatively correlated with GDT performance in patients with ADHD. 
This indicated that a dysfunction in an area associated with reward value processing was associated with 
impaired decision making (Wilbertz et al., 2012). Studies using the IGT revealed neural changes in the OFC, the 
vmPFC, the dlPFC, the cerebellum, and in the striatum in patients with substance abuse, which were associated 
with more disadvantageous decision making compared to healthy controls (Bolla, Eldreth, Matochik, & Cadet, 
2005; Power, Goodyear, & Crockford, 2012; Vaidya et al., 2012). Patients suffering from traumatic brain injury 
showed different activation in the dlPFC, the thalamus, and the hippocampus during the CGT compared to 
healthy controls associated with increased risky decision making (Newcombe et al., 2011), while patients with 
mania displayed neural activity changes in the ACC and the frontopolar region (Rubinsztein et al., 2001).  
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Figure 6 A simplified presentation of the activated brain regions found in various decision-making studies. 
The cortical regions are colored in black and the subcortical regions are colored in grey.   
In general, it appears that some brain regions are more activated during (affective) feedback processes 
while others are more initiated during cognitive processes in decision making. This may be in line with the 
finding by Gläscher and colleagues (2012). The authors applied a lesion overlap analysis (using nonparametric 
voxel-based lesion symptom mapping; Rorden, Karnath, & Bonilha, 2007) that takes advantage of a unique 
dataset, accrued over several decades in order to analyze the regional specificity of various cognitive functions 
in the PFC (e.g., cognitive control and valued based decision making). This dataset provided “sufficient lesions 
coverage in the PFC, and most other regions of the brain, to detect significant lesion-deficit relationships” 
(Gläscher, et al., 2012, p. 14682) on cognitive functioning. Gläscher and colleagues demonstrated two 
functional-anatomical systems within the PFC: One system is associated with cognitive control (e.g., response 
inhibition, conflict monitoring, and switching) including the dlPFC and the ACC. In contrast, the second system 
is associated with valued based decision making and reward learning and includes following brain regions: the 
vmPFC, the frontopolar cortex, and the OFC. However, it appears that both networks converge in the ACC, 
indicating a potential for assumed interactions between the two networks. This again may support the postulated 
decision-making models, in which affective as well as cognitive processes are suggested to be involved in 
decision-making performance (see section 3, Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
To this point, the underlying cognitive and affective processes as well as the associated neural 
correlates of decision making were focused. The next chapter will discuss situational circumstances and their 
possible influence on decision-making behavior.  
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3.4 Situational influences on decision making from a neuropsychological perspective 
Based on the discussed findings so far, it is imaginable that task-irrelevant affective processes for instance 
sadness, happiness or stress, which involve brain areas associated with decision making may interrupt human 
decision-making behavior; just as additional cognitive processes, which load on the same cognitive (neural) 
network as decision making. The following sections address such influences in more detail. In section 3.4.1 
additional cognitive demand and its influence on decision-making performance will be addressed. This is 
followed by affective influences (see section 3.4.2) and stressful influences (see section 3.4.3) on decision 
making. At last the interaction between affective and cognitive additional demand and decision making 
particularly under risk will be discussed.  
3.4.1 Additional cognitive demand 
Affective and cognitive processes are involved in decision making under ambiguity and risk and may interact in 
order to realize superior decision-making performance (c.f. the decision-making models in Figure 1 and Figure 
2). However, it appears that affective processes are rather essential for decisions under ambiguity while 
cognitive processes are predominantly involved in decisions under risk (for a detailed discussion see chapter 3.1 
and 3.2). In order to further analyze these assumptions, researchers used additional executive tasks which the 
participants had to perform while making a decision. This leads to an additional load on the cognitive system. 
Researchers assumed that if cognitive processing would be essential in the decision-making process, this 
additional demand should lead to decreased decision-making performance (for detailed description see section 
3.4.1.4). This assumption is derived from dual-process theories, which also assume two information processing 
modes, whereby one appears to be more comparable with the affective route and the other with the cognitive 
route (for reviews see Evans, 2003, 2008). Decision situations in which an additional executive task has to be 
performed are comparable with basic dual-tasking studies in which participants are asked to perform two tasks 
simultaneously. Dual-tasking situations are often used in order to investigate information processing and over 
the years of research different approaches arose (see section 3.4.1.1). Therefore, before reporting studies 
investigating the role of dual tasking in decision making under ambiguity (section 3.4.1.4.1) and risk (section 
3.4.1.4.2), an overview about dual-process theories and dual-tasking approaches will be given in the upcoming 
section (see section 3.4.1.1). The focus of the chapter is on the involved executive functions in dual tasking. 
Therefore, a few studies investigating the underlying executive mechanisms of dual tasking will be briefly 
discussed (see section 3.4.1.2). In this context task-switching paradigms are introduced, too. These paradigms, 
which also consist of two concurrent tasks, were in particular developed in order to investigate executive 
processes in more detail (see section 3.4.1.2.1) This is followed by an overview about findings concerning the 
associated neural correlates of dual-tasking and task-switching paradigms (section 3.4.1.3), in order to 
understand which cognitive and neural mechanisms these processes share with decision-making processes and 
why it is of interest to investigate decision making in dual-tasking situations. 
3.4.1.1 From a theoretical perspective: Dual processes and dual tasking  
The assumption of two separated but interacting processing modes is in line with dual-process theories (for 
reviews see Evans, 2003, 2008). However, the assumption of a generic dual-process system appears to be 
simplified: Dual-process theorists describe these systems with various attributes and it is difficult to link them 
together across different dual-process theories (Evans, 2008). Evans argues that this is because while one system 
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is rather described as relying on single, capacity limited working memory resources, the other system is usually 
referred to any process which can operate automatically without occupying working memory capacity. This 
includes perception, attention, and language processes, as well as associative learning, habitual, and automated 
behavior patterns, which lead to many dual-process theories varying regarding application orientation. In the 
following the two systems will be described in more detail based on the established work of Kahneman and 
colleagues (Kahneman, 1973, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1974) as 
well as Epstein and colleagues (Epstein, 1994; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; 
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). The first system is called system 1 (Kahneman, 2003) or intuitive-
experiential system (Epstein, et al., 1996) and described as working fast, automatic, effortless, associative, 
implicit, and is associated with affect (Epstein, et al., 1996; Kahneman, 2003). In contrast, the second system is 
called system 2 (Kahneman, 2003) or analytical-rational system (Epstein, et al., 1996) and described as working 
slow, intentional, effortful, analytic, flexible, rule-governed and is more likely to be consciously monitored and 
deliberately controlled (Epstein, et al., 1996; Kahneman, 2003). Epstein (1994) postulated that the intuitive-
experiential system involves general implicit beliefs or schemas which are derived from previous affective 
experiences and are not simply isolated constructs, but rather organized in an overall adaptive system. In 
contrast, the analytical-rational system is associated with conscious beliefs and is capable of high levels of 
abstraction and long-term delay of gratification. It is assumed that both systems normally work in integrated 
interaction, but that sometimes a conflict appears which is then experienced as a struggle between feelings and 
thoughts (e.g., Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). Moreover, Epstein and colleagues (1996) suggested that it depends 
on several individual or situational factors whether the intuitive-experiential or the analytical-rational system is 
dominant: Besides the situational properties of a situation (e.g., a mathematical problem is rather solved by the 
analytical-rational system), it depends on the individual preference of a person for relying on one system more 
than on the other. Additionally, it depends on the degree of affective involvement of a person and the degree to 
which a situation requests personal experiences.  
 
Figure 7 The processes and contents in the two information processing systems adapted from Kahneman (2003).  
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The approach of Kahneman (2003) concentrated in particular on judgments. He postulated that the 
operating features of system 1 are similar to perceptual processing (see Figure 7. However, it is not restricted to 
perception alone. He assumed that intuitive judgments (system 1), besides percepts deal with concepts and can 
be evoked by language. Together, percepts and intuitive operations generate impressions of objects of thoughts 
and perception. In contrast, system 2 is nearly involved in all judgments independently whether they are based 
on impressions or rational reasoning. The judgments associated with system 2 are always intentional and 
explicit. Moreover, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) suggested that even though system 2 monitors the 
processing of system 1, such monitoring is rather lax, allowing intuitive judgments to be expressed. Whether a 
judgment appears to be intuitive or corrected by system 2, depends on the accessibilities of competing 
considerations and the accessibility of metacognitive awareness of bias (Kahneman, 2003). In sum, there appear 
to be two separated but interacting processing systems, from which one is associated with intuitive, experiential, 
automatic, and effortless processes (from now on called system 1), while the other system is associated with 
rational, analytic, intentional and effortful processes (from now on called system 2).  
However, the question remains how to investigate which processing mode is used for which operation 
or task. Kahneman (2003) suggested that the effect of the performance of two congruent tasks indicates best 
whether or not a given mental process belongs to system 1 or system 2: Assuming that the overall mental 
capacity is limited, concurrent tasks can only be performed simultaneously up to a certain limit. It depends on 
the demand of each task when the limit is achieved. He proposed that effortless, automatic tasks (i.e., relying on 
processes of system 1) do not suffer or cause interference when combined with concurrent tasks, while effortful 
tasks (i.e., relying on processes of system 2) are susceptible to interference (see also Kahneman, 1973). Over the 
years of research various theories of how subjects perform two tasks simultaneously, not necessarily related to 
dual-process theories were developed. Four further common approaches, differing in the assumptions if and how 
two tasks may be processed simultaneously will be presented. These approaches emphasize the importance of 
executive functions involved in dual-tasking processes. Figure 8 provides a graphical overview about the four 
approaches of dual tasking.  
In the capacity sharing theories it is assumed that people share processing capacity or mental resources 
among tasks (Pashler, 1994). Therefore, performing more than one task at a time leads to less capacity for each 
single task, resulting in diminished performance. It can be distinguished between two theoretical approaches 
within these theories. On one hand there is the single-resource /unitary-resource approach, in which it is 
suggested that there is only one mental resource with limited capacity. The assumption of Kahneman (1973, 
2003) that only effortless tasks can be processed in parallel, taps in such approach. On the other hand there is the 
multiple-resource approach (Navon & Gopher, 1979; Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Wickens, Sandry, & Vidulich, 
1983), in which it is postulated that there is more than one resource. It is assumed that interference between 
tasks occurs only, if the two tasks rely on the same resource. As long as they apply different resources two tasks 
can be performed simultaneously.  
In contrast, in bottleneck theories it is suggested that some mechanisms are only dedicated to one task 
at a time. If two tasks require the same mechanism for the same period of time a bottleneck ensues, in which 
only one task can be processed, leading to a delay or impairment of the second task (Pashler, 1994). Pashler 
assumed that this corresponds not only to punctate tasks but also to continuous tasks, if both tasks need access to 
the bottleneck mechanism. There is a broad discussion about when the bottleneck occurs. Different theorists 
suggested diverse points in process when a bottleneck occurs (c.f. D. E. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a). Broadbent 
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(1958) for example assumed that a bottleneck exists at a perceptual level (perceptual bottleneck), at the point 
where stimuli are identified and their meanings are determined. On the contrary, various authors (Pashler, 1984; 
M. C. Smith, 1967; Welford, 1967) assumed that it is possible to identify multiple stimuli at a time. However, 
then this information is stored in short-term working memory, because the process of response-selection is only 
able to deal with one task at a time (response-selection bottleneck). Therefore, the response on the second task is 
delayed. In a further approach (a.o. postulated by Keele, 1973) it is assumed that the bottleneck does not appear 
until onset of the movement-production process (movement-production bottleneck). This means that this process 
is only able to prepare and initiate individual movements successively and therefore only one task at a time can 
be processed. 
A third dual-tasking approach is the crosstalk model. In this model it is supposed that task interference 
occurs because of the same content the tasks share and not due to the kind of operation that has to be carried out 
(c.f. Pashler, 1994). Logan and Gordon (2001) proposed that one task interferes with a second task when the 
task set of the second task is also relevant for the first task (or the other way around). For example, in a study by 
Navon and Miller (1987) words were presented in different locations belonging either to the category city names 
or to the category boys’ names. Depending on the locations participants were asked to indicate whether the 
presented word is a boys’ name (“yes” or “no”), while they had to indicate whether the word presented in 
another locations is a city name (“yes” or “no”) simultaneously. The authors found that when in task two (city 
names) the distractor words were boys’ names the reaction time increases in the parallel first task (boys’ name). 
Those findings support the assumption that when two tasks share the same task set between-tasks crosstalk 
occurs. This interference does not occur when both tasks have independent contents (Logan & Gordon, 2001).  
In the last approach presented here, the aforementioned three theories and models are integrated into 
one approach. In the executive-process interactive control (EPIC) architecture (D. E. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 
1997b) it is assumed that under certain conditions the response-selection processes for two simultaneous tasks 
overlap at a procedural cognitive level and therefore, two tasks can be performed simultaneously without severe 
impairments. However, further contextual factors could lead to a preclusion of this overlap of response-selection 
processes, resulting in a delay of the secondary task. For example, when participants have to move their eyes in 
opposite directions for each task this would not lead to a response-selective overlap between the two tasks and 
therefore, does not lead to a delay in one of the tasks. The crucial point of this theory is that D. E. Meyer and 
Kieras did not assume a central bottleneck, but rather that executive processes, like strategy application, are 
flexible to manage task sequences at various levels according to task priority instructions. The authors assumed 
that selected task responses are either stored in working memory or are sent to the motor processes leading to a 
direct reaction (D. E. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a). 
Overall, there appear to be two separated but interacting processing modes. One is described as being 
slow, effortless, automatic, and affective charged (system 1), the other as effortful, intended, analytical, and 
affect free (system 2). According to Kahneman (1973, 2003) it depends on the processing modes whether two 
tasks can be performed simultaneously. However, approaches describing how two tasks might be processed 
simultaneously (or not), differ across researchers. Still, it seems to be a general agreement that there has to be an 
executive mechanism managing the processing of two simultaneous tasks. The next section will discuss studies 
investigating the involvement of executive processes in dual tasking. 
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Figure 8 Graphic representation of the four different dual-tasking approaches described in the text.  
The capacity sharing model postulates that tasks can be performed simultaneously until working to capacity. The bottleneck approach 
suggests that tasks can be performed simultaneously until a bottleneck appears. Depending on theory it appears either at perceptual level, at 
response-selection or movement-production. In the crosstalk theory it is assumed that interference occurs when two task share the same 
content. The executive-process interactive control architecture integrates the former approaches and suggests simultaneous performance of 
two tasks as long as the context allows a response-selection overlap. If no overlap occurs executive processes have to apply strategies in 
order to manage the sequence of the tasks. R = resource, T = task, C = content, RS = response-selection. 
3.4.1.2 Dual tasking and the role of executive functions 
Regardless of the various theoretical approaches, it becomes obvious that there has to be a mechanism that 
organizes the order of the tasks when they cannot be processed simultaneously. D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a, 
1997b) suggested a supervisory function of being involved and got support from other studies demonstrating the 
inclusion of executive functions in the dual-tasking process (Cooper, Wutke, & Davelaar, 2012; De Jong, 1995). 
In his study De Jong (1995) investigated how the performance of two parallel tasks is organized and controlled. 
Participants had to perform two different tasks in parallel: an auditive task, in which participants were asked to 
indicate whether the current tone is high or low and a visual task, in which they were asked to indicate whether 
the current figure is a square or a diamond. Across the three experiments the tasks differed in following 
parameters: the time participants had to initially prepare for the first tasks (stimulus onset asynchrony between 
100 and 800 ms), the time to prepare for a switch between tasks (inter trial interval between 500 and 2,000 ms), 
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and the information which task has to be performed next (unexpected vs. expected order, and presented cues 
before each trial informing about the next tasks). The results of this study suggested that performance of 
simultaneous tasks as well as the switch between these tasks is prepared in advance. For this, he proposed 
similar to D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a, 1997b), that a “superordinate control structure” (De Jong, 1995, p. 
22) is involved that procures in which order the central processing mechanism (also called central executive, c.f. 
section 3.2) processes these tasks and initiates a switch between them.  
Cooper and colleagues (2012) investigated this central processing mechanism (i.e., the central 
executive) in more detail. They conducted a study in order to get increased insight on the interactions and roles 
of executive control functions. Executive control functions are understood as processes which organize the 
processing of two tasks. That means these functions implement set shifting or protect an ongoing task from 
disruption while still be flexible to execute the second task (monitoring/updating) (c.f. Cooper, et al., 2012; 
Monsell, 2003). Cooper and colleagues (2012) used the dual-tasking approach to segment the central executive 
and thereby testing for the diversity of executive functions (based on results from Baddeley, 1998a; Miyake, et 
al., 2000; see also section 3.2 for a detailed discussion about the central executive and a possible segmentation 
of this function). In the experiments participants had to perform either the random letter generation task as 
primary task (in which they were asked to generate a random sequence of 100 letters (A-J) by selecting letters 
with the mouse on a screen) or the WCST (for a description of this task see sections 5.3.2.3 and 6.3.2.2). 
Simultaneously, participants had to perform each of the following three secondary tasks: go/no-go task 
(participants were asked to react to either a single beep or a double beep while inhibiting the reaction to the 
other), 2-back task (participants heard a sequence of numbers and had to answer vocally with “yes” when a 
current number was mentioned two trials before), and digit switching task (participants heard a sequence of 
numbers and had to respond vocally for four times whether the current number is higher or lower than the 
number 5, the next four times they were asked to tell whether the current number is odd or even etc.). Cooper 
and colleagues found that the interference profiles across the different dual tasks do not support the assumption 
of a single-resource model of cognitive processing. Instead, the profiles are consistent with a segmentation of 
the central executive (see section 3.2 for detailed information about executive subfunctions). Moreover, the 
authors argued that the central processing (i.e., central executive) is not completely parallel, but is itself 
dependent to bottlenecks associated with set-shifting and memory monitoring/updating.  
The importance of executive functions in dual tasking was additionally supported by studies 
investigating patients with executive dysfunctions for example patients with Parkinson disease (Dalrymple-
Alford, Kalders, Jones, & Watson, 1994), Alzheimer disease (Greene, Hodges, & Baddeley, 1995; Logie, 
Cocchini, Delia Sala, & Baddeley, 2004), schizotypal personality disorder (Harvey, Reichenberg, Romero, 
Granholm, & Siever, 2006), and patients with dysexecutive syndrome (Baddeley, Della Sala, Papagno, & 
Spinnler, 1997). Those patients showed inferior performance in dual tasking compared with healthy control 
participants. Further support for the involvement of executive functions in dual tasking comes from studies 
using task-switching paradigms in order to investigate whether there is a central executive or a segmentation of 
various executive control processes. The next section will give an overview about such studies.  
3.4.1.2.1 Task switching 
In the field of task-switching research, different paradigms were emerged over the years, all in order to 
investigate flexible task performance and the involved executive control processes. Here, only a short overview 
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about such paradigms will be presented, for more detailed reviews see for example Kiesel et al. (2010) or 
Monsell (2003).  
One of the first attempts was made by investigating mixed-task blocks vs. single-tasks blocks (e.g., 
Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 1976). In mixed-blocks participants had to 
switch between task A and B in each trial (ABAB). In contrast, in single blocks participants had at first to 
perform task A and in a second block task B (AAA vs. BBB). Comparing the performance in mixed-task blocks 
with the performance in single-task blocks revealed a higher reaction time for switches between two different 
tasks than for repetition trials (called switch costs see e.g., Allport, et al., 1994; Jersild, 1927; Spector & 
Biederman, 1976). However, Roger and Monsell (1995) argued that this between-block comparison could be 
influenced by confounding factors for example, different effort or arousal. Moreover, they assumed that mixed-
task blocks require abilities that are not required in single-task blocks for example, “keep two rather than one 
task set ‘active’ or available” (Rogers & Monsell, 1995, p. 210). Therefore, the authors developed a new 
paradigm: predictable task switching. In this paradigm the order of the tasks is known by the participants and 
changes every n trials (AABBAA or AAAABBBBAAAA). In this paradigm the mentioned confounding factors 
should be diminished. Studies using this paradigm supported the finding that again switch costs appeared 
(Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In order to avoid the predictability of task 
sequences a few other paradigms were developed: In the task-cuing design the order of task switches and 
repetition is random. Participants get to know which task has to be performed next, by receiving an explicit task 
cue right before each upcoming trial or accompanying the target stimulus (see e.g., Meiran, 1996; Sudevan & 
Taylor, 1987). In the intermittent instructions paradigm a sequence of trials involving task A has to be 
performed. From time to time a cue occurs that informs the participants about the action for the upcoming trial 
sequence. That could involve a switch to task B, but also to stay at task A (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008; Gopher, 
Armony, & Greenshpan, 2000). A somewhat different approach is the voluntary task selection (e.g., Arrington 
& Logan, 2004; Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2010). Hereby, participants can decide for themselves 
when to switch to the other task. Their only information is that they have to perform all tasks randomly but 
balanced. In all mentioned studies using an unpredictable paradigm, reaction time for switching trials was again 
higher than for repetition trials, indicating switch costs. 
As mentioned above task-switching paradigms were often used to investigate executive control 
processes (c.f. Arrington & Logan, 2004; Jersild, 1927; Kiesel, et al., 2010). Independently of the task-switching 
paradigm, various studies found a direct relationship to several executive control processes (e.g., Arbuthnott & 
Frank, 2000; Aron, Monsell, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2004; Arrington & Yates, 2009; Butler, Arrington, & 
Weywadt, 2011; Mecklinger, von Cramon, Springer, & Matthes-von Cramon, 1999). For example, Arbuthnott 
and Frank (2000) showed in a task-cuing paradigm that especially task-set inhibition is a crucial executive 
control process. Additionally, Aron and colleagues (2004) demonstrated the important role of inhibition of task 
sets but also the involvement of top-down control of task sets (i.e., subject-initiated/endogenous control that 
directs the attention to a particular attribute of the task set or selects a stimulus-response rule) in an intermittent 
instruction paradigm. Using a voluntary task selection paradigm Butler and colleagues (2010) revealed that task-
switching performance was related to working memory capacity. The tasks used in these studies were mostly the 
well-established switching tasks, consisting of numbers (in which participants were asked to indicate whether 
the current number is odd or even or higher/lower than the number five) or letters (in which participants would 
have to indicate whether the current letter is a vowel or a consonant). These studies reveal an involvement of 
various executive control processes supporting again the assumption of a segmentation of the central executive 
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(see section 3.2). In line with these findings is a study by Mecklinger and colleagues (1999), demonstrating the 
involvement of different executive control processes. They investigated patients with left and right brain 
damage, performing an object (round vs. not round) vs. spatial (which object is further away from the middle: 
upper vs. lower object) switching task. The authors found that the patient groups had different executive 
problems: While the patients with left brain damage demonstrated problems with the reconfiguration of task sets 
(i.e., internally guided actions), patients with damage to the right side of the brain had problems with the 
suppression of the inappropriate task set (i.e., externally guided action like stimulus-response actions). 
Therefore, Mecklinger and colleagues assumed differentially functional executive (control) functions to be 
involved in task-switching paradigms, instead of one functional executive process. 
Taken together, dual-tasking as well as task-switching approaches have demonstrated that the 
simultaneous performance of two tasks involves several executive control processes for instance, set-shifting 
and monitoring/updating. Hereby, the approaches support the assumption of a segmentation of executive 
processes rather than the assumption of a central executive (c.f. section 3.2). Compared with dual-tasking 
approaches, task-switching paradigms concentrate in particular on the switch between the two tasks and the 
associated switch costs. Even though some dual-tasking studies used also simple task-switching paradigms (e.g., 
De Jong, 1995) most of the studies are interested in the simultaneous performance of more complex tasks and 
relationships than research with task-switching paradigms does (see section 3.4.1.2). The question remains 
whether brain areas involved in dual-tasking and task-switching paradigms may be different or whether they 
require similar brain regions. The following section addresses this question and reports studies investigating 
associated brain regions.  
3.4.1.3 Neural correlates of dual tasking and task switching 
The findings concerning neural correlates associated with dual-tasking or task-switching paradigms are 
heterogeneous. At first studies investigating the neural correlates underlying dual-task performance will be 
addressed followed by those investigating in particular task-switching performance. In the end the results of one 
study comparing underlying neural correlates of dual-tasking and task-switching performance will be presented. 
Some studies using fMRI (for details about fMRI see section 4.3.4) found activation in certain brain 
areas associated with performance in a dual-tasking paradigm (D'Esposito et al., 1995; Deprez et al., 2013; 
Dreher & Grafman, 2003; Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund, & Marois, 2006; MacDonald III, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 
2000; Szameitat, Lepsien, von Cramon, Sterr, & Schubert, 2006; Szameitat, Schubert, Müller, & von Cramon, 
2002; Wu, et al., 2013). Most activation patterns were found in prefrontal areas, for example, in parts of the 
lateral PFC (Dux, et al., 2006; Szameitat, et al., 2006), or in particular the dlPFC (D'Esposito, et al., 1995; 
MacDonald III, et al., 2000; Schubert & Szameitat, 2003; Szameitat, et al., 2002), and the ACC (D'Esposito, et 
al., 1995; MacDonald III, et al., 2000). These brain areas are associated with executive control functions and 
were mostly interpreted to be involved in the coordination of two interfering tasks. However, some studies 
found also activations in parietal areas, such as the superior parietal cortex (Szameitat, et al., 2002; Wu, et al., 
2013) and in different parts of the cerebellum (Wu, et al., 2013). A recent study found a right-sided fronto-
parietal network and the cerebellum to be activated when comparing a dual-task paradigm with each of its single 
tasks (Deprez, et al., 2013). In contrast, other studies found no specific brain areas associated with the 
performance of a dual-tasking paradigm, but an increase in activation in brain areas involved in each component 
task (Adcock, Constable, Gore, & Goldman-Rakic, 2000; Bunge, Klingberg, Jacobsen, & Gabrieli, 2000; 
Erickson et al., 2005; Klingberg, 1998, 2000). The increase in activation was mostly associated with the 
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involvement of additional executive processes that are necessary to solve the dual-tasking problem. Nonetheless, 
there are also studies demonstrating a decrease in brain activation associated with dual-tasking performance, for 
example in the dlPFC (Jaeggi et al., 2003), parietal and temporal brain areas (Just et al., 2001), as well as 
somatosensory brain areas (Gazes et al., 2010). The decrease in activations was mostly associated with the 
limited resources available for each component task. Overall, the findings of these studies point in the direction 
that the decrease in activation is associated with brain areas specific for each component task, while the increase 
in activation concerns a cortico-subcortical circuit associated with executive functions (Heyder, Suchan, & 
Daum, 2004). In this context another possible explanation for the heterogeneous findings should also be 
considered. In the review by Szameitat, Schubert and Müller (2011) various studies were analyzed in order to 
investigate the underlying neural correlates of dual tasking. The authors found that the different studies not only 
used different paradigms that could lead to different activation patterns, but also differed in their imaging 
analyses leading to different activation patterns. Therefore, the results are not directly comparable. Szameitat 
and colleagues suggested that future studies should use at least the same imaging analyses in order to be 
compared and thus, getting a better overview about the brain areas that might be involved. 
FMRI-studies investigating neural activations during task-switching paradigms found also prefrontal 
and parietal areas to be involved, regardless of the task-switching paradigm used (Brass, Ullsperger, Knoesche, 
von Cramon, & Phillips, 2005; Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000; Forstmann, Brass, 
Koch, & von Cramon, 2006; Forstmann, Ridderinkhof, Kaiser, & Bledowski, 2007; Hyafil, Summerfield, & 
Koechlin, 2009; Mueller, Brass, Waszak, & Prinz, 2007; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008; Wylie, Javitt, & 
Foxe, 2003). Noteworthy are the findings of studies investigating voluntary task switching. They found 
consistently the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) to be activated (Forstmann, et al., 2006; Forstmann, et al., 2007; 
Mueller, et al., 2007). Mueller and colleagues (2007) demonstrated that this zone is involved in internally 
guided actions (voluntary selection) compared with externally guided actions. Some studies used EEG in order 
to investigate the temporal resolution of the activation pattern of prefrontal and parietal regions (Brass, et al., 
2005; Forstmann, et al., 2007; Wylie, et al., 2003). However, the results are heterogeneous which could be due 
to the different points of interests of the studies: For example, Brass and colleagues (2005) focused on whether 
prefrontal and parietal areas are involved in different functions of cognitive control. The authors found the 
involvement of the PFC in updating of general tasks-settings, which biases the following stimulus-response 
associations in the parietal cortex. In contrast, Forstmann and colleagues (2007) were interested in the neural 
bases of agency-related processes and their temporal dynamics (choice vs. non-choice conditions). They found 
an early parietal activation (parieto-occipital) interpreted as a categorization process for the choice condition 
compared with the no-choice condition. This activation was followed by a frontal activity, associated with the 
voluntary selection of tasks sets. Finally, Wylie and colleagues (2003) addressed the question of how switch 
costs derive: Whether switch costs derive because before a new stimulus is presented participants need time to 
disengage from task A to prepare for the upcoming task B (reconfiguration theories) or because after a stimulus 
is presented participants need time to disengage from the goal of task A to adapt to the goal of task B 
(competition theories). Hereby, Wylie and colleagues (2003) assumed, based on previous research, that frontal 
areas are associated with reconfiguration processes while parietal areas are associated with the competition 
processes (for a detailed information see Wylie, et al., 2003). Therefore, if the switch costs are due to the 
reconfiguration process the frontal areas should be activated before the parietal areas. However, the authors 
found previous activation of the parietal areas than frontal areas. Consequently, they interpreted their findings in 
accordance with the competition hypothesis. 
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So far, only one study compared the neural activation during a task-switching paradigm with the neural 
activation during a dual-tasking paradigm (Dreher & Grafman, 2003). In the task-switching condition 
participants had either to perform task 1 (vowel or consonant) or task 2 (upper or lower case) indicated by the 
color of the letter (red = task 1; green = task 2). In the dual-tasking condition participants had to perform both 
tasks simultaneously: In order to indicate whether the letter was a consonant or in lower case they were asked to 
push the left button and the right button otherwise. The fMRI results revealed that both paradigms (dual tasking 
and task switching) activated a common prefrontal-parietal neural network when compared with a baseline task. 
Dreher and Grafman (2003) suggested that the activated network is neither specific for task-switching 
paradigms nor for dual-tasking paradigms but rather for more generally executive processes. Nevertheless, 
comparing the neural activation between the dual-task and the task-switching paradigm, revealed more activity 
in the RCZ during the dual-task paradigm, and more activation in the lateral PFC, as well as the bilateral inferior 
parietal sulcus during the task-switching paradigm.  
Overall, the findings concerning the neural correlates associated with dual-tasking paradigms and task-
switching paradigms are heterogeneous. However, most of the findings suggest the involvement of prefrontal 
and parietal areas, which are associated with a network of executive functions in dual-tasking and task-
switching paradigms. As can be seen by results of task-switching studies, the temporal resolution of the 
involved areas depends on the focus of the study. Regarding studies addressing explicitly dual tasking it is still 
unclear whether or not dual tasking involves certain brain areas or whether it just leads to an increase/decrease 
in activity in the brain areas involved in the component tasks or not. Nonetheless, the neuroimaging studies 
support the assumption of the behavioral and patient studies demonstrating the important role of executive 
functions in dual-tasking and task-switching paradigms. Due to this fact dual-tasking paradigms are also used in 
the decision-making field in order to investigate the role of executive functions or the underlying information 
processing system in more detail. Therefore, the following section gives an overview about studies using dual-
tasking paradigms to investigate decision making under ambiguity and risk in more detail.  
3.4.1.4 Dual tasking in the field of decision making 
As mentioned at the beginning of section 3.4.1, dual tasking becomes also a topic of interest in the field of 
decision making. Here, it is of special interest to investigate the underlying processing systems (see section 
3.4.1.1 for more details). For this purpose the decision-making tasks display the primary tasks while 
simultaneously a secondary task has to be performed. So far, only two studies investigated dual tasking in 
decisions under ambiguity (Hinson, et al., 2002; Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, Carzolio, & O'Connor, 2005) and two 
studies in decisions under risk (Starcke, et al., 2011; Whitney, Rinehart, & Hinson, 2008), all in healthy 
participants. In the following the results of those studies will shortly be presented. 
3.4.1.4.1 Decisions under ambiguity in situations with additional cognitive demand 
Turnbull and colleagues (2005) used a dual-tasking paradigm in order to investigate the underlying information 
processing system of the IGT (see Table 1 for a brief description of this task). Different studies using the IGT 
suggested that to perform well on this task participants have to rely on their intuition as well as on their 
experiences from previous trials instead of their cognitions (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Bechara, et 
al., 1997; Dunn, et al., 2006; for detailed information see section 3.1. and 3.2). Therefore, Turnbull and 
colleagues (2005) assumed that affective-based learning is more important to perform decisions under ambiguity 
than cognitive reasoning. Based on the approach of Kahneman (1973, 2003, see also section 3.4.1.1), they 
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assumed that the IGT would tap into system 1. Consequently, the performance of a secondary executive task in 
parallel to the IGT should not interfere with the decision-making performance, because both tasks require 
different processing systems (see section 3.4.1.1 for more detail). In order to test this hypothesis Turnbull and 
colleagues conducted a study with three different groups: In the first group participants had to perform the IGT 
in parallel with an executive secondary task. The second group had to perform the IGT in parallel with a non-
executive secondary task and the third group performed only the IGT. In the executive secondary task 
participants were asked to randomly generate numbers between 1 and 9 without using any sequences and 
patterns. This task was known to load on the executive system (Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996). In the non-
executive task participants were asked to recite the number sequence 1 through to 9. This task was known to 
load on the phonological loop of working memory (Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996). The results supported the 
hypothesis by demonstrating that the IGT-performance between groups did not differ. Instead, all three groups 
showed the common learning curve over the 100 trials of the IGT. 
Contrasting findings revealed a study by Hinson and colleagues (2002). The authors found that the 
performance in the IGT diminished when simultaneously a secondary task with working memory load had to be 
performed (for a detailed description of the study see section 3.2.2.1). Moreover, they measured SCRs and 
showed that during the working memory task no affective biasing signals were developed. Hinson and 
colleagues concluded that the lack of these signals lead to disadvantageous choices in the IGT. However, one 
reason for the contrasting findings could be that Hinson and colleagues used a modified version of the IGT. In 
this version overall payoffs were changed into less extreme ones, making it more difficult to identify the 
advantageous options. Additionally, the authors implemented an intermediated option between the advantageous 
decisions (small short-term gains but also long-term gains) and disadvantageous options (large short-term gains 
but long-term losses). This option offered long-term gains rather than long-term losses but of smaller magnitude 
than those of the advantageous options. Due to the fact that this task was changed in order to be more difficult, 
this could lead at the same time to higher involvement of working memory compared to the original version of 
the IGT and could consequently lead to interference between the secondary task and the decision-making 
performance.  
Overall, these studies seem to be contrasting, while Turnbull and colleagues (2005) did not find 
interference between an executive task and decisions under ambiguity, Hinson and colleagues (2002) did. 
However, this discrepancy might be explained as followed: Decisions under ambiguity tap into system 1, when 
operationalized with the original version of the IGT. However, once the decision-making situation under 
ambiguity is a little bit more demanding (see the version of the IGT by Hinson, et al., 2002), system 2 seems to 
be additionally involved in the processing of information. This might indicate, the suggested controlling role of 
system 2 (c.f. Kahneman, 2003 and section 3.4.1.1). The following section will describe dual tasking in the 
context of decisions under risk. 
3.4.1.4.2  Decisions under risk in situations with additional cognitive demand 
While the findings in the field of decision making under ambiguity seem to be contrasting, the studies in the 
field of decision making under risk point both in the same direction: Additional cognitive load interferes with 
decision making under risk. Based on the study by Turnbull and colleagues (2005), a recent study used the GDT 
(for a brief description of this task see Table 1) and a secondary executive working memory task (n-back) in 
order to investigate the underlying information processes of decision making under risk (Starcke, et al., 2011). 
In the n-back task participants had to indicate whether or not the current number on the screen was the same 
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number as the number two trials (or one trial) before. Starcke and colleagues (2011) assumed that due to the fact 
that various studies demonstrated the involvement of executive functions in the GDT (Brand, Recknor, et al., 
2007; Schiebener, et al., 2011; for detailed discussion see section 3.2.2.2) additional executive load should 
diminish the decision-making performance. The authors conducted a study with three different conditions: GDT 
plus 2-back task, GDT plus 1-back task, and GDT solely. The results showed that participants performing the 2-
back task (high executive load) simultaneously to the GDT chose the disadvantageous options more often 
compared with participants performing the GDT solely. The difference between the groups performing the 1-
back task (low executive load) and the GDT simultaneously as well as the GDT solely failed to reach 
significance. In accordance with the dual-process theory of Kahneman (see section 3.4.1.1) Starcke and 
colleagues (2011) assumed that both tasks (GDT and 2-back) tap into system 2 and thus the secondary task 
interferes with the primary task.  
Similar results provided a study by Whitney and colleagues (2008). The authors used an explicit but 
instable decision-making task, in which participants had to play for a certain amount of money. In this task 
participants were able to choose between different explicit options: a certain gain option, a certain loss option, or 
a gambling option in which they could either win a high amount of money or lose it. However, the gains and 
losses differed in the amount of money as well as in the way they were displayed: either the winning or the 
losing probability was given. In the dual-tasking condition participants were asked to perform a working 
memory task in parallel. They had to remember a sequence of five consonants throughout a decision trial. After 
a decision was made participants were asked to indicate which letter was for example, at the third place. In the 
no-load condition, participants saw the letter sequence after each decision trial. The results demonstrated that in 
the dual-task condition participants made fewer decisions to gamble. Whitney and colleagues assumed that this 
is because of minimized cognitive effort due to limited cognitive resources: Gambling requires cognitive 
capacity in order to ponder/analyze the possibility to win/lose, which is not required in situations of a certain 
gain or loss.  
Overall, the studies support the assumptions that decision making under risk taps into a different 
processing system than decisions under ambiguity namely system 2. The studies demonstrate that performing 
another task in parallel to risky decision making leads to disadvantageous decisions. This may be in line with the 
unitary-resource approach of Kahneman (1973, 2003; see also section 3.4.1.1 and Figure 8): Performing two 
effortful tasks, which therefore require system 2 rather than system 1 processes, leads to interference between 
these tasks and therefore to reduced task performance. The question remains, which underlying (executive) 
functions might be involved in performing a decision-making task and an additional task simultaneously. The 
third study of the current thesis (see chapter 6) investigated the underlying executive mechanisms of performing 
a risky decision-making task (GDT) simultaneously with an additional executive task (2-back task). Moreover, 
besides cognitive processes, affective processes are also involved in decision making (see section 3.1). Thus, the 
next chapter will address the issue of what happens when the affective route is additionally loaded, by giving an 
overview about affective influences and stress and their effect on decision-making performance. 
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3.4.2 Affective influences 
The field of research regarding the influences of affect on cognitive processes in general is huge (for an 
overview see e.g., Dolan, 2002; Dolcos, et al., 2011; Pessoa, 2008, 2009). It reaches from studies investigating 
the influence of neurotransmitter associated with affective processing on cognitive processes (Harrison et al., 
2004; Matrenza et al., 2004; R. L. C. Mitchell & Phillips, 2007), to studies investigating performance of 
cognitive processes in patients suffering from impaired affective processing, for example, depression (Levens & 
Gotlib, 2010), anxiety (Miu, et al., 2008), and mania (Adida et al., 2008). However, the focus of this chapter is 
on healthy participants and studies investigating the induction of affective states and their influence on decision 
making. Chapter 3.1 discussed the underlying affective processes of decision making and showed that when 
making decisions under ambiguity such processes are particularly involved in the guidance of a decision. 
However, when making decisions under risk these processes are more involved in the evaluation of a certain 
decision strategy. Moreover, several brain areas that are activated during the decision-making process are also 
associated with affective processing in general (c.f. sections 3.1.1 and 3.3). This suggests that various affective 
states may influence human decision making. For example, an angry person might take the risk to speed on the 
highway despite the speed limit and the possibility of getting caught by the police, while a relaxed person might 
be more likely to follow the speed limit. Before discussing studies investigating affective influences on 
decision-making behavior, the next section will at first give an overview about possibilities to induce affective 
states in the laboratory. 
3.4.2.1 Laboratory induction of affect 
There are various ways to induce affective states in participants in the laboratory. One option is the injection of 
adrenaline or the donation of psychotropic drugs, to increase persons’ arousal (Schachter & Singer, 1962). 
Another possibility to induce affect is to transfer the arousal from one situation (e.g., increased arousal due to a 
training session on an ergometer) to a subsequent situation where the participant has to perform the task of 
interest (Zillmann, 1978). However, both induction methods are only possible when the participants are unaware 
to the impact of the medication they are taking (Reisenzein & Gattinger, 1982) or the cause of the arousal in the 
second induction method (Zillmann, 1978). Ekman (1982) let participants imitate the affective states (i.e., 
characteristic expressions of the affect) he wanted to induce. He showed that this imitation had influence on the 
heart rate and skin conduction of the participants (Ekman, 1993). Example for induction methods inducing 
affective states by modulating the cognitive contents of participants are the Velten mood induction procedure 
(Velten Jr, 1968) or the imagination of a self-experienced affective situation (positive or negative). The Velten 
mood induction procedure includes statements which describe either a positive or negative self-evaluation (e.g., 
“I have too many bad things in my life”) or a somatic state (e.g., “Every now and then I feel so tired and gloomy 
that I’d rather sit than doing anything”) (c.f. Velten Jr, 1968). Participants are instructed to feel the affect 
described. Such cognitive affect induction procedures are commonly used in current studies alongside the use of 
situational affective stimuli, for instance a film, a story, music, odors or other affect-laden, visual or auditive 
stimuli (c.f. Sokolowski, 2008; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). Usually these stimuli are presented 
in three different valences, positive, negative, and neutral, to induce different affective states across groups. One 
popular affective stimuli system is the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert). This system provides ratings of affect for a large set of affect evoking color photographs which are 
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internationally accessible and include across a wide range of semantic categories (c.f. Lang, et al., 2008). In the 
IAPS, over 1,000 pictures are listed regarding the three dimensions they were rated for: arousal, valence, and 
dominance/control. This simplifies the selection of standardized stimuli inducing the required affect. 
To measure whether the affect induction was successful or not, it is possible to apply the facial action 
coding system (Ekman, 1978), in which small parts of the face are observed and expression changes regarding 
occurrence, duration and, ending of these changes are strictly protocolled. Thereafter, an experienced rater 
analyzes and compares this expression changes with common patterns for the affect which was intended to be 
induced. However, such procedure is rather elaborate. Therefore, self-report questionnaires listing adjectives 
with various response dimensions (e.g., Likert scale or visual analogue scale) are frequently used. Common 
questionnaires are the Positive Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson & Clark, 1999) or the language free 
Self-Assessment-Manikin (Lang, 1980) containing manikins illustrating different degrees of valence, arousal 
and dominance. Sometimes also heart rates, blood pressure, and skin conductance are measured (Sokolowski, 
2008). However, these measurements only prove that the participants are aroused, but give no information about 
the valence of the affect.  
Overall, this section summarized the most common affect induction procedures. For detailed 
information about various induction methods and the effectiveness and validity of such measures please be 
referred to (Westermann, et al., 1996). In the following section studies will be discussed investigating the 
influence of several affective states on decision-making performance. 
3.4.2.2 Affective influences on decision making 
The fact that affect influences certain cognitive processes which are associated with decision-making processes, 
was shown by Bless and Schwarz (1999) and Clore, Schwarz and Conway (1994). These studies demonstrated 
that negative affect in particular increases the probability for people to rely on deliberative processes and 
systematic elaboration. Based on these studies De Vries and colleagues assumed that affective states also 
influence the usage of decision strategies (De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008a): While negative affect 
appears to be compatible with thoughtful, deliberative decision strategies (Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Clore, et al., 
1994), De Vries and colleagues (2008a) suggested compatibility between positive affect and intuitive decision 
strategies. They specifically aimed to investigate whether a fit or a non-fit, respectively, influences the 
subjective value of a decision outcome. Therefore, following experimental design was conducted: In order to 
induce affective states participants saw either a sad or happy video clip. The core part was the question which of 
two presented Thermos flasks the participants would like to win in a lottery. Participants were asked to decide 
either intuitively or deliberatively (i.e., they had to think about the pros and cons) which Thermos flask they 
preferred. De Vries and colleagues found that a fit between affective state and decision strategy improves 
people’s subjective value of their decision outcome (De Vries, et al., 2008a): Participants who saw a sad video 
and were able to deliberate the pros and cons before making a decision, as well as participants who saw a happy 
video and had to make their decision based on their feelings, valued the outcome of their decision more than 
participants who had no fit between affective state and strategy use (i.e., participants who saw the happy video 
and needed to deliberate about their decisions, and participants who saw the sad video and needed to make their 
decision based on their feelings). Based on these findings it is not farfetched to suggest that affective states may 
influence decisions differentially under risk and ambiguity. Decisions under ambiguity are best done by relying 
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on their intuition and feelings (Bechara, et al., 1997, see also chapter 3.1.2.1), while in decisions under risk 
participants decide more advantageously when they apply more deliberative strategies (Brand, Heinze, et al., 
2008, see also section 3.2.2.2). The following sections will give further insight to this matter by summarizing 
studies that investigated the influence of affective states on decision making under ambiguity (section 3.4.2.2.1) 
and risk (section 3.4.2.2.2). 
3.4.2.2.1 Decision making under ambiguity in affective situations 
Based on their findings that positive affective states fits affect-based (i.e., intuitive) decision-making strategies 
(De Vries, et al., 2008a, see also section 3.4.2.2), De Vries and colleagues investigated the possible influence of 
affective states on the IGT (De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008b; see Table 1 for a description of the task). 
The authors hypothesized that positive affect should enhance advantageous decision making in the IGT. 
Specifically, they assumed that it should enhance the performance in the second block of the IGT (trials 20-40, 
pre-hunch phase; Bechara, et al., 1997), in which participants develop a preference for the good decks of the 
task without explicitly knowing the reason for this preference. De Vries and colleagues (2008b) argued that 
because in this phase of the IGT participants start to develop affective signals (somatic markers) associated with 
the different blocks, participants in a positive affective state rely more on their feelings and consequently show 
enhanced IGT performance. In contrast, participants in a negative affective state should rely less on their 
feelings and thus show less good decision-making performance in the second block. The results supported their 
assumption. While experiment one demonstrated significant correlation between affect and IGT performance in 
the second block only, experiment two and three revealed that participants in a positive affective state, induced 
by a positive film clip, selected cards from deck C and D (good decks) more often, compared with participants 
in a negative affective state (induces by a sad film clip). Moreover, experiment three also showed that in the last 
block of the IGT (trials 81-100, conceptual period; Bechara, et al., 1997) participants, who saw the sad film 
before performing the task, chose the good decks more often than the bad decks compared with participants in a 
positive affective state. However, De Vries and colleagues reported that further analysis revealed that affect only 
influences the second block of the IGT. At this point results of this study need to be looked at carefully, because 
especially regarding the performed additional analysis, the methodological procedure remains 
incomprehensible. Therefore, the conclusion that only the second block is influenced by induced affect can only 
be made with caution. Particularly, because the finding that in the last block of the IGT participants with a 
negative affective state performed superior than participants with a positive affective state is in accordance with 
other research findings: This period is known to be more associated with deliberative decision making (Bechara, 
et al., 1997; Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007; Maia & McClelland, 2004), which in turn is more favored in a sad 
affective state than in a positive affective state (De Vries, et al., 2008a). In sum, the study revealed that 
compared to a negative affective state, a positive affective stat is associated with superior performance in the 
pre-hunch phase of the IGT. However, conclusions about the affective influence on other phases of the IGT, in 
particular the conceptual phase, appear to be less clear.  
Another study demonstrated that whether decision making is influenced by affective processing 
depends on an affective regulation mechanism (Heilman, Crişan, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010). In this study 
participants watched short video clips (of negative value to induce a negative affective state) before performing 
the IGT. The participants were divided into three groups. The first group was instructed to cognitive reappraise 
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their affective states during the video to decrease the negative affect. That means, “to think about what they 
were seeing in such a way that they did not feel anything at all” (Gross, 2002, p. 284). The second group was 
instructed to apply expressive suppression (i.e., hiding the affective reactions; Gross, 2002) as an affect-
regulation strategy. The third group served as control group and did not receive any instruction. After watching 
the video clip participants were asked to fulfill the PANAS. This was done in order to analyze whether or not 
the film clip induced the required affective state. Results confirmed that the induction was successful. Moreover, 
it was found that participants of the “cognitive reappraisal” group demonstrated better decision-making 
performance in the transition between pre-hunch and hunch phase of the IGT compared to participants of the 
control group. Furthermore, participants who applied expressive suppression as an affect-regulation strategy, 
showed comparable IGT performance than participants of the control group. Heilman and colleagues (2010) 
assumed that negative affect increases physiological noise, which inhibits the somatic markers and consequently 
leads to disadvantageous decision making. A similar assumption was made by Preston, Stansfield, and Bechara 
(2007) see section 3.4.3.3.1. Hence, when people engaged in cognitive reappraisal the physiological noise 
decreased, thus explaining the better decision-making performance in reappraisers. In contrast, engaging in 
expressive suppression increases sympathetic activations (Gross, 1998) that potentially interfere with somatic 
markers. This may explain disadvantageous decision making in subjects applying expressive suppression as 
affective regulation. Even though affect was induced artificially in the mentioned studies, the naturally 
occurring differences in affective states as measured with the PANAS support those findings. Participants who 
indicated to be in a negative affective state on the PANAS, without further laboratory affect induction, 
demonstrated inferior IGT performance (De Vries, et al., 2008b; Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007). However, when 
engaging in cognitive reappraisal the effect of the negative influence of natural occurred negative affect on 
decision making is reduced (see study 2 in Heilman, et al., 2010). 
Overall, those studies have shown that it appears to depend on the value of the affective state whether it 
impairs or enhanced decision making in ambiguous situations: While positive affect leads to advantageous 
decisions, negative affect leads to disadvantageous decision. This is because negative affect seems to lead to 
sympathetic activation, which inhibits somatic markers that play a crucial role in decisions under ambiguity 
(Bechara, et al., 1996; Heilman, et al., 2010; Preston, et al., 2007). Moreover, subjects in a negative affective 
state apply more deliberative strategies known to be of little benefit for IGT task performance (De Vries, et al., 
2008b). In contrast, subjects in a positive affective state rely more on their feelings, which is superior for 
decision making under ambiguity (e.g., Bechara, et al., 1999). However, the affective influence seems to 
interfere with the usage of affective regulation. Furthermore, there appears to be a differentiation between the 
decision-making phases in the IGT: The results pointed out that in particular in the pre-hunch phase and at the 
beginning of the hunch phase (second and third block of the IGT, during which participants need to rely on their 
gut feeling), positive affect seems to support superior decision making, while negative affect does not (De Vries, 
et al., 2008b; Heilman, et al., 2010). This was not shown for the other decision-making phases. In addition, 
preliminary findings indicate that in the conceptual phase (last block of the IGT, where the participants know 
the rules and contingencies of the task) negative affective states appear to be related with superior decision-
making performance (De Vries, et al., 2008b). Due to the fact that the last phase of the IGT was found to be 
associated with deliberative decision making (Bechara, et al., 1997; Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007; Maia & 
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McClelland, 2004), it is assumable that negative affect has a comparable effect on decision making under risk. 
The following section will review studies examining the affective influence on decisions under risk.  
3.4.2.2.2 Decisions under risk in affective situations 
Besides the influence of affective state and the role of affective regulation in decisions under ambiguity Heilman 
and colleagues (2010) were additionally interested in their influences in decisions under risk. Using the BART 
(see Table 1 for a brief description of this task) as a measurement of decisions under risk the authors found that 
naturally occurring negative affect (experiment 2 of their study) led to higher risk aversion compared to positive 
affect. This finding is in accordance with studies demonstrating that negative affect leads to an enhanced 
engagement in deliberative strategies (Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Clore, et al., 1994), which in turn result in less 
choices of high-risk decisions (Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008). However, compared with participants who used 
expressive suppression or no affect-regulation strategy, the application of cognitive reappraisal as an affect-
regulation strategy in a negative affective state, increased risk-seeking. The last effect was found in their first 
experiment, during which the negative affect was induced via a negative movie clip. Heilman and colleagues 
argued that the effective down regulation of the experienced negative affective state gives an increased sense of 
affective control which decreases risk aversion. This is in line with other previous findings that the feeling of 
control mediates the relation between affect and risk taking (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  
The study by Cassotti and colleagues (2012) highlighted the affective influence on decision making 
under risk from a slightly different angle. It is well known that participants decide differently according to how 
the options are offered in a decision-making situation (framing effect; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2007; Reyna, 2004): If options are offered in terms of a certain gain, subjects prefer the risk averse 
choice (i.e., they take the sure gain and do not gamble). But if the options are displayed in terms of a certain 
loss, subjects are more risk seeking (i.e., they rather gamble instead of taking the sure loss). Cassotti and 
colleagues (2012) were interested in whether a specific affective context (positive or negative) influences the 
framing effect in decision making. Based on previous studies, the authors hypothesized that positive affect 
(induced by positive affective pictures) enhances the focus on potential gain. This in turn should reduce the 
affective impact of a sure loss (in the loss frame), resulting in risk-averse decision making. In contrast, Cassotti 
and colleagues predicted that if a negative affect increases the focus on potential loss, an increase in risky 
decisions should be found in the loss frame. This is based on the assumption that negative affect enhances the 
affective influence of a sure loss. In order to measure the framing effect in decision making, Cassotti and 
colleagues used an adapted version of the gambling task of De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour and Dolan (2006). 
In this task participants were endowed with an amount of money ranging from €10 to €50 at the beginning of 
each trail. Furthermore, participants were informed that they cannot retain the whole amount, but would have to 
choose between a gamble and a sure option. Herby, the sure option would lead to a sure win or loss of a certain 
amount of money received initially. In contrast, in the gamble option participants were informed about a set 
probability to lose or keep the whole amount of the money received initially. Between the initial amount of 
money and the choosing part participants saw negative or positive pictures for a short interval (5000 ms). The 
results support the assumptions only in parts: Positive affect decreased risk propensity in the loss frame, while 
participants of the negative and neutral picture group still showed the framing effect. 
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In a study investigating the influence of affective states on the GDT (see Table 1 for a brief description 
of this task) as a measurement of decision making under risk (Bagneux, Bollon, & Dantzer, 2012; for a brief 
description of the task see Table 1), there was no distinction between positive and negative affect but between 
certainty-associated affect (e.g., anger or happiness) and uncertainty-associated affect (e.g., fear; for detailed 
information see the Appraisal-Tendency Framework of Lerner & Keltner, 2000). The induction of such affective 
states was done by presenting video clips before participants had to perform a modified version of the GDT (30 
trials instead of 18). According to Lerner and Keltner (2000) certainty-associated affect lead to heuristic 
processing and uncertainty-associated affect encourage deliberative processing. In accordance with this, 
Bagneux and colleagues (2012) assumed that participants who watched the video clips inducing anger or 
happiness would rely more on heuristic processing (which takes affective information into account) and 
therefore use more strongly the feedback of previous decisions in the GDT, resulting in good decision-making 
performance. As opposed to this, participants who watched the video with fearful content should rely more 
strongly on systematic processing, leading to less use of the feedback and thus to disadvantageous decision 
making. The findings were in line with this assumption: Dividing the 30 trials of the GDT into five blocks, 
Bagneux and colleagues (2012) found that in the last three blocks participants who watched videos inducing 
anger and happiness chose the low-risk options more often than participants who saw the videos inducing fear. 
However, even though the difference slightly failed to reach significance, on a descriptive level the data display 
that there was a difference between positive (happy) and negative (anger) certainty-associated affect: 
Participants who watched the anger videos demonstrated better GDT performance compared with participants 
who watched the happy videos.  
Overall, these findings demonstrate that in decisions under risk affective states influences decision-
making performance differently compared to decision making under ambiguity (see section 3.4.2.2.1). While a 
negative affect increases risk aversion in decisions under risk (c.f. Heilman et al., 2010) it leads to inferior 
decision making under ambiguity (De Vries, et al., 2008b). Additionally, while a positive affective state leads, at 
least on a descriptive level, to inferior decision making under risk (c.f. Bagneux et al., 2012), it increases the 
decision-making performance in ambiguous decisions (De Vries, et al., 2008b). However, in decision under risk 
these influences interfere with other situational conditions, for instance framing effects (c.f. Cassotti et al., 
2012), or the usage of experimental induced affect-regulation strategies (c.f. Heilman et al., 2010). Due to the 
special role of executive functions in decision making under risk (see section 3.2.2.2), the question remains 
whether executive functions could also moderate affective influences on decision-making performance. This is 
considered in the second study (chapter 5) of the present thesis, in which the possible interaction between 
decision making under risk while performing an additional task simultaneously, executive functions, and 
affective influences were analyzed. 
A related topic to affect is stress. The origin of several affective states (e.g., anger, anxiety, hope, and 
relief) often lays in stressful situations. However, in the literature stress and affect were mostly investigated 
separately (Lazarus, 1993, 1999). Therefore, the following chapter is devoted to stress and its influence on 
decision-making processes.  
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3.4.3 Stress 
Stress is a mental and bodily state that accompanies humans in everyday life and influences peoples’ behavior, 
including decision making (for a review about stress and decision making see Starcke & Brand, 2012). 
However, before going into more detail on neurobiological correlates of stress and its influence on decision-
making processes, in the following a short synopsis of the history of stress research will be given, which display 
the understanding of stress in the current thesis. 
Since the 1930s stress is a constant field in psychological research and investigated in its many facets 
and in many different ways (for an overview see Schiebener, Staschkiewicz, et al., 2013; Starcke & Brand, 
2012). A first understanding of stress was given by Hans Selye who defined stress as a general, nonspecific 
physiological response to a stressor (Selye, 1956). Hereby, a stressor was described as heat or cold while in the 
following decade the focus lied on cognitive factors (e.g., appraisals; c.f. Lazarus, 1999). In 1976 Selye 
specified his concept of stress by distinguishing between eustress and distress, whereby eustress was associated 
with positive feelings and healthy bodily states and distress with negative feelings and impaired bodily states 
(c.f. Lazarus, 1993; Selye, 1976). However, Seyle did not specify the physiological or psychological differences 
between those kinds of stress. This became more clear in the works of Lazarus (Lazarus, 1966, 1991a, 1993; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Launier, 1978). He differentiated between challenge, harm, and threat. 
According to Lazarus, challenge results from demanding situations, which a person feels confident about to 
overcome, and often leads to exhilarated feeling and expansive performance. In contrast, harm describes 
psychological damage that has already take place (e.g., death of a beloved person) and threat includes the 
anticipation of possible harm that has not yet taken place. Threat is described as an “unpleasant state of mind 
that may seriously block mental operations and impair functions” (Lazarus, 1993, p. 5). However, over the years 
studies have shown that it appears to be extremely difficult to dissociate these different kinds of stress (Koolhaas 
et al., 2011). Therefore, in the current thesis, there is no distinction between positive or negative stress. Stress is 
seen as an occurrence due to a discrepancy between an environmental, personal relevant demand (primary 
appraisal; Lazarus & Smith, 1988) and available resources to cope with it (secondary appraisal; Lazarus & 
Smith, 1988). In particular, unpredictable and uncontrollable situations seem to be experienced as stressful 
(Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Koolhaas, et al., 2011).  
In order to get a better understanding of how stress is processed and may possibly interfere with 
decision-making processes, the following section will address the neuroendocrine and neural correlates of stress.  
3.4.3.1 Neurobiological correlates of stress 
It is postulated that stress processes bear on two neural systems of brain and body: The sympathetic 
adrenomedullary system (SAM-system; Cannon, 1914) that reacts fast and the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal 
axis (HPA-axis; Selye, 1956), which reacts slower. These two systems will now be outlined. 
Within the SAM-system (see Figure 9), the neural stress reactions arise immediately after stress 
exposure: They originate in the hypothalamus and are conveyed via the sympathetic nuclei to the adrenal 
medulla. At this juncture, the catecholamines adrenaline and noradrenaline are released. In return, the 
catecholamines can enter the brain via the locus coeruleus. Here, projections reach the amygdala, the thalamus, 
the hypothalamus, the hippocampus and the PFC (review in e.g., Chrousos & Gold, 1992; De Kloet, Joels, & 
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Holsboer, 2005; Roozendaal, McEwen, & Chattarji, 2009). Moreover, the release of noradrenaline and 
adrenaline elicits different reactions of the sympathetic nervous system. For example, increases in electrodermal 
activity, blood pressure, and heart rate that occur directly after stress onset and return to baseline around 10 min 
after leaving the stressful situation (Het, Rohleder, Schoofs, Kirschbaum, & Wolf, 2009; Clemens Kirschbaum, 
Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). Catecholamines can be measured in the blood and by analyzing the enzyme alpha-
amylase in saliva samples (Nater & Rohleder, 2009; Rohleder & Nater, 2009).  
 
Figure 9 The sympathetic adrenomedullary system (SAM-system; Cannon, 1994).  
The directly involved structures are accentuated. This figure is modified from Schiebener, Staschkiewicz et al. (2013). PFC = prefrontal 
cortex; LC = locus coeruleus.  
 
Within the HPA-axis (see Figure 10), stress leads to a release of the corticotropin-releasing hormone of 
the hypothalamus. This causes a release of the adrenocorticotropic hormone of the pituitary that in turn 
stimulates the secretion of glucocorticoids (Sapolsky, Romero, & Munck, 2000). Various structures of the 
central nervous system are involved in the regulation of the HPA-axis: the amygdala, the hippocampus, and 
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parts of PFC (De Kloet, et al., 2005; Herman, Ostrander, Mueller, & Figueiredo, 2005). These are brain regions 
that possess a high density of receptors (mineralocorticoide-receptors/type 1 and glucocorticoid-receptors/type 
2; review in Lupien, Maheu, Tu, Fiocco, & Schramek, 2007) to that glucocorticoids can bind. The major stress 
hormone in humans is cortisol. It elevates blood glucose levels to mobilize energy resources. It peaks 
approximately 21 to 40 min after a person encounters a stressful situation and returns to baseline level (i.e., 
before stressor) within 41 to 60 min (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Cortisol can, among others, also be 
measured by analyzing the cortisol level in saliva samples (Clemens Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1994).  
 
Figure 10 The hypothalamic pituitary adrenal axis (HPA-axis; Selye, 1956).  
The directly involved structures are accentuated. This figure is modified from Schiebener, Staschkiewicz et al. (2013). PFC = prefrontal 
cortex; ACTH = adrenocorticotropic hormone; CRH = corticotropin-releasing hormone. 
 
Furthermore, various neuroimaging studies investigating neural correlates of stress in healthy 
participants demonstrated metabolic changes in brain regions associated with a high density of glucocorticoids 
receptors. However, the results are heterogeneous. As can be seen in Table 3, some studies found an increase in 
Theoretical background                   Situational influences on decision making 75 
 
activity due to stress exposure in brain regions, like the ACC, the dlPFC, the cerebellum, and brain regions that 
are associated with the limbic system such as, the thalamus, and the insular cortex. In contrast, other studies 
found a decrease in activity due to stress in some of the same brain regions, for example, the ACC, the dlPFC, 
the OFC, and limbic related structures such as the hippocampus, the basal ganglia and the hypothalamus. These 
heterogeneous findings could be due to the fact that the studies differ in the paradigms used to induce and 
measure stress as well as in the time points of stress inducement and measurement (see Table 3). Therefore, the 
results are not directly comparable, and it remains unclear whether stress leads to an increased or decreased 
activation of prefrontal and limbic structures.  
These mixed results can also be explained by interindividual differences in stress response (Kudielka, 
Hellhammer, & Wust, 2009). For example, it is consistently found that psychological stress paradigms (see 
section 3.4.3.2 for a few examples) lead to differences in cortisol response between men and women (Lovallo, 
Farag, Vincent, Thomas, & Wilson, 2006; Steptoe, Fieldman, Evans, & Perry, 1996). Although the pre-stress 
level did not differ, the cortisol increase after a psychological stress paradigm was found to be up to twice as 
high in men as in women (Clemens Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1995; C Kirschbaum, Wüst, & 
Hellhammer, 1992; Kumsta et al., 2007). Further factors that might influence the HPA-reactivity are age, use of 
oral contraceptive, chronic alcohol, or nicotine consumption. Therefore, it is important to control for these 
factors in stress research. However, there are many other factors influencing the stress reaction, which cannot 
easily be controlled, for instance, genetic factors, early life stress experiences, and personality. Therefore, the 
inability to control all of the factors that might influence stress response may lead to heterogeneous findings 
across studies (Kudielka, et al., 2009).  
Overall, it becomes obvious that the brain regions involved in stress reactions, are also partially 
involved in decision making under ambiguity and risk (see section 3.3). The following sections will present 
studies investigating the interaction between stress and decisions under ambiguity and risk in healthy 
participants. First, however, an overview about possible stressors used in the laboratory to induce stress in 
participants, is given. 
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Table 3 Overview about the stressors, indicator of stress, and the time points of measurement and induction used in studies investigating the 
neural correlates of stress. 
Note. The imaging results only include activation pattern from healthy participants, findings from patient groups are not mentioned. PET = 
Positron Emission Tomography, fMRI = functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, MIST = Montreal Imaging Stress Task, SAM = Self-
Assessment Manikin, STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
 
 
Study Stressor Time point of 
stressor 
Indicator of 
stress 
Time point of 
stress 
measurement 
Imaging results 
Critchley, Corfield, 
Chandler, Mathias, 
and Dolan (2000) 
Serial 
subtraction 
During PET
 
session 
Heart rate and 
blood pressure 
During scanning Increased activation in 
the ACC and 
cerebellum 
Dedovic, Rexroth 
et al. (2009) 
MIST
 
During fMRI 
session 
cortisol  Before and 
during scanning 
Increased activation in 
the dlPFC, the 
dorsomedial PFC, and 
temporal pole;  
Decreased activation in 
the hippocampus, 
medial OFC, and basal 
ganglia 
Ito, Kanno, 
Hatazawa, and 
Miura (2003) 
Serial 
subtraction 
During fMRI 
session 
Heart rate, blood 
pressure and 
arterial 
concentration of 
adrenaline, 
noradrenaline and 
dopamine 
During scanning Increased activation in 
the thalamus, insular 
cortex, ACC, 
cerebellum, superior 
temporal gyrus, inferior 
frontal gyrus, and 
angular gyrus 
Koric et al. (2012) Serial 
addition 
During fMRI 
session 
SAM During scanning Increased activation in 
the dlPFC 
Pruessner et al. 
(2008) 
MIST
 
During 
PET/fMRI 
session 
Cortisol  Before, during, 
and after the 
scanning 
Decreased activation in 
the hippocampus, 
hypothalamus, OFC, 
and ACC  
Soufer et al. (1998) Serial 
subtraction 
During PET 
session 
Heart rate and 
blood pressure 
During scanning Increased activation in 
the inferior frontal 
gyrus 
Tillfors et al. 
(2001) 
Public 
speech 
During fMRI 
session 
1) Heart rate 
2) STAI, ratings 
of fear 
and distress 
1) During 
scanning 
2) After 
scanning 
Increased activation in 
the insular cortex and 
temporal pole 
Wang et al. (2005) Serial 
subtraction 
During fMRI 
session 
Cortisol, heart 
rate, self-report 
Before, during, 
and after 
scanning 
Increased activation in 
the ventral PFC, ACC, 
and insular cortex 
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3.4.3.2 Laboratory stressors 
In order to induce stress in the laboratory it is possible to administer stress hormones, like adrenaline and 
cortisol, which directly leads to physical stress reactions. Another common method is to use laboratory stressors 
that simulate natural stressors (Starcke & Brand, 2012). Such stressors might either be of a physical challenge 
(e.g., pain, heat, cold, exercise, inhalation of CO2), a cognitive demand (e.g., analytical tasks, mental arithmetic, 
vigilance, or reaction-time tasks), or a social-evaluative threat (e.g., actual performance or anticipation of a 
public speech, direct or virtual observation of a person performing something, or verbal interaction). It is also 
possible to combine two or more stressors (e.g., mental arithmetic and public speech) (for a review see Dedovic, 
D'Aguiar, & Pruessner, 2009; Starcke & Brand, 2012).  
An example of a physical challenge is the Cold Pressor Test (CPT; Hines & Brown, 1932). In the CPT, 
the hand of an individual is immersed into ice cold water for duration of one to three minutes (sometimes even 
longer). To the field of cognitive demands, belongs the serial subtraction or addition task, in which participants 
have to subtract or add a number e.g., 7 from/to a given 3- to 4- digit number (e.g., Ito, et al., 2003; Koric, et al., 
2012). An example of a social-evaluative threat is the actual performance or anticipation of a public speech. 
Participants are asked to prepare a speech to a given topic. Thereafter they have to deliver the speech in front of 
an audience while they are videotaped. In the case of the anticipated speech participants do not have to deliver 
the speech (but this information is not given to the participants). A combination of social-evaluated threat and 
cognitive demand are the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Clemens Kirschbaum, et al., 1993) and the Montreal 
Imaging Stress Task (MIST; Dedovic et al., 2005). In the TSST, participants are asked to prepare and actually 
deliver a speech (similar to a mock job interview) in front of a committee, clothed with white coats, which 
behaves in a reserved and neutral way. After the speech, participants are asked to perform an arithmetic task as 
fast and accurate as possible, for example, counting backwards in steps of 17 starting with the number ‘2043’. 
During this whole procedure the participants are videotaped. In the MIST, participants are asked to perform 
challenging mental arithmetic tasks presented on a computer screen. Feedback is provided on screen (“correct” 
vs. “incorrect”). The difficulty of the tasks adapts to the participants performance such that a range of 20% to 45 
% correct answers is enforced. A pseudo performance indictor informs the participants about their own and the 
other participants’ average performance. Between experimental runs, participants are informed by the 
investigator that their individual performance has to be close to the average performance (80% to 90% correct 
answers) in order to be used in the study and the participants are told that their performance is monitored by the 
investigator and other participants.  
To measure participants stress reactions, various stress indicators can be used. For example, it is 
possible to use the aforementioned saliva sample to analyze the cortisol, and alpha-amylase level (see section 
3.4.3.1). Hereby, salivary cortisol is associated with slower HPA-axis activity (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004), 
while salivary alpha-amylase mirrors the fast reactivity of the sympathetic nervous system, also SAM-system, 
(Nater & Rohleder, 2009; Rohleder & Nater, 2009). Furthermore, stress reactions can be measured by heart rate, 
blood pressure (e.g., Soufer, et al., 1998), but also through blood samples, which are used to analyze the stress 
hormone level (e.g., Ito, et al., 2003). Other measurements for stress reactions are self-reports and 
questionnaires, e.g., participants are asked to indicate their experienced level of anxiety and distress on a Likert 
scale. Common questionnaires used in stress studies are for example, the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
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Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1977), which measures acute anxiety reactions and the PANAS 
(Watson & Clark, 1999), which measures current affect. 
3.4.3.3 The influence of stress on decision making  
Most of the mentioned laboratory stressors were also used in order to induce stress in participants before they 
have to perform a decision-making task. This was done to examine the assumed negative influence on the 
decision-making performance. The following two sections will provide an overview about studies addressing 
decision making under ambiguity (section 3.4.3.3.1) or risk (section 3.4.3.3.2) in stressful situations in healthy 
participants. 
3.4.3.3.1 Decision making under ambiguity in stressful situations 
In the year 2007, Preston and colleagues were one of the first researcher groups investigating the influence of 
stress on the performance of decisions under ambiguity. They assumed that stress might interfere with task-
related affect (somatic markers) that are necessary to make advantageous decisions in ambiguous situations. To 
test their assumption the authors conducted a study, in which participants were asked to perform the IGT two 
times (the first time the original version, the second time the repeat test version with different contingencies; for 
a brief description of the original version see Table 1). Before participants performed the IGT a second time, the 
experimental group was stressed while the control group sat quietly and waited until the second IGT 
performance began. For stress inducement Preston and colleagues (2007) used a social-evaluative threat, an 
anticipated public speech. Participants were asked to prepare a speech about what they like or dislike about their 
physical appearance. They were told that they would have to perform the IGT a second time within the next 20 
min and that thereafter they would have to deliver the speech. However, after the participants had performed the 
repeat test version of the IGT they were debriefed that they would not have to deliver the speech. Stress 
reactions were measured via heart rate during both IGT performances. For this purpose, electrodes were 
attached at the participants’ bodies. Moreover, STAI and PANAS were used to measure the current (affective) 
state of the participants. The self-report measurements were administered after arrival of the participants and a 
second time after the 50
th
 trial of both IGT versions. The results demonstrated that the stress induction was 
successful: Compared with the control group the experimental group showed higher anxiety and less positive 
affect in the self-report measures and a higher increase in heart rate. The increase in experienced stress 
influenced the decision-making performance: Across the 100 trials the participants of the experimental group 
learned the contingencies of the IGT more slowly than the control group. Furthermore, the results revealed an 
effect of gender. Stressed women chose from the advantageous card decks more often than unstressed women, 
while stressed men decided more disadvantageously than unstressed men. Preston and colleagues concluded that 
stress interferes with task-related affect and consequently leads to impaired decision making. However, gender 
appears to moderate these effects. 
These results are supported by findings by Van den Bos, Harteveld, and Stoop (2009). While the 
authors also used the IGT in order to operationalize decision making under ambiguity, they induced stress using 
the TSST (for a short description of this test see section 3.4.3.2). Stress was induced before participants of the 
experimental group performed the IGT. In contrast, the control group listened to music or read magazines. 
Stress reactions were measured by analyzing the salivary cortisol concentration (see section 3.4.3.2) in both 
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groups. Thus, it was possible to classify the stress group in to high stress responders (i.e., participants with high 
cortisol responses) and low stress responders (i.e., participants with low cortisol responses). The data 
demonstrated again an effect of gender: Male high-responders decided more disadvantageously than male low-
responders and control participants. Moreover, the correlative analysis revealed that higher cortisol 
concentration is associated with inferior decision-making performance. Conversely, female high-responders 
chose more cards from the advantageous decks and won more money in the second part of the game than low-
responders and control participants, at least by trend. Furthermore, the correlative analysis revealed an 
interesting finding: An increase in cortisol concentration is associated with superior decision-making 
performance. However, very high cortisol concentrations lead to an increase in decision-making performance. 
Van den Bos and colleagues concluded that increased cortisol concentration as an indicator of stress reactions 
appears to influence decision making under ambiguity differently in men and women.  
In total, it appears that stress impairs ambiguous decision making, especially in men. In contrast, 
women likely profit from stressful situations: Stressed women decide more advantageously than non-stressed 
women. The next section gives an overview about studies investigating the influence of stress in decision 
making under risk.  
3.4.3.3.2 Decision making under risk in stressful situations 
Regarding decisions under risk, several studies investigated the influence of stress on decision making using 
different decision-making tasks and various stressors and measurements of stress. This might have led to the 
heterogeneous findings reviewed here. 
For example, studies using different modified versions of the CGT (see a brief description of the 
original version in Table 1) showed heterogeneous findings of the effect of stress on decision making under risk 
(Clark et al., 2012; Porcelli & Delgado, 2009; Putman, Antypa, Crysovergi, & van der Does, 2010). While Clark 
and colleagues (2012) found that stress leads to more risk-averse decision making, probably through an increase 
in processing loss information, the other two research groups found that stress increases risk-taking. Porcelli and 
Delgado (2009) revealed that in stressful situations participants choose more of the risky options especially in 
the loss domain (potentially negative outcomes), whereas they played more conservative in the gain domain 
(potentially positive outcomes). In comparison, stress in the study by Putman, Antypa, and colleagues (2010) 
led to risky decision making, in particular when this choice was associated with a potential high reward. As 
implied before, these contrasting findings might be due to different stressors and stress indicators used in those 
studies. For example, Clark and colleagues (2012) induced stress using the anticipation of an electric shock and 
for an indicator of stress they measured SCRs and heart rate. By contrast, Porcelli and Delgado used the CPT 
(for a short description of this test see section 3.4.3.2) for stress inducement. Stress reactions were measured 
with SCRs, too. Putman, Antypa, et al. (2010) induced stress by direct oral application of cortisol (capsule 
containing 40 mg cortisol) and collected saliva samples (see section 3.4.3.2) in order to measure cortisol level as 
stress reaction. Moreover, the STAI as a self-report measurement was administered. A further difference 
between those studies is that Putman, Antypa, and colleagues (2010) only investigated men, whereas the two 
other research groups investigated both men and women. Those factors could be reason for the heterogeneous 
findings. In total, studies investigating the influence of stress on decision making under risk, using various 
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modified versions of the CGT, found that stress influences decision-making performance, but whether stress 
leads to more advantageous or more disadvantageous decisions remains unclear. 
There are also two studies investigating the effect of stress on decision making under risk using the 
BART (Lighthall, Mather, & Gorlick, 2009; Lighthall et al., 2012; see also Table 1 for a brief description of the 
task). In the first study (Lighthall, et al., 2009), stress was induced using the CPT before performing the 
decision-making task. Stress reactions were measured by analyzing cortisol concentration. Results revealed an 
effect of gender: Under stress, men became more risk-seeking while women became more risk avoidant. In a 
subsequent study Lighthall and colleagues (2012) were interested in the underlying brain mechanism of this 
gender-specific stress effect. Using the same stressors and indicators for stress reactions the authors found no 
differences in risk-taking between men and women. However, results revealed on a behavioral level that stress 
led to higher reward collection and faster decision-making speed in men but to lower reward collection and 
slower decision-making speed in women. Moreover, imaging data showed that regions associated with reward 
collection (the striatum and the insular cortex) were more activated in men than in women. Lighthall and 
colleagues (2012) suggested that the BART, which was used in an fMRI version in this study, could be the 
reason for not finding any sex-related differences in risk-taking. In this fMRI version participants did not need 
to take the risk and inflate balloons in order to earn more money; instead they could increase the decision-
making speed and leave the balloons relatively small. In summary, stress appears to influence decision making 
in men and women differentially: While stressed men seem to be more risk-seeking and reward-collecting, they 
are also faster in decision making under risk than non-stressed men. Stressed women appear to be more risk 
avoidant, less reward-collecting, and slower in decision making under risk than non-stressed women. 
Starcke and colleagues (2008) found that stress also influences GDT performance (see Table 1 for a 
brief description of this task). In their study the participants were told that before performing the GDT they 
would have to deliver a (anticipated) speech, discussing how they evaluate their cognitive abilities, in front of an 
audience and a video camera. By contrast, control participants were told to think about their last holiday. To 
assess stress reactions salivary cortisol and alpha-amylase were used as well as questionnaires (PANAS and 
STAI). The findings demonstrated that stressed participants were more anxious and had more negative affect 
after stress induction. Furthermore, they showed a significantly higher alpha-amylase increase than control 
participants. The cortisol increase was only higher on a descriptive level for stressed participants compared to 
control participants. Still, concerning decision-making performance, the results demonstrated that the stress 
group made more disadvantageous decisions than the control group. Moreover, a negative correlation between 
decision-making performance and cortisol increase was found. This indicates that a higher increase in cortisol is 
associated with more risky decision making. Analyses revealed no effect of gender. A further study using the 
GDT investigated how stress affects decision-making performance at different points in time (Pabst, Brand, & 
Wolf, 2013). Therefore, the GDT was administered at three different points in time resulting in three different 
experimental groups plus control group. To induce stress the TSST (for a short description of this test see 
section 3.4.3.2) was used. Stress reactions were measured using the PANAS as well as collecting salivary 
cortisol and alpha-amylase. The male participants were assigned to the four groups. In group one the 
participants performed the GDT after they had prepared the speech they would have to deliver (5 min after 
baseline measurement). Participants of the second group performed the GDT right after the TSST (18 min after 
baseline measurement), while the third group had to wait additional 10 min before performing the GDT (28 min 
Theoretical background                   Situational influences on decision making 81 
 
after baseline measurement). The control group performed the GDT at the same time point as the second group 
(18 min after baseline measurement). However, the control group was not stressed. Instead, they had to rest 
before they were asked to perform the GDT. In summary, the results revealed that acute stress has a time 
dependent effect on the decision-making performance. The first and the second group, which performed the 
GDT earlier than the third group, demonstrated superior decision-making performance, than the third group and 
the control group. In contrast, descriptively, the third group showed more disadvantageous decisions than the 
control group. This indicates that fast sympathetic reactions (increase in salivary alpha-amylase that suggests 
increased catecholamine like noradrenaline and dopamine) lead to improved decision making while slower 
HPA-axis related reactions (increase in salivary cortisol) appears to lead to inferior decision-making 
performance. 
Overall, stress influences decision making under risk. However, while some studies found effects of 
gender other did not. Moreover, findings are heterogeneous regarding the fact whether stress leads to 
impairment or to improvement of decision-making performance. Besides the fact that this might be due to 
different stressors used and different stress reaction measurements, studies using the GDT demonstrated that this 
might also be a time depended effect, with superior decision-making performance at the beginning of a stressor 
and inferior performance later on. So far, the studies mentioned above only addressed one situational influence 
on decision making at a time that means either additional cognitive demand (see section 3.4.1) or additional 
affective influence (see sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3). The question remains what happens with the decision-making 
performance when both processing routes (cognitive and affective) are demanded by decision making irrelevant 
claims simultaneously. The following section will address this matter. 
3.4.4 Additioinal cognitive and affective influences and the interaction with decision making under 
risk 
So far, each situational influence and its effect on decision-making performance, was addressed individually. 
Particularly in decision making under risk it was shown that additional executive demand leads to inferior 
decision making, as well as affective influences, especially stress (see sections 3.4.1.4.2, 3.4.2.2.2, and 
3.4.3.3.2). However, in everyday life a situation provides many situational influences in combination (see the 
example in section 2, in which the student has an exam, missed the train and now needs to reschedule the 
departure while simultaneously deciding whether she/he will get in time to the university to take the exam). The 
remaining question is: What would happen to the decision-making performance when both processing routes 
(the cognitive and the affective route) are demanded simultaneously while having to decide. Due to the fact both 
routes interact in decision-making processes it appears plausible that this will lead to impairments in 
performance. 
A recent study addressed this question and examined the interaction between stress, decision making 
under risk, and additional executive load (Pabst, Schoofs, et al., 2013). For this purpose participants had either 
to perform the GDT plus an additional 2-back task or the GDT solely. Moreover, half of the participants of each 
condition (GDT plus 2-back vs. GDT) were stressed before task performance. For stress induction the TSST 
was used. Stress reactions were measured by the PANAS as well as salivary cortisol and alpha-amylase. It was 
hypothesized that the combination of stress and additional task would lead to an even substantial impairment of 
decision making. The results showed that each condition alone (i.e., participants performing the GDT solely 
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after being stressed and participants performing the GDT plus 2-back task without being stressed before) led to 
the well-known decrease in disadvantageous decision making in the GDT (c.f. Starcke, et al., 2011; Starcke, et 
al., 2008; see also section 3.4.1.4.2). Interestingly, the combination of both (stress and additional task) revealed 
no decision-making impairments. Stressed participants performed the GDT in the dual-tasking condition similar 
to non-stressed participants performing the GDT solely. This appears to be paradoxical, but Pabst, Schoofs, and 
colleagues (2013) argue that this might be due to stress induced cognitive shift from serial to parallel processing: 
According to Starcke and colleagues (2011) both tasks (GDT and 2-back task) require the same cognitive 
processes, which belong to system 2. Therefore, both tasks need to be processed serially (Evans, 2003; 
Kahneman, 2003). In the frame of dual-process theories and dual-tasking approaches this means that 
concentrating on one task set, results in inhibition of information of the second task set (Koch, Gade, Schuch, & 
Philipp, 2010), which again narrows the attention of the participants to the particular tasks and subsequently 
shielding the task from competing distractors (see Easterbrook, 1959). Simultaneously, it enables participants to 
monitor task performance for potential second-task-associated action information, in order to switch to this task 
if necessary (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, & Goschke, 2011). If acute stress is induced 
in this kind of dual-tasking situations it was shown that it did not impair task performance (see also Schwabe, 
Schächinger, de Kloet, & Oitzl, 2010), but that it decreases task shielding (Plessow, et al., 2012). Plessow and 
colleagues (2012) assumed that decreasing task shielding enables a cognitive shift from a serial to parallel goal 
monitoring enabling the performance of both tasks. Furthermore, they suggest that stress triggers a less 
resource-demanding processing mode (see also Arnsten, 2009; Schwabe, Wolf, & Oitzl, 2010). It is assumed 
that in a single-task situation the less resource-consuming task-processing mode is associated with tonic task 
shielding (Lehle, Steinhauser, & Hübner, 2009), which was shown to be increased under acute stress (Plessow, 
et al., 2011). In dual-task situations, however, the less resource-consuming processing mode is associated with a 
reduction of task shielding that increases parallel processing (Lehle, et al., 2009). Consequently, Pabst, Schoofs, 
and colleagues (2013) argue that in their study stress may also have triggered a serial-to-parallel processing 
mode in the dual-tasking condition, in which parallel performance is advantageously for inferior task 
performance. Besides this finding, it was also found that executive functions (i.e., divided attention) appear to 
moderate this influence: When performing the GDT solely participants with low divided attention ability 
decided disadvantageously in the condition without stress and even worse in a stressful situation. In contrast, 
participants with high divided attention ability performing the GDT plus 2-back task showed improved (low 
risk) decision making under stress than those without. However, stress did not influence the decision-making 
performance in participants who have a high ability to divide attention when they performed the GDT solely. 
Likewise, when participants had a low ability to divide their attention they showed disadvantageous decision 
making, regardless whether they were stressed before or not. In summary, while studies using the GDT solely 
have shown that stress seems to impair the decision-making performance, a simultaneous induced cognitive 
demanding load due to an additional executive task, does not lead to an increased impairment. In contrast, a 
combination of both manipulations seems to cancel out the negative effects of each single condition. 
Furthermore, executive functions appear to moderate the influence of stress on such demanding situations. 
Still remaining is the question of the underlying neural correlates of the interaction between stress, 
decision making under risk, and additional executive load. What happens in the brain that enables participants to 
decide advantageously although both processing routes (cognitive and affective route) are demanded otherwise? 
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Study 1 of the present thesis was conducted to address this question in detail and to contribute to enlarge the 
knowledge about processing mechanisms of the human brain in demanding decision-making situations.  
3.5 Conclusion from theoretical background 
Reviewing the literature of the neuropsychological decision-making research revealed that there is a broad 
knowledge about the underlying cognitive and affective processes as well as about the associated neural 
correlates. Yet, about the interaction between cognitive and affective processes in decision making and the 
associated neural correlates little is known. In particular, in decision making under risk it is of interest to 
investigate such interaction in more detail, since it was shown that a demand on the cognitive route alone (see 
section 3.4.1.4.2) as well as a demand on the affective route solely leads to impaired decision making (see 
sections 3.4.2.2.2 and 3.4.3.3.2), but a demand on both routes simultaneously does not affect decision-making 
performance (see section 3.4.4). The first study of this thesis aims to investigate the underlying neural correlates 
of the interaction between stress (as affective demand), additional cognitive demand and decision making, in 
order to enlighten this paradoxical appearing effect. Due to the fact that it was shown that varying valence of 
affect influences decision making under risk differentially (see section 3.4.2.2.2), the second study aims to 
investigate the effect of affective influences of varying valence on decision making in situations with additional 
cognitive demand. Moreover, studies have shown that cognitive functions may compensate each other in case 
one function is impaired as well as they appear to compensate impairments of the affective route, in order to 
prevent decision-making performance from decreasing (see sections 3.1.2.2, 3.2.2.2, and 3.4.4). Therefore, a 
possible moderation effect of cognitive functions, such as executive functions, on the affective influence on 
decision-making performance in situations with additional cognitive demand will also be examined in study 2. 
According to dual-tasking approaches a supervisory/ monitoring function is needed to perform two tasks 
simultaneously (see section 3.4.1). However, regarding decision making various studies have demonstrated that 
executive functions, for instance categorization and feedback processing, are involved in order to decide 
advantageously (see section 3.2.2.2). The last study of the current thesis aimed to analyze which specific 
executive functions are involved in this kind of dual-tasking situation, where a decision needs to be made while 
another executive task needs to be performed simultaneously. Gaining knowledge about the executive functions 
involved in such situations may firstly extend understanding the role of executive functions in decision making 
per se and secondly in demanding decision-making situations in particular. 
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4. Study 1: Stress and decision making: Neural correlates of the interaction between stress, executive 
functions, and decision making under risk 
4.1 Abstract 
Stress and additional load on the executive system, produced by a parallel working memory task, impair 
decision making under risk. However, the combination of stress and a parallel task seems to preserve the 
decision-making performance (e.g., operationalized by the GDT) from decreasing, probably by a shift from 
serial to parallel processing. The question remains how the brain manages such demanding decision-making 
situations. The current study used a 7-tesla magnetic resonance imaging system in order to investigate the 
underlying neural correlates of the interaction between stress (induced by the TSST), risky decision making 
(GDT), and a parallel executive task (2-back task) to get a better understanding of those behavioral findings. 
The results show that on a behavioral level, stressed participants did not show significant differences in task 
performance. Interestingly, when comparing the stress group (SG) with the control group, the stress group (SG) 
showed a greater increase in neural activation in the anterior PFC (aPFC) when performing the 2-back task 
simultaneously with the GDT than when performing each task alone. This brain area is associated with parallel 
processing. Thus, the results may suggest that in stressful dual-tasking situations, where a decision has to be 
made when in parallel working memory is demanded, a stronger activation of a brain area associated with 
parallel processing takes place. The findings are in line with the idea that stress seems to trigger a shift from 
serial to parallel processing in demanding dual-tasking situations. 
4.2 Introduction 
Decision making is a key function in human everyday life. Sometimes, decisions are less important, without far-
reaching consequences, and easy to make such as which clothes to wear or which meal to cook. However, in 
some situations, people have to make decisions with potentially severe consequences, for example, a doctor in 
the operating room, a policeman during a street fight, or a stock market trader who has to decide which company 
shares to buy or to sell. These situations often elicit psychological stress, which could have an influence on the 
decisions people make. Additionally, these situations often require making more than one decision at the same 
time. In these situations, people have to make crucial decisions in a stressful setting while working on another 
problem simultaneously. It is important to understand what happens to peoples’ decision-making performance in 
such situations.  
As described in detail in section 3, the field of neuropsychological decision-making research 
distinguishes between decisions under ambiguity and decisions under risk (Brand, et al., 2006). In contrast to 
decision making under ambiguity, in decisions under risk, the decision maker has knowledge about the 
probabilities of different potential outcomes – or the probabilities are explicitly provided – and can largely 
estimate the possible consequences (Brand, et al., 2006). An often used task to measure decision making under 
risk is the GDT (for a brief description of this task see Table 1). A recent study using this task investigated the 
interaction between stress, decision making under risk, and additional executive load (Pabst, Schoofs, et al., 
2013; a more detailed description of this study is given in section 3.4.4). The participants were divided into four 
groups: a stress group and a control group performing only the GDT (single-task condition) and a stress group 
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and a control group performing the GDT plus an additional working memory 2-back task (dual-task condition). 
Pabst, Schoofs, and colleagues (2013) found that while stress led to diminished GDT performance in the single-
task condition, in the dual-task condition stress seems to preserve the decision-making performance from 
decreasing, resulting in comparable GDT performances in the dual-task condition and in the single-task 
condition. However, when comparing the decision-making performance between the two control groups, they 
found that participants performing the additional 2-back task in parallel made more disadvantageous decisions 
than participants performing the GDT by itself. These results are in line with previous studies demonstrating 
negative influence of stress on GDT performance (Starcke, et al., 2008) and diminished decision-making 
performance while performing a secondary executive task simultaneously (Starcke, et al., 2011). Still, of more 
interest is the fact that stress combined with a parallel executive task seems to retain good decision-making 
performance. As discussed in section 3.4.4 in detail, Pabst, Schoofs, and colleagues (2013) assumed that stress 
triggers a cognitive shift from serial goal monitoring to parallel goal monitoring, which is a less resource-
consuming mode for dual tasking (Lehle, et al., 2009). Consequently, leading to preserved performance in the 
decision-making task. The question remains what happens in the brain in such demanding situations and which 
brain areas are involved. 
Neuroimaging studies investigating the underlying neural mechanisms of decision making under risk 
found brain areas associated with executive functions (the dlPFC, the ACC, and parts of the posterior parietal 
lobe) as well as areas associated with affective processing (the vmPFC/OFC and limbic structures) to be 
involved in decision making under risk (see section 3.3 for detailed information about the neural correlates of 
decisions under risk). These findings fit nicely with the results of a recent fMRI study by Gläscher and 
colleagues (2012), demonstrating that the aforementioned brain areas are involved in two functional-anatomical 
pathways: a cognitive one, which includes the dlPFC and the ACC, and a value-based one, which includes, 
among others, the vmPFC/OFC. These findings support the assumption by Brand and colleagues (2006) that 
beyond the necessity of the cognitive pathway, affective processing is also involved in decision making under 
risk (for more information see sections 3.1.2.2 and 3.2.2.2). Studies comparing the decision-making 
performance of healthy control subjects with patients who have lesions or dysfunctions to limbic and prefrontal 
brain areas support these findings by demonstrating that these patients made more disadvantageous decisions in 
the GDT (e.g., Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; Delazer, et al., 2007; Drechsler, et 
al., 2007; Euteneuer, et al., 2009; Fond, et al., 2012; Svaldi, et al., 2012).  
Studies addressing the neural correlates of stress revealed heterogeneous findings. Some studies found 
that stress leads to deactivation in brain regions such as the OFC (Pruessner, et al., 2008; Tillfors, et al., 2001) 
and other regions associated with the limbic system such as the hippocampus and the hypothalamus (Dedovic, 
Rexroth, et al., 2009; Pruessner, et al., 2008), the ACC (Åhs et al., 2006; Pruessner, et al., 2008), and the dlPFC 
(Åhs, et al., 2006; Oei et al., 2007; Pruessner, et al., 2008; Qin, Hermans, van Marle, Luo, & Fernández, 2009). 
In contrast, other studies demonstrated an increase in some of the same brain regions during stress exposure: the 
ACC and the dlPFC (Dedovic, Rexroth, et al., 2009; Tillfors, Furmark, Marteinsdottir, & Fredrikson, 2002; 
Wang, et al., 2005), and limbic-related structures such as the hippocampus, the amygdala, the thalamus, and the 
insular cortex (Ito, et al., 2003; Tillfors, et al., 2002; Wang, et al., 2005). Results are not consistent, and it 
remains unclear whether stress leads to an increased or decreased activation of prefrontal and limbic structures 
(see section 3.4.3.1 for further information regarding the heterogeneity of the findings). Apart from this, it is 
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assumable that because decision making and stress reactions are associated with overlapping brain areas, stress 
can modulate decision making as discussed before (see also the review by Starcke & Brand, 2012). However, no 
study investigated the underlying neural correlates of the interaction between stress, decision making, and an 
additional executive load. What are the neural correlates of the suggested shift to a parallel goal monitoring and 
thus to advantageous decision making in dual-task situations as described by Pabst, Schoofs, and colleagues 
(2013)?  
The present study was conducted in order to close this gap. We used the same task paradigm used in 
the study by Pabst, Schoofs, and colleagues (2013) but modified for fMRI. In one group, stress was induced 
before the scans, while a second group served as control group. In order to compare GDT performance with 
GDT plus 2-back performance, all participants had to perform single-task and dual-task conditions. At 
behavioral level, we assumed to replicate the findings by Pabst, Schoofs, and colleagues that acute stress in 
combination with a parallel executive task leads to preserved decision-making performance. Concerning the 
neural correlates, we hypothesized for the control group that dorsolateral prefrontal areas as well as parts of the 
ACC would be activated in particular during the GDT plus 2-back task (contrasts: GDT plus 2-back>; GDT plus 
2-back > GDT; GDT plus 2-back > 2-back; GDT plus 2-back < GDT; GDT plus 2-back < 2-back), given that 
these regions are activated when a person processes gains/losses in combination with winning probabilities and 
also in a working memory paradigm (Labudda et al., 2010; Labudda, et al., 2008; Owen, et al., 2005). Of special 
interest was the comparison between the stress group and the control group, concerning the difference in 
activations between a dual-task condition and a single-task condition. We hypothesized that stress would lead to 
changes in neural activity in brain areas also involved in task performances that means, dorsolateral prefrontal 
areas and parts of the ACC. Moreover, we assumed that the shift from serial to parallel processing is associated 
with the same brain areas. This was assumed because those regions are known to be involved in the executive 
control mechanisms (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; D'Esposito, et al., 1995), which in turn are presumed to be 
engaged in the serial-to-parallel shift. Studies with similar types of stressors (Åhs, et al., 2006) as well as 
comparable points in time when the stressor takes place (before fMRI and before a cognitive task, Åhs, et al., 
2006; Oei, et al., 2007; Qin, et al., 2009) displayed deactivation in the dlPFC and the ACC. However, because 
several studies were also able to demonstrate an increase in these brain areas during stress (Dedovic, Rexroth, et 
al., 2009; Tillfors, et al., 2002; Wang, et al., 2005), the neural activity changes will be analyzed in both 
directions (contrast for increase in activation: stress group > control group, GDT plus 2-back > GDT 
alternatively 2-back; contrast for decrease in activation: control group > stress group, GDT plus 2-back > GDT 
alternatively 2-back).  
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Participants 
We examined 38 right-handed, healthy participants. The participants were randomly assigned to either the stress 
group (SG; n = 19) or the control group (CG; n = 19). Exclusion criteria, as determined by telephone screening, 
were history of or current neurological or psychiatric diseases, acute or chronic diseases, and stressful life 
circumstances. Smokers and participants with current intake of medication, body mass index above 30 kg/cm² or 
lower than 18 kg/cm², recent immunization, hormonal contraceptive, or pregnancy were excluded because these 
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criteria influence the measurement of stress hormones. Further exclusion criteria concerned issues interfering 
with the magnetic field of the fMRI such as active implants, mechanical contraception, or any metal objects that 
were not removable from the body. A further exclusion criterion was claustrophobia. Additionally, participants 
were requested not to engage in exhausting physical activities at least 24 hr before the testing, to refrain from 
drinking alcohol at least 24 hr before the testing, and to wake up at least 2 hr before the testing. Furthermore, all 
participants were instructed not to eat or drink anything other than water 1 hr before and during the study. All 
participants were recruited by advertisements and were paid €10/hr for participation. Student participants 
obtained credits for courses. Participants gave written informed consent prior to the investigation. After 
participation, they were fully debriefed about the aim of the study. The study was approved by the ethics 
committee of the German Society of Psychology. Due to problems in data acquisition, because of software 
malfunctions, artifacts in salivary samples, and one participant dropping out of the scanning session, the final 
groups consisted of n = 16 in the SG and n = 17 in the CG. The two groups did not differ regarding gender, SG: 
9 men and 7 women, CG: 8 men and 9 women, χ² = 0.28, df = 1, p = .598, or age, MSG = 23.69, SDSG = 5.00, 
MCG = 24.06, SDCG = 5.07, t = 0.21, df = 31, p = .834. Moreover, all participants started the experiment between 
9:30 am and 6:00 pm, and there was no significant difference in starting time between the groups, χ² = 2.22, df = 
3, p = .528. There was also no difference between groups in the number of participants who started in the 
mornings (9:30 am and 11:40 am) and those who started in the afternoons (1:20 pm and 3:00 pm), χ² = 0.79, df 
= 1, p = .373. 
4.3.2 Stress induction 
Stress was induced using the TSST (Clemens Kirschbaum, et al., 1993). This test is an established procedure 
that induces moderate psychosocial stress and a distinctive activation of the HPA-axis (see also section 3.4.3.2). 
In the TSST, participants had to deliver a free speech (after a preparation time of 5 min) followed by a 
demanding arithmetic task in front of a selection committee, each part lasting 5 min. The members of the 
committee were dressed in white lab coats and were introduced as psychologists who were specially trained to 
analyze speech and non-verbal behavior. Furthermore, it was announced that the speech will be video recorded. 
During the whole speech, the committee acted in a cold and non-responsive manner. In the non-stressful control 
condition, the standardized control version of the TSST (placebo TSST; Het, et al., 2009) was used. Here, 
participants also had to deliver a speech but not in front of a committee. They were alone in a room, not video 
recorded, and the arithmetic task was easier. 
4.3.3 Measurements of stress response 
4.3.3.1 Salivary cortisol 
Endocrine indicators of stress were acquired by collecting salivary cortisol (for a description of the 
characteristics of saliva cortisol see section 3.4.3.1). A rise of cortisol concentration indicates the stress response 
due to HPA-axis activity (see Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Saliva was sampled five times (see the section 
4.3.6.1) using Salivette collection devices (Sarstedt, Nuembrecht, Germany) and was sent to the laboratory of 
Prof. Kirschbaum in Dresden, Germany, for analysis. An immunoassay (IBL, Hamburg, Germany) was used to 
measure free cortisol. 
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4.3.3.2 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
The PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was administered to measure the self-experienced stress level. 
In the German version of the PANAS, participants were asked to rate 10 items for positive affect (e.g., “elated” 
and “excited”) and 10 items for negative affect (e.g., “distressed” and “hostile”) on a five-point scale from 1 
(very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The answers are added up to a positive affect score and a negative 
affect score, both ranging from 10 (minimum) to 50 (maximum).  
4.3.4 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)1 
FMRI is a noninvasive imaging technique, which provides the opportunity to visualize structural (i.e., 
anatomical images of a brain region) and functional data (i.e., images which display increases/decreases of brain 
activity) without the use of radiation (Bandettini, Wong, Hinks, Tikofsky, & Hyde, 1992; Goebel, 2007; Kwong 
et al., 1992). It is a modification of the anatomical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), which is able to provide 
detailed anatomical images of, for example, gray and white matter in the brain. These images are used to 
localize the functional results, which presents themselves an increase or decrease of brain activity due to for 
example, stimuli presentation (Wager, et al., 2007). This neural brain activity is linked to changes in regional 
blood flow and the associated oxygen concentration (Stippich, 2007; Wager, et al., 2007).  
4.3.4.1 Physical principles of magnet resonance imaging (MRI) 
FMRI is based on the excitation and measurement of an electromagnetic echo of the participants’ tissue. Each 
biological organism consists of a high density of water atoms, which are the largest source of protons in the 
body. Protons can be magnetized easily: Each proton spins around its own axis and thus induces its own 
magnetic field. Normally, the magnetic field of each proton is randomly aligned in the human body, which leads 
to a mutual neutralization and consequently the human tissue provides no magnetizable features. However, as 
soon as a person enters the magnetic field of the MRI system, the magnetic fields of the protons align with the 
magnetic field of the MRI system (Goebel, 2007; Goebel & Kriegeskorte, 2005b; Wager, et al., 2007). Through 
a short impulse of a radio frequency (released by e.g., a head coil which surrounds the head of a participant or 
the radio frequency coil) it is possible to excite the protons: They are briefly taped; thereafter they tip back 
(relax) into the alignment of the magnetic field of the MRI system. While the protons relax they emit a radio 
frequency, the electromagnetic echo, which is the magnetic resonance signal (MR-signal). The MR-signal is 
received by a receiving coil, for example the head coil. The relaxation process can be described by three 
parameters (see Goebel, 2007; Goebel & Kriegeskorte, 2005b; Wager, et al., 2007 for detailed information): T1, 
T2 and T2
*
. T1 (also known as longitudinal relaxation or spin-lattice relaxation) determines the rate at which 
protons relax back to the alignment of the magnetic field of the MRI system. The magnetization increases in this 
period. T2 (also known as transversal relaxation or spin-spin relaxation) refers to the duration in which the spins 
(tipped protons) exchange energy with each other, because of their own originated magnetic field. Due to this 
exchange the protons dephase (i.e., the transversal alignment to the extern magnetic field, induced by the radio 
frequency pulse, is lost). This is associated with loss of transversal magnetization and loss of the MR-signal. 
The transversal relaxation occurs faster in physiological tissues because of local inhomogeneity of the magnetic 
                                                          
1 This section is not part of the original paper (c.f. Gathmann, Schulte, et al., 2014). It was added in the current thesis to give 
a comprehensive description of the imaging procedure used. 
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field. The resulting shorter time component is labeled T2
*
. The originated MR-signal is intercepted outside the 
human body and converted into three-dimensional pictures, which are sensitive to the different relaxation times: 
T1-weighted images and T2-weighted images are used for high-resolution structural scans. T2
*
 is sensitive to 
blood flow and oxygenation and therefore T2
*
-weighted images reflect changes in brain activity (Goebel, 2007; 
Goebel & Kriegeskorte, 2005b; Wager, et al., 2007). For detailed information about the physical basics of 
(f)MRI be kindly referred to Bandettini, Birn, and Donahue (2000) and Huettel, Song, and McCarthy (2009), for 
detailed information about the generation of magnetic resonance images see Elster (1994). 
A particular goal of fMRI is to capture functional changes in neural activity that is associated with 
specific functions (e.g., motor response). This is assessed indirectly via the hemodynamic response (Menon et 
al., 1995): An increase of neuronal activity in a certain brain area leads to an immediate increase of the 
extraction of oxygen-rich blood (oxygenated hemoglobin) within the capillary bed, which in turn increases 
oxygen-depleted (deoxygenated hemoglobin) blood. This fast response (initial dip) is followed by a strong local 
blood flow and consequently to an increase of oxygenated blood, which is referred to as hemodynamic response 
(Goebel, 2007). The hemodynamic response is so strong that it even results in a local oversupply of oxygenated 
hemoglobin (P. T. Fox & Raichle, 1986). One method which is used in fMRI to indirectly measure the neural 
activity is to adopt the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) effect (Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & Tank, 1990; Ogawa 
et al., 1993). The BOLD effect implies that the ratio of oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin influences the 
MR-signal: Deoxygenated hemoglobin is paramagnetic (more magnetic) and thus leads to local inhomogeneity 
of the magnetic field (Ogawa, et al., 1990). In contrast, the oxygenated hemoglobin is diamagnetic (Ogawa, et 
al., 1990) that means, less magnetic. Therefore, the increase of the oxygenated hemoglobin during the 
hemodynamic response diminishes the inhomogeneity of the magnetic field. This entails that the positrons 
dephase more slowly after excitation, which leads to a stronger T2
*
-weighted MR-Signal (Goebel, 2007; Goebel 
& Kriegeskorte, 2005b). In summary, the BOLD effect “measures increased neuronal activity indirectly via a 
change in local magnetic field (in)homogeneity, which is caused by an oversupply of oxygenated blood” 
(Goebel, 2007, p. 18). How exact or detailed the brain tissue is measured depends on the magnetic field strength 
of the fMRI-system.  
4.3.4.2 Procedures of functional data analysis 
The functional data can then be analyzed using statistical programs such as statistical parametric mapping 
(SPM8, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). In the 
course of this the raw data need to be processed substantially to stick to the assumptions on which most analyses 
are based (Goebel, 2007; Wager, et al., 2007). During fMRI measurement the brain is scanned in slices along 
three axes: x-axis (sagittal slices), y-axis (coronal slices), and z-axis (axial slices). These data must first be 
transformed into a 4-D matrix: a sequence of functional volumes (3-D images) (Goebel, 2007). This step is 
known as reconstruction (Wager, et al., 2007). In the next step (slice timing) all slices need to be brought into 
one time zone, because it is assumed that each slice is scanned at the same time. However in reality all slices are 
shifted in time. To comply with the assumption that over time each data point from a given voxel (“voxel = 
volume element analogues to pixel = picture element"; c.f. Goebel, 2007, p. 23) was collected from that voxel 
only, a correction for movement for each participant needs to be done (realignment). The next step is called 
smoothing: At this time, all images are convolved with a Gaussian kernel (a 3-D normal probability density 
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function, c.f. Wager, et al., 2007) to uphold the assumption that the noise in all images conform to a normal 
distribution (c.f. Gaussian random field (GRF) theory; for detailed information about the role of the GRF theory 
in spatial smoothing be referred to e.g., Goutte, Nielsen, & Hansen, 2000; Worsley & Friston, 1995). Finally, it 
is important to make sure, that all image localizations in the structural and functional data correspond to the 
same brain region for each participant (co-registration) and between all participants (normalization and 
warping) (c.f. Wager, et al., 2007). Thereafter, preprocessing is finished and the images can be used for 
inferential statistics in terms of general linear modeling (GLM; see e.g., Goebel, 2007; Goebel & Kriegeskorte, 
2005a; Wager, et al., 2007). At this point it is possible, for example, to calculate differences in brain activity in 
one brain region between groups (for a detailed description about several statistical analyses of the imaging data 
please be referred to Goebel, 2007; Goebel & Kriegeskorte, 2005a; Wager, et al., 2007).  
4.3.5 The functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm 
In the fMRI within-subject design of the current study, three different experimental tasks were used: an fMRI 
version of the original GDT (see description in Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; and Table 1), the GDT plus a 
parallel 2-back task (c.f. Starcke, et al., 2011), and a single 2-back task (c.f. Schoofs, Preuß, & Wolf, 2008). The 
experimental conditions are described in detail below. All experimental conditions had the same visual input in 
terms of screen organization and screen content. When performing the GDT alone, the interface of the 2-back 
task was frozen, showing one number that did not change. In contrast, when performing the 2-back task alone, 
the GDT interface was frozen, although the dice cup was being shaken. In the GDT plus 2-back task, the whole 
screen was activated. Each experimental condition lasted 144 s (for a detailed description of the tasks, see 
section 4.3.5.1). Moreover, two control tasks were used to normalize the BOLD (Ogawa, et al., 1990; see also 
section 4.3.4.1) signal (back to baseline) and to avoid carry-over effects of activation between the experimental 
conditions. In the high-level control task, participants were asked to indicate in which line a number or a number 
combination was highlighted. The duration was 144 s, and the task was performed twice. The order of the tasks 
was pseudo-randomized to minimize adaption to the tasks. The low-level control task lasted 30 s and was 
administered before an instruction window appeared (for 10 s) that provided a short summary of the ensuing 
experimental task and the upcoming high-level control task. Additionally, the low-level control task was 
administered after the last task in the scanning session. The total duration of the study was 26.5 min. The two 
orders of the tasks were counterbalanced across groups. The fMRI data of each task were assembled, and the 
behavioral data for each task were averaged for both runs for analysis. To register the answers of the 
participants, they held two four-touch keypads in their hands. The keypad in the left hand was associated with 
the 2-back task and with the low-level control task. The keypad in the right hand was associated with the GDT 
and the high-level control task. To indicate the answers for the GDT plus 2-back task, both keypads had to be 
used simultaneously. 
4.3.5.1 Experimental conditions 
We designed an fMRI version of the GDT based on the original GDT (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; the task is 
also briefly described in Table 1) to measure decision making under risk for the first experimental condition. 
The goal of this task was to increase the fictitious starting capital of €1,000. A virtual die was thrown 18 times, 
and the participants were asked to guess each time which number would be thrown. Participants could bet either 
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on one single number or on combinations of two, three, or four numbers, each associated with different winning 
probabilities: The choice of a single number provided a €1,000 gain/loss (winning probability 1:6); the choice of 
one of the other combinations provided a €500 gain/loss for two numbers (winning probability 2:6), a €200 
gain/loss for three numbers (winning probability 3:6), and a €100 gain/loss for four numbers (winning 
probability 4:6). Even though the options were permanently shown on the screen, in this fMRI version of the 
GDT the participants were able to choose only one option of each possible category (one for each degree of 
risk). The available options were highlighted and pseudo-randomized across trials. This was performed to 
reduce the complexity of the game as well as to reduce artifacts in brain activation due to finger/hand 
movements, which would have been likely if participants had to select one of the alternatives with the mouse, as 
it is the case in the original GDT. In our fMRI version, participants had to indicate their answer on a four-touch 
keypad in the right hand, where each button was associated with one category. Furthermore, the decision time 
was limited to 4 s. If participants did not decide within the 4-s limit after the dice cup had started to shake, this 
trial was counted as a skip. In this case, “Failure – no selection” appeared on the screen. After each decision or 
non-selection the feedback (the amount of the gain/loss or the failure message) was given for 4 s before the next 
trial started immediately. This time interval corresponds to the average processing time reported in previous 
studies with the GDT. The time limit was set to ensure that all tasks were of equal duration, as mentioned above. 
In contrast to the original version of the GDT, it was possible to skip a trial in the current version if the 
participant did not indicate a decision on the keypad within 4 s. Therefore, the number of played rounds may 
differ between participants. 
The second experimental condition was an fMRI version of the GDT with a parallel 2-back task (see 
Figure 11). The goal of this condition was to perform as well as possible in each task and equally well on both 
tasks.  
 
Figure 11 The GDT plus 2-back task modified for fMRI. 
On the right side of the screen, participants had to work on the GDT by betting which number will be thrown. They had to select one of the 
four highlighted possible combinations (one number, combination of two, three, or four numbers) with a four-touch key pad in the right 
hand. Afterward a die was thrown, followed by the feedback if the participants had won or lost. On the left side of the GDT interface, 
participants continuously had to monitor the numbers presented. Here, they had to indicate on a keypad in the left hand whether the current 
number presented was already seen two trials before. For the single-task condition, either the right or left side of the screen was fixed. Thus, 
participants could only perform the GDT or the 2-back task by itself. 
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The administered 2-back task was comparable to the high-load parallel executive task used by Starcke 
and colleagues (2011). Here, participants were asked to monitor the identities of numbers between 0 and 9. The 
numbers were presented in a pseudorandom sequence, and participants were asked to indicate with the keypad 
in the left hand whether or not the currently presented number was identical to the number presented two trials 
before. The stimuli were displayed for 500 ms with an interstimulus interval of 2,750 ms. Thus, participants had 
a time limit of 500 ms for making their response. The target stimuli (same stimulus as two trials before) were 
presented randomly with a probability of 33 % (c.f. Schoofs, et al., 2008).  
In the third experimental condition, participants had to work on the 2-back task alone.  
4.3.6 Procedure and analyses 
4.3.6.1 Procedure 
The procedure was identical for the SG and the CG with one exception: The SG received the TSST (Clemens 
Kirschbaum, et al., 1993) for stress inducement, whereas the CG received the placebo TSST (Het, et al., 2009). 
After the participants had given written informed consent for the experiment, the practice part began. For each 
experimental condition, the participants received detailed instructions on the screen, followed by a short practice 
sequence for each task. The GDT was practiced alone for three trials and the 2-back task alone for 20 trials. For 
the GDT with parallel 2-back task, the GDT was practiced for three trials in parallel with the 2-back task for 
seven trials. Afterward, the PANAS was completed, and the first salivary sample (baseline) was taken. 
Subsequently, participants were brought to the room where the TSST or the placebo TSST took place, after that 
participants were asked to fill in the self-report again, and the second salivary sample was taken (+20 min). 
Next, participants were brought to the scanner room, and after a third salivary sample (+30 min), the fMRI 
procedure began. After the fMRI scanning (which in total lasted about an hour, including the experimental 
design plus shimming, anatomical scans, and preparation time), participants were asked to complete the PANAS 
and to give a fourth salivary sample (+95 min). The fifth salivary sample was taken during the debriefing (+105 
min). 
4.3.6.2 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) acquisition 
Functional MRI scanning was performed with a 7T whole-body MRI system (Magnetom 7T, Siemens 
Healthcare, Erlangen, Germany) at the Erwin L. Hahn Institute for MRI, Essen, Germany. For this experiment, 
the scanner was equipped with a 32-channel transmit/receive head coil (Nova Medical, Wilmington, USA).  
Before the acquisition of the sequences, B0 shimming was performed using a vendor-provided 
gradient-echo sequence and an algorithm based on the work of Schär, Kozerke, Fischer, and Boesiger (2004). 
For B1 field mapping and local flip angle optimization, a vendor-provided spin-echo type sequence was used. 
After a slice selective excitation, two refocusing pulses generated a spin-echo and a stimulated echo, 
respectively. The algorithm was mainly based on the work of Hoult (2000). Structural images (0.7 x 0.7 x 0.7 
mm³) were acquired using a modified T1-weighted three-dimensional magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-
echo (MPRAGE) sequence: repetition time (TR) = 2500 ms, echo time (TE) = 1.54 ms, field of view (FOV) = 
270 x 237 mm², flip angle = 7° (c.f. Wrede et al., 2012). Whole functional MRI images were acquired with an 
optimized bold contrast-sensitive echo-planar-imaging sequence (c.f. Poser, Koopmans, Witzel, Wald, & Barth, 
2010). For fMRI, two sessions, each lasting approximately 14 min, were conducted, which led to 790 mosaic 
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images in total. Each mosaic image contains 144 images (mosaic 12 x 12). The following scan parameters were 
used: TR = 1,980 ms, TE = 22 ms, FOV = 256 x 253 mm, flip angle = 14°, 144 slices with a voxel size of 1.5 x 
1.5 x 1.5 mm
3
, Grappa R = 9 (see section 4.3.4.1 for a detailed description of the physical principles of fMRI). 
4.3.6.3 Image analysis 
Functional images were analyzed using MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc) and statistical parametric mapping 
(SPM8, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) for all 
imaging, pre-processing, and voxel-based statistical analyses within the context of the GLM (for a detailed 
description of functional data analysis see section 4.3.4.2). For movement correction, realignment was assessed 
using the default SPM8 algorithm, followed by spatial normalization to reduce anatomical differences. 
Therefore, a standard stereotactic space of SPM8 that means, the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain 
and the default SPM8 settings for normalization, was used. To improve the signal and anatomical conformity, 
spatial smoothing was performed using a Gaussian kernel (5 mm full width at half-maximum). Based on prior 
hypotheses, we conducted region of interest (ROI) analyses in the PFC, in particular in the dlPFC (Brodmann 
areas [BA] 9, 10, and 46), in the ACC (BA 24 and 32), and in the parietal cortex (BA 5 and 7). ROIs were 
defined using WFUPickatlas version 3.0.3 (Maldjian, Laurienti, & Burdette, 2004; Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & 
Burdette, 2003).  
GLMs were applied to the time course of activation, where stimulus onsets were modeled as single-
impulse response functions. Linear contrasts of parameter estimates were defined to test specific effects. The 
resulting statistical maps were entered into second-level t test random-effects group analyses. These analyses 
were conducted to identify significant differences between BOLD (Ogawa, et al., 1990; see also section 4.3.4.1) 
responses for the planned linear contrasts between the SG and the CG. All effects were reported with a height 
threshold of p ≤ .001, uncorrected with an extent threshold of k ≥ 10 voxel as done in many previous studies 
(e.g., Ernst et al., 2004; Forstmann, et al., 2006; Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Kukolja, Thiel, 
Wolf, & Fink, 2008; Otsuka, Osaka, Morishita, Kondo, & Osaka, 2006; Van Snellenberg, Whitman, McDonald, 
& Liotti, 2007; Yarkoni, Braver, Gray, & Green, 2005). To obtain the associated anatomical structures of the 
maximum activation, the MNI coordinates of this activity were transformed into Talairach and Tournoux space 
(Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) using the correction procedure of Brett (1999). Subsequently, the transformed 
coordinates were put into the Talairach Daemon (Lancaster, Summerln, Rainey, Freitas, & Fox, 1997; Lancaster 
et al., 2000) to identify the anatomical structures.  
4.3.6.4 Statistical analyses of the behavioral data 
Statistical analyses of the behavioral data were carried out using the IBM SPSS Statistics software for Windows 
(Release 19.0; April 18, 2011; SPSS Inc. IBM, Chicago). Potential differences in gender distribution and the 
distribution of experimental starting time between groups were calculated using Pearson’s χ² test. To compare 
the performance in the GDT, the 2-back task, and the GDT plus 2-back task between groups, t tests for 
independent samples as well as one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used. For the stress response 
analyses, a between-within-subject ANOVA and an ANOVA with repeated measures were used. In case of a 
violation of the assumption of sphericity (Maulchy’s test: p < .05), the degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity. If necessary, Bonferroni correction was applied to adjust α for 
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multiple comparisons. Simple effect tests were conducted in order to follow up possible main effects and 
interactions between task performances, affect, and cortisol concentration at different points in time. In order to 
analyze the relationship between increase in cortisol concentration and brain activation, Pearson’s correlations 
were calculated.  
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Stress response 
4.4.1.1 Cortisol response to stress 
As mentioned above, saliva was collected at five points in time. The +30 min point (before the beginning of the 
fMRI session) had to be excluded from further analyses because there was not enough saliva to analyze the 
cortisol concentration in eight samples, most likely because this salivary sample had only been taken about 10 
min after the previous sample. At first, it was calculated whether there was an interaction between starting time 
(pm vs. am) and cortisol concentration for the four points in time (baseline, +20 min, +95 min, and +105 min) 
using a between- and within-subject ANOVA. The analysis revealed no significant main effect for the between-
factor starting time, F (1, 31) = 1.38, p = .249, η² = .04, but a significant main effect for the within-factor time, 
Greenhouse-Geisser F (2.30, 71.34) = 6.78, p ≤ .001, η² = .18. The interaction between starting time and time of 
measurement was also not significant, Greenhouse-Geisser F (2.30, 71.34) = 2.44, p = .087, η² = .07. 
Subsequently, a 4 (time) x 2 (group) repeated-measures ANOVA was computed with time as within-factor 
(baseline, +20 min, +95 min, +105 min) and group (SG vs. CG) as between-factor. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of group, F (1, 31) = 14.03, p ≤ .001, η² = .31, a significant main effect of time, 
Greenhouse-Geisser F (1.78, 55.23) = 8.85, p ≤ .001, η² = .22, and a significant interaction between time and 
group, Greenhouse-Geisser F (1.78, 55.23) = 10.52, p ≤ .001, η² = .25. Further analyses revealed that at baseline 
the cortisol concentration did not differ between groups, t (31) = 0.52, p = .604, d = 0.18, but at all following 
points in time, the SG showed higher cortisol than the CG (directly after TSST: t (22.77) = 4.76, p ≤ .001, d = 
1.67; +95 min: t (18.21) = 5.05, p ≤ .001, d = 1.78; +105 min: t (31) = 2.44, p = .021, d = 0.84).  
 
Figure 12 Mean salivary cortisol as a function of time for the stress group (SG) and the control group (CG).  
The SG demonstrated a significantly higher cortisol concentration than the CG after the stress induction. The gray bars illustrate the points 
in time when the stress induction (TSST/placebo TSST) and the fMRI session took place. Note that the fMRI session including the 
behavioral tasks was during the high cortisol period of the SG. The error bars represent standard deviations. 
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In total, the SG had a significantly higher cortisol concentration after the TSST (+20 min) and 
throughout the fMRI paradigm than the CG. These results are summarized in Figure 12.  
4.4.1.2 Affect 
A 3 (time) x 2 (group) repeated-measures ANOVA with time as a within-factor (before the TSST, directly after 
the TSST, and at the end of the fMRI session) and group as a between-factor (SG vs. CG) was performed 
separately for the positive and negative affect scales of the PANAS. For the positive affect, the main factor 
group did not reach significance, F (1, 31) = 0.13, p = .725, η2 = .01. However, the main factor time was 
significant, F (2, 62) = 38.94, p ≤ .001, η2 = .56. The interaction between group and time was again not 
significant, F (2, 62) = 0.77, p = .469, η2 = .02. Post-hoc pairwise Bonferroni-corrected comparisons revealed 
that participants had a less positive affect at the end of the fMRI session, M = 23.91, SD = 7.21, than before the 
TSST, M = 31.76, SD = 5.79; p ≤ .001, d = 1.25, or directly after the TSST, M = 31.39, SD = 6.11; p ≤ .001, d = 
1.21. However, the positive affect did not differ between the points of measurement before the TSST and 
directly after the TSST, p > .900, d = 0.08. For the negative affect, neither main factor group, F (1, 31) = 0.01, p 
= .930, η2 ≤ .01, or time, F (2, 62) = 0.46, p = .633, η2 = .02, nor the interaction between time and group, F (2, 
62) = 2.02, p = .141, η2 = .06, was significant.  
In total, there were no significant differences in the self-reported affect between SG and CG (see Table 
4).  
Table 4 Means and standard deviation of the PANAS at the three points of measurement. 
Points of measurement Stress group 
M (SD) 
Control group 
M (SD) 
Positive affect scale   
Before the TSST (baseline) 32.00 (5.79) 31.53 (5.97) 
Directly after the TSST (+20 min) 31.13 (5.81) 31.65 (6.56) 
After the fMRI session (+95 min) 22.88 (7.82) 24.88 (6.68) 
Negative affect scale   
Before the TSST (baseline) 13.94 (2.91) 14.12 (2.52) 
Directly after the TSST (+20 min) 15.19 (3.89) 13.76 (2.99) 
After the fMRI session (+95 min) 13.06 (2.21) 14.53 (4.99) 
 
4.4.2 Behavioral results 
Table 5 shows that on a behavioral level, the performance in the GDT, the 2-back task, as well as the GDT plus 
2-back task did not differ significantly between the SG and the CG.  
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Table 5 Comparison of task performance between stress and control group. 
Task scores 
 
Stress group 
M (SD) 
Control group 
M (SD) t df p d 
GDT       
Rounds 17.81 (0.31) 17.74 (0.50) 0.53 31 .602 0.17 
Risky choices in % 33.56 (20.98) 23.58 (20.35) 1.39 31 .175 0.48 
2-back task       
Rounds 47.94 (0.25) 47.79 (0.73) 0.75 31 .462 0.27 
Correct responses in % 84.13 (15.54) 86.74 (17.03) 0.46 31 .650 0.16 
Reaction timea 591.13 (111.08) 612.10 (173.58) 0.41 31 .684 0.14 
GDT plus 2-back       
GDT: rounds 16.84 (1.21) 17.00 (0.90) 0.42 31 .675 0.15 
GDT: risky choices in % 28.75 (24.23) 22.26 (24.78) 0.76 31 .453 0.26 
2-back: rounds 47.59 (0.42) 47.44 (1.01) 0.57 21.53 .574 0.18 
2-back: correct responses in % 70.62 (12.21) 70.91 (14.42) 0.06 31 .950 0.02 
2-back: reaction timea 753.42 (238.71) 685.26 (153.02) 0.97 25.30 .341 0.34 
aIn ms. 
4.4.3 Imaging data 
To investigate the underlying neural correlates of the GDT plus 2-back task, we analyzed the brain areas 
involved in the dual task compared with the single-task performance (see Table 6 for the CG and Table 7 for the 
SG). The following contrasts were calculated for each group separately: GDT plus 2-back > GDT and GDT plus 
2-back > 2-back as well as GDT plus 2-back < GDT and GDT plus 2-back < 2-back.  
Table 6 Comparison between dual-task activation and single task activation in the control group. 
Contrast Nearest brain region Laterality k MNI - coordinates Peak 
t 
p 
x y z 
GDT plus 2back > GDT Limbic lobe, cingulate 
gyrus (BAa 24) 
L 172 -5 -1 49 4.83 ≤ .001 
 R 172 8 -4 48 4.53 ≤ .001 
 Frontal lobe, medial frontal 
gyrus (BAa 6)  
R 172 6 4 52 3.40 ≤ .001 
GDT plus 2back < GDT Occipital lobe, cuneus, 
(BAa 19) 
R 15 29 -87 28 4.13 ≤ .001 
GDT plus 2back > 2-back Parietal lobe, inferior 
parietal lobule (BAa 40) 
R 47 38 -55 58 4.38 ≤ .001 
 
Parietal lobe, superior 
parietal lobule (BAa 7) 
L 29 -26 -52 60 4.20 ≤ .001 
 
Parietal lobe, precuneus 
(BAa 7) 
R 56 9 -52 55 4.13 ≤ .001 
 R 33 18 -60 52 4.11 ≤ .001 
 R 33 26 -57 52 3.74 ≤ .001 
GDT plus2-back < 2back n.s.
b        
aBrodmann Area. bNo significant neural activation differences in the second-level group analysis. 
Concerning the CG, there was significantly more activation in parts of the cingulate gyrus as well as in the 
medial frontal gyrus during the dual task compared with the GDT. However, there was also a significant 
decrease in activation in the cuneus during the dual-task condition compared with the GDT. Moreover, when 
comparing the dual-task condition with the 2-back task condition, there was a significant increase in activation 
in inferior and superior parietal areas (see Table 6). 
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Table 7 Comparison between dual-task activation and single task activation in the stress group. 
Contrast Nearest brain region Laterality k MNI - coordinates Peak 
t 
p 
x y z 
GDT plus 2back > GDT Frontal lobe, middle frontal 
gyrus (BAa 9) 
L 91 -36 34 42 5.09 ≤ .001 
 L 91 -30 43 40 3.58 ≤ .001 
 Frontal lobe, paracentral 
lobule (BAa 31) 
R 67 9 -34 51 4.53 ≤ .001 
 
Frontal lobe, precentral 
gyrus (BAa 6) 
R 13 59 1 36 3.99 ≤ .001 
 
Parietal lobe, superior 
parietal lobule (BAa 7) 
R 58 35 -51 63 4.78 ≤ .001 
 R 52 21 -55 64 4.05 ≤ .001 
GDT plus 2back < GDT n.s.
b 
       
GDT plus 2back > 2-back Parietal lobe, postcentral 
gyrus (BAa 2, 5) 
R 96 33 -48 63 5.50 ≤ .001 
 R 96 33 -39 69 4.25 ≤ .001 
 
Parietal lobe, superior 
parietal gyrus (BAa 7) 
R 89 14 -72 55 4.15 ≤ .001 
 R 89 23 -64 58 3.95 ≤ .001 
 L 12 -20 -72 55 3.84 ≤ .001 
 
Parietal lobe, inferior 
parietal lobule (BAa 40) 
L 17 -38 -43 61 4.39 ≤ .001 
 
Frontal lobe, superior 
frontal gyrus (BAa 8) 
R 45 20 49 42 4.62 ≤ .001 
GDT plus2-back < 2back n.s.
b 
       
a
Brodmann Area. bNo significant neural activation differences in the second-level group analysis. 
Concerning the SG, the analyses revealed significantly more activation during the dual task compared with the 
GDT in a part of the dorsolateral prefrontal area (middle frontal gyrus, BA 9), in supplementary motor areas 
(paracentral lobe and precentral gyrus), as well as in the superior parietal lobe. Compared with the 2-back task, 
there was an increased activation in superior as well as inferior parietal areas, in parts of the supplementary 
motor area (postcentral gyrus), and in the superior frontal gyrus (see Table 7). 
The main focus lay on the interaction effect between stress, decision making, and additional executive 
load. Therefore, the contrasts GDT plus 2-back > GDT and GDT plus 2-back > 2-back were also compared 
between SG and CG, in order to see whether there was an increase in activation (SG > CG) or a decrease in 
activation (SG < CG) due to acute stress (see Table 8). The analyses revealed a significant increase in activation 
(SG > CG) in the superior frontal gyrus as well as in the supplementary motor area (paracentral gyrus; see 
Figure 13) during the GDT plus 2-back compared with the GDT. All other contrasts did not survive the height 
and extent threshold. 
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Table 8 Activation pattern during the dual-task paradigm (comparison: GDT2back > GDT and GDT2back > 2-back), compared between 
stress group (SG) and control group (CG). 
Contrast Nearest brain region Laterality k MNI - coordinates Peak 
t 
p 
x y z 
GDT plus 2back > GDT         
SG > CG Frontal lobe, superior 
frontal gyrus (BAa 10) 
L 13 -18 47 28 3.92 ≤ .001 
 
Frontal lobe/parietal lobe, 
paracentral lobule (BAa 5) 
R 55 12 -34 51 4.16 ≤ .001 
SG < CG n.s.b        
GDT plus 2back > 2-back         
SG > CG n.s.b        
         
SG < CG n.s.b        
aBrodmann Area. bNo significant neural activation differences in the second-level group analysis. 
 
Figure 13 Neural activity underlying the dual-task effect (GDT plus 2-back > GDT) in the stress group compared with the control group. 
Results are displayed at a threshold of p ≤ .001 (uncorrected) and an applied extended threshold of k ≥ 10 voxel. a) The supplementary 
motor area (paracentral lobe) and b) the superior frontal gyrus were significantly activated (for detailed information see Table 8). 
Additionally, the activation during the GDT solely, the 2-back task solely, and the GDT plus 2-back 
task was compared between the two groups (see Table 9). Only the comparison concerning the GDT (performed 
solely) activation survived height and extent threshold, revealing an increase in activation in the superior frontal 
gyrus during acute stress. Additionally, the precuneus was less activated during acute stress compared with the 
control condition.  
In total, the results demonstrated increased brain activation during the dual task when compared with 
the single-task performance. However, depending on the single task with which the dual-task performance is 
compared and depending on the group, different brain areas seem to be involved. Moreover, in the CG there was 
also a significantly decreased activation in the cuneus during the GDT plus 2-back task compared with the GDT 
when performed solely. The analysis of the interaction between decision making, executive functions, and stress 
revealed the following: Stressed participants performing a decision-making task simultaneously with an 
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executive task show an increased activation in the supplementary motor area and the aPFC (superior frontal 
gyrus, BA 10) in comparison with stressed participants performing only the decision-making task. 
Table 9 Comparison of the activation pattern of each task between the stress group (SG) and the control group (CG). 
Contrast Nearest brain region Laterality k MNI - coordinates Peak 
t 
p 
x y z 
GDT         
SG > CG Frontal lobe, superior 
frontal gyrus (BAa 9) 
R 23 30 52 33 4.28 ≤ .001 
SG < CG Parietal lobe, precuneus 
(BAa 7) 
R 13 27 -67 36 4.29 ≤ .001 
2-back         
SG > CG n.s.b        
SG < CG n.s.b        
GDT plus 2back         
SG > CG n.s.b        
SG < CG n.s.b        
aBrodmann Area. bNo significant neural activation differences in the second-level group analysis. 
4.4.3.1 Correlations between cortisol concentration and brain activity 
In order to analyze the relationship between cortisol concentration and brain activity, we calculated correlations 
between cortisol data and activations in the ROI for each group.  
 
Figure 14 Results of the correlations between cortisol concentration and brain activity. 
a) Increasing cortisol concentration in the stress group is associated with a deactivation in the middle frontal gyrus during the GDT plus 2-
back when compared with the GDT. The fixing cross was set at MNI-coordinate 1 (x = -36, y = 34, z = 42). The plot of the negative 
correlation between increase in cortisol in the stress group (from baseline to time point +95 min) and brain activation b) at the MNI-
coordinate 1 and c) at the MNI-coordinate 2 (x = -30, y = 43, z = 40). 
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We used the results from the second-level analyses shown in Table 6 and Table 7. We extracted the parameter 
estimates (beta values) from each location of the activation pattern resulting from the calculated contrasts for 
each participant. We also calculated the cortisol increase between baseline and +95 min point of time (directly 
after the fMRI session) for each participant (cortisol concentration at the +95 min point minus cortisol 
concentration at baseline). These cortisol data were then correlated with the parameter estimates of the ROI for 
both groups separately. Results demonstrated a negative correlation between increases in cortisol in the SG and 
the activation in the left middle frontal gyrus (MNI-coordinate 1: x = -36, y = 34, z = 42; MNI-coordinate 2: x = 
-30, y = 43, z = 49) for both coordinates (MNI-coordinate 1: r = -.523, p = .038; MNI-coordinate 2: r = -.618, p 
= .011) in the contrast GDT plus 2-back > GDT. This indicates that an increase in cortisol in the SG is 
accompanied by less activation of parts of the dorsolateral prefrontal area (i.e., BA 9) during the GDT plus 2-
back compared with the GDT (see Figure 14). No other correlations calculated for the SG or CG reached 
significance. 
4.5 Discussion 
Overall, stress induction was successful. Stressed participants had a higher cortisol concentration after stress 
induction and throughout the experiment compared with control participants. The main results support the 
findings of Pabst, Schoofs, and colleagues (2013) that on a behavioral level acute stress in combination with a 
parallel executive task do not impair decision-making performance (for a detailed description of these findings 
see section 3.4.4). More interestingly, the analyses of the neural correlates revealed significant differences 
between SG and CG: When stressed participants (compared with non-stressed participants) had to make a 
decision while simultaneously working memory was demanded, a greater activation in BA 10 - the more 
anterior part of the dlPFC, which is also referred to as the aPFC (Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, Panzer, & Grafman, 
1999; Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007) - and in a part of the supplementary motor area (paracentral lobe) was revealed 
in comparison with the activation when no additional demand was given. Additionally, we found that in the SG 
the increase in cortisol concentration was negatively correlated with the increase in activation in the BA 9 (the 
more dorsal part of the dlPFC) regarding the contrast GDT plus 2-back > GDT. This indicates that in the SG an 
increase in stress level is associated with a decrease in neural activation in the dorsal part of the dlPFC during 
the GDT plus 2-back task compared with the GDT. According to Koechling and Hyafil (2007), the aPFC (BA 
10) forms with other prefrontal regions the apex of the executive system whereby it is particularly associated 
with parallel processing of two tasks. In contrast, BA 9 was found to work more serially upon cognitive 
processes (Dux, et al., 2006). Based on their neurocomputational model, Koechling and Hyafil (2007) suggested 
that the aPFC overcomes such serial constraints by joint consideration of two task sets. Plessow and colleagues 
(2012) and Pabst, Schoofs, and colleagues (2013) assumed that stress may trigger the serial-to-parallel shift by 
reducing task shielding in order to enable the more resource-efficient parallel processing mode in dual-task 
situations. The increased activation of the aPFC in the stressed and not in non-stressed participants may be 
associated with such a serial-to-parallel shift. It may be possible that due to reduced task shielding, the aPFC 
maintains previously selected task sets in a pending state for automatic retrieval and implementation upon the 
process of the ongoing task as described by Koechlin and Hyafil (2007). Even though we did not find a 
deactivation in serially working brain areas (e.g., BA 9; Dux, et al., 2006) in the SG when compared with the 
CG, the negative relationship within the SG between brain activation in BA 9 and cortisol concentration may 
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point in the same direction: In decision-making situations with a simultaneous executive task, stress seems to 
lead to reduced activation of serial processing brain areas (dorsal part of the dlPFC, BA 9) while simultaneously 
to an increased activation of brain areas associated with parallel processing (aPFC, BA 10). This may have led 
to a reduced task shielding of the decision-making task as well as the executive task, resulting in good 
behavioral performance in both tasks. The finding of the increased activation in the supplementary motor area 
may be most likely due to the fact that performing a single task involved one hand and the participants had to 
give their answers only every 4 s. In contrast, when performing both tasks (GDT plus 2-back) simultaneously, 
participants had to use their second hand and give an answer at least every 2,750 ms. This might have led to a 
greater motor and sensory response. However, it has to be mentioned that this increased activity was only found 
in the SG and not in the CG. Therefore, we assume that this increase may also be due to the serial-to-parallel 
shift in the SG: Performing two tasks serially is probably accompanied by less motor response because only one 
hand at a time needs to be used. In contrast, performing two tasks simultaneously involves both hands, probably 
leading to an increased motor response.  
Studies investigating reactivity of stress in the brain found that stress increases the release of 
catecholamine, in particular dopamine (Abercrombie, Keefe, DiFrischia, & Zigmond, 1989; Hutson, Patel, Jay, 
& Barton, 2004; Morrow, Roth, & Elsworth, 2000). Since the PFC provides a high density of D1 receptors, the 
influence of stress leads to a high activity in this area (Thierry, Tassin, Blanc, & Glowinski, 1976; Williams & 
Castner, 2006). However, most studies found that an increase in dopamine is followed by an impairment of 
cognitive functions (Arnsten, 2009; Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998), which was not found in the current 
study. Here, stressed participants performed all tasks as well as the CG in both executive associated tasks. 
Regarding the GDT plus 2-back task performance, the current finding seems to be in line with a recent study 
also demonstrating that stress does not impair dual-tasking performance (Beste, Yildiz, Meissner, & Wolf, 
2013) and may be due to a shift to a less demanding processing mode (c.f. Pabst, Schoofs, et al., 2013; Plessow, 
et al., 2012; see also section 3.4.4 ). Still, this cannot explain the missing differences in the single-task 
conditions. In particular, decision-making performance as well as working memory performance was found to 
be reduced by stress (e.g., Lupien, Gillin, & Hauger, 1999; Porcelli & Delgado, 2009; Putman, Hermans, & van 
Honk, 2010; Schoofs, et al., 2008; Starcke, et al., 2008). Possible explanations why we did not find any 
differences in task performance are briefly discussed in section 4.5.1. 
Regarding the single-task performance, the analyses of the neural correlates revealed again significant 
differences between the SG and the CG but only during the GDT: Stressed participants showed increased 
activation in the dorsal part of the superior frontal gyrus (dlPFC) and decreased activation in the precuneus. 
Both areas are known to be involved in decision making under risk (Labudda, et al., 2008; Lighthall, et al., 
2012; see also section 3.3): The dorsal superior frontal gyrus is part of the dlPFC and therefore involved in 
executive functioning (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Lie, et al., 2006; see also section 3.2.1), while the precuneus is 
especially associated with mental arithmetic (Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, & Tsivkin, 1999; Stanescu-
Cosson et al., 2000). Both regions are highly relevant for GDT performance (Labudda, et al., 2008). However, 
the current findings may suggest that under stress, brain areas associated with executive functions seem to be 
more involved than areas associated with mental arithmetic. This may be because executive functions are 
involved in task shielding, which is known to be increased in demanding single-task situations in order to 
perform well on the task (Plessow, et al., 2011).  
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All other comparisons of the neural correlates between SG and CG (GDT plus 2-back solely, 2-back 
solely, and GDT plus 2-back > 2-back) revealed no significant differences. Concerning the 2-back task solely, 
the results are in contrast to those reported by Cousijn and colleagues (2012) and Qin et al. (2009) who found 
decreased activation in different brain areas due to acute stress while performing an n-back working memory 
task. However, it has to be mentioned that the areas that were deactivated in those studies are different: While 
Cousijn and colleagues (2012) found a decrease in activation in the medial temporal lobe in male participants, 
Qin et al. (2009) found a deactivation in the dlPFC in female participants. Thus, the findings reveal no 
homogeneous picture. Additionally, the stressor in the current study (TSST) differed completely from the one 
used in the other two studies (aversive movie clips). This may have led to differential stress reactions resulting 
in the heterogeneous findings. It may be advisable to engage in further research in order to get a clearer picture 
of the activation pattern when performing a 2-back task under the influence of acute stress (e.g., using similar 
stressors or directly comparing the differential stress reactions due to different stressors). 
So far and to our best knowledge, this is the first study that investigated the underlying neural 
correlates of the GDT plus 2-back task. Therefore, we additionally compared the activation patterns of the dual 
task with the decision-making task (GDT plus 2-back > GDT) within the CG only. This revealed an increased 
activity in the cingulate gyrus as well as in the medial frontal gyrus. These areas were also found to be activated 
in studies investigating neural correlates during working memory (for a review see Owen, et al., 2005). While 
the activation in the medial frontal gyrus is additionally associated with executive functioning (Talati & Hirsch, 
2005), the activation in the anterior part of the cingulate gyrus emphasizes the increased complexity and effort 
in the dual task (Callicott et al., 1999). The resulting activation pattern when comparing the dual task with the 2-
back task (GDT plus 2-back > 2-back) is in line with the study by Labudda and colleagues (2008), which 
investigated the neural correlates of decision making using a paradigm similar to the GDT. The activated brain 
areas are associated with number processing, exact calculation (inferior parietal lobe; Dehaene, Molko, Cohen, 
& Wilson, 2004; Pesenti, Thioux, Seron, & De Volder, 2000) and mathematical approximation functions 
(precuneus, superior parietal lobe; Dehaene, et al., 1999; Stanescu-Cosson, et al., 2000), which are involved in 
the GDT performance. Those comparisons reveal that the manipulation of the dual task as well as each single 
task was successful and support the validity of our findings discussed above. 
4.5.1 Limitations 
There are some limitations to our study, which have to be mentioned. First, the fMRI version of the GDT was 
most likely easier to perform than the original version, since participants only had to choose among four instead 
of 14 alternatives. This could be the reason why we did not find significant differences on a behavioral level. 
Secondly, the experimental conditions (GDT, 2-back, and GDT plus 2-back) and the high-level control task 
were all similar in design and visual input. Therefore, it may be possible that even though the participants were 
advised to perform one of the single tasks (GDT or 2-back), they still paid attention to the second task on the 
screen, even though it was frozen and not executable. This circumstance was not controlled, and given that we 
had a within-subject design with respect to the different activation conditions (GDT solely, 2-back solely, and 
GDT plus 2-back), this may have reduced the power for the comparison between the SG and CG in the second-
level analyses. In future studies, it would be helpful to use the activation conditions as a between-factor, as well. 
Thirdly, the time interval after the TSST until the end of the behavioral tasks, in which we investigated the 
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influence of stress, was around 60 min. However, it is known that the peak cortisol response is about 21 to 40 
min after the onset of a stressor (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004) and should return to baseline 41 to 60 min after 
cessation of the stressor (Clemens Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1994). Nevertheless, the data demonstrated that 
the SG compared to the CG had a higher cortisol concentration after the TSST as well as at the end of the study. 
Fourthly, the fMRI investigation itself was an unfamiliar situation for the participants, in which they were 
confronted with loud noises from the scanner and other unfamiliar conditions that could have created stress in 
the participants (c.f. Eatough, Shirtcliff, Hanson, & Pollak, 2009; Tessner, Walker, Hochman, & Hamann, 
2006). This could have had a reducing effect on the positive affect in all participants, and therefore, group 
differences in the PANAS might have been diminished, resulting in a non-significant group effect on the 
subjective stress response. Still, as mentioned before, the physiological data (cortisol concentration) 
demonstrated that the neuroendocrine stress level differed between groups: The SG had a higher cortisol 
concentration than the CG. Therefore, we concluded that the stress induction was successful. However, in future 
studies it might be helpful to further reduce the subjective stress level in the CG and to increase the stress level 
in the experimental group to have stronger effects on both behavioral and neural level. Finally, it has to be 
pointed out that the assumptions regarding the serial-to-parallel shift need to be treated with caution. Due to the 
fact that the contrast GDT plus 2-back > 2-back did not reveal any significant results, it may be possible that the 
current findings regarding the contrast GDT plus 2-back > GDT are task specific. Additionally, the activation 
found in this contrast is of very small cluster size (k = 13). 
4.5.2 Conclusion 
Despite these limitations, we conclude that the findings reported here support the results of Pabst, Schoofs, and 
colleagues (2013) that acute psychological stress in combination with a parallel executive task seems to preserve 
decision-making performance from decreasing. Moreover, the current study reveals that making advantageous 
decisions in a stressful situation, while simultaneously working memory is demanded otherwise, is accompanied 
by an increased activation in the aPFC (BA 10). Thus, this region may be included in the process that maintains 
good decision-making performance. Pabst, Schoofs, and colleagues (2013) assumed that such underlying 
mechanism may be a shift from sophisticated serial processing mode to a less demanding parallel processing 
mode (Plessow, et al., 2012). It may be possible that the aPFC is involved in this mechanism, because it was 
found that this region overcomes the serial constraint of two tasks by joint consideration of those, resulting in a 
parallel processing mode (Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007). Future studies should investigate the possible role of the 
aPFC in the serial-to-parallel shift in more detail. Several studies demonstrated that patients with executive 
dysfunctions have problems performing two tasks simultaneously (Baddeley, et al., 1997; Dalrymple-Alford, et 
al., 1994; Greene, et al., 1995). Understanding the neural and cognitive mechanisms in dual tasking in more 
detail may give us the opportunity to further investigate how it may be possible to train or compensate those 
functions so that in case of executive dysfunctions or in demanding situations, the handling of two task 
simultaneously will still be manageable. 
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5. Study 2: Performing a secondary executive task with affective stimuli interferes with decision 
making under risk conditions 
5.1  Abstract 
Previous studies demonstrated that executive functions are crucial for advantageous decision making under risk 
and that therefore decision making is disrupted when working memory capacity is demanded while working on 
a decision task. While some studies also showed that affective influences have an effect on decision making 
under risk, it is unclear how affective processing and executive functions predict decision-making performance 
in interaction. The current experimental study used a between-subjects design to examine whether affective 
pictures (positive and negative pictures compared to neutral pictures), included in a parallel executive task 
(working memory 2-back task), have an impact on decision making under risk as assessed by the GDT. 
Moreover, performance GDT plus 2-back task was compared to performance in the GDT without any additional 
task (GDT solely). The results show that performance in the GDT differed between groups (positive, negative, 
neutral, and GDT solely). The groups with affective pictures, especially those with positive pictures in the 2-
back task, showed more disadvantageous decisions in the GDT than the groups with neutral pictures and the 
group performing the GDT without any additional task. However, executive functions moderated the effect of 
the affective pictures. Regardless of affective influence, subjects with good executive functions performed 
advantageously in the GDT. These findings support the assumption that executive functions and affective 
processing interact in predicting decision making under risk. 
5.2 Introduction 
Decision making is an important key function in everyday life. Therefore, a huge number of studies addressed 
decision making under certain conditions, for example, risk (see e.g., sections: 3.1.2.2, 3.2.2.2, 3.4.1.4.2, 
3.4.2.2.2, and 3.4.3.3.2). That executive functions have an important role in decisions under risk became 
obvious in chapter 3.2. Furthermore, Starcke and colleagues (2011) demonstrated that when performing an 
additional executive task in parallel with a decision-making task (GDT), leads to inferior decision-making 
performance. Thus, the authors assumed that the GDT taps into system 2 (Kahneman, 2003; for more detail 
about the study see section 3.4.1.4.2). This again emphasized the crucial role of executive functions (and 
therefore aspects of system 2) for advantageous decision making under risk. These findings received support 
from several fMRI-studies (for detailed information about fMRI see section 4.3.4) showing activations in the 
dlPFC while making decisions under risk, an area also known to be involved in executive functioning (for more 
information about neural correlates of decision making and executive functions see section 3.3 and 3.2.1). 
Additionally, these results are in accordance with a model of decision making under risk (Brand, et al., 2006; 
see also section 3). As mentioned in section 3 it is assumed that in decisions under risk cognitive as well as 
affective processes are involved. Brand and colleagues (2006) argued that decisions under risk can principally 
be made using cognitive processes alone that means that affective reactions to feedback are not necessarily 
involved. However, the authors also proposed that the combination of cognitive and affective components will 
lead to the best performance in the decision-making process under risk. In the past few years, several studies 
using the GDT provided further support for this model. For example, it has been demonstrated that besides 
processing the (affective) feedback of previous decisions (Brand, 2008), individuals benefit from the application 
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of analytical strategies (Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008). Moreover, the necessity of receiving feedback to perform 
well on the task is moderated by the individuals’ executive functioning (Brand, Laier, et al., 2009): Subjects 
with relatively low executive functions do need feedback to perform well, while participants with superior 
executive functions perform advantageously with and without feedback (for more information see sections 
3.1.2.2, 3.2.2.2, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.4.2.2.2, and 3.4.3.3.2.) In summary, it seems that the affective and the cognitive way 
play an important role in decision making under risk, but it is still unclear whether or not the interaction between 
both systems may influence the decision-making performance. 
Different studies showed that processing affective stimuli interfere with executive functioning (Dolcos, 
Diaz-Granados, Wang, & McCarthy, 2008; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Perlstein, et 
al., 2002). In their fMRI-study, Dolcos and McCarthy (2006) as well as Dolcos and colleagues (2008) 
demonstrated that affective stimuli distract participants and lead to reduced working memory performance at 
least on individual levels. During performance activation in the dlPFC was found that decreased when affective 
stimuli were presented while the activity in the ventral brain area (e.g., the amygdala) increased simultaneously. 
The authors suggested that this deactivation in the dlPFC led to diminished cognitive performance. These 
findings correspond with Perlstein and colleagues (2002) who showed that unpleasant stimuli in a working 
memory task lead to reduced activation in the dlPFC when compared to pleasant or neutral stimuli that in turn 
leads to weaker working memory performance. Similarly, Kensinger and Corkin (2003) demonstrated that in a 
n-back task with sad and neutral faces, participants responded more slowly to sad faces than to neutral faces. 
Given these results and the findings concerning (affective) feedback-processing (Brand, 2008; Brand, Laier, et 
al., 2009), the question remains whether an additional load of the executive system as well as a simultaneous 
load on the affective system would lead to an even stronger impairment of decision-making behavior. In the 
current study it is assumed that simultaneous performance of a decision-making task and a parallel executive 
task involving affective pictures would reduce both: The resources of the executive system and the resources of 
the affective feedback processing, which are necessary for effective decision making under risk (Brand, 2008; 
Brand, Laier, et al., 2009). Therefore, decision-making performance should be worse in the affective than in the 
neutral or no simultaneous task conditions. However, this may not be the case for all types of affective stimuli. 
There are studies demonstrating that differential valences of affect (negative and positive) has a different 
influence on cognitive processes: While some showed that negative and not positive affective stimuli interfere 
with working memory performance (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003) and lead to risk-averse behavior (Alhakami & 
Slovic, 1994; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004), other studies suggested that positive affect reduces 
executive task performance (Spies, Hesse, & Hummitzsch, 1996) and leads to risk-seeking behavior (e.g., 
Cheung & Mikels, 2011; Heilman, et al., 2010; Romer & Hennessy, 2007; Yuen & Lee, 2003). Therefore, in the 
current study affective stimuli of different valence (positive and negative) were used. However, the additional 
load on executive functioning and the simultaneous demand on the affective system (due to processing of 
affective stimuli) should lead to a combined negative effect on decision making, independent of the affective 
valence, because of an interference with both systems (the cognitive and the affective system) involved. The 
current study investigated this hypothesis. In addition, it was also investigated whether the assumed effects of 
task interference due to an affective parallel task are moderated by an individuals’ level of executive 
functioning. This was not done in any of the previous studies mentioned. Similar to Starcke and colleagues 
(2011) a 2-back working memory task as a parallel executive task was used, albeit with affective and neutral 
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pictures instead of numbers. It is hypothesized that the parallel executive task more strongly interferes with 
GDT performance when affective (positive or negative) pictures are used, as compared to the effect of neutral 
ones. Due to the fact that system 2 appears to be the crucial system for decision making under risk (Starcke, et 
al., 2011) and because several studies showed that executive functions seem to moderate or at least influence the 
performance in the GDT (Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; Euteneuer, et al., 2009; Schiebener, et al., 2011), it is 
additionally assumed that this effect should be moderated by the participants’ general level of executive 
functioning: Participants with good executive functions should show improved decision-making performance 
independently of the affective stimuli in the 2-back task. However, compared to a group that performed the 
GDT by itself, the decision-making performance in all three groups with a parallel executive task 
simultaneously to the GDT (positive, negative, and neutral) should be reduced. 
5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Participants 
A sample of 194 healthy volunteers (mean age: 27.11 years, SD = 10.08, range: 18-59, 99 female) was 
examined. The participants were students of the University of Duisburg-Essen as well as their relatives and 
friends. Participation was voluntary and participants were not compensated for participation. None of the 
participants had neurological or psychiatric diseases as determined by a screening interview. All participants in 
the dual-task conditions in which both hands had to be used to perform the tasks (see description in sections 
5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2), were right-handed. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: GDT with 
secondary 2-back task including positive stimuli (positive group), GDT with secondary 2-back task including 
negative stimuli (negative group), GDT with secondary 2-back task including neutral stimuli (neutral group), 
and a CG with the GDT without a parallel task (GDT solely). Table 10 displays the demographic data of the 
four groups. 
5.3.2 Instruments 
5.3.2.1 Decisions under risk: Game of Dice Task (GDT) 
In order to measure decision making under risk, the GDT (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; see also Table 1) was 
utilized. The goal of this computerized task was to maximize the fictitious starting capital of €1,000. The game 
consisted of 18 trials in which a virtual die is thrown and the participants were asked to guess which number 
will be thrown next. During each of the 18 trials, participants were able to bet on one single number and 
combinations of two, three, or four numbers. The options were permanently shown on the screen. If the chosen 
number or one number of the chosen number combination was thrown the participants won, otherwise they lost. 
Each option offered was associated with explicit and stable gains and losses (which are also permanently 
presented on-screen) and winning probabilities (not shown on-screen): The choice of a single number provided a 
€1,000 gain/loss (winning probability 1:6), the choice of one of the other combinations provided a €500 
gain/loss for two numbers (winning probability 2:6), a €200 gain/loss for three numbers (winning probability 
3:6), and a €100 gain/loss for four numbers (winning probability 4:6). For example, if a participant bet on the 
combination of two numbers such as a “one” and a “two”, and a one or a two was thrown, he/she won €500. If 
one of the other numbers was thrown (“three”, “four”, “five”, or “six”) the subject lost €500. Following each 
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decision the participant received visual feedback about the amount of gain (colored green) or loss (colored red). 
The current capital and the remaining rounds were also shown on-screen. The different options were categorized 
into disadvantageous (one number and the combination of two numbers with a winning probability of less than 
34 %) and advantageous decisions (combination of three and four numbers with a winning probability of 50 % 
and higher). The advantageous categories are known to lead to a positive outcome in the long run. Choosing 
these options all the time statistically led to a positive final balance given the starting capital of €1,000 or more. 
Therefore, the three-number and four-number options were classified as advantageous or low risk and the one-
die and two-dice options as disadvantageous or high risk as mentioned in previous studies (e.g., Bayard, 
Raffard, & Gely-Nargeot, 2011; Brand, Laier, et al., 2009).  
To evaluate performance in the GDT, a net score was calculated by subtracting the number of 
disadvantageous decisions from the number of advantageous decisions. A positive net score indicated 
advantageous or low-risk behavior (c.f. Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; Delazer, et al., 2007; Fond, et al., 
2012). Additionally, the frequency of the riskiest choice (one single number) was used for analysis. A high 
frequency indicated disadvantageous decision making (c.f. Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008; Schiebener, et al., 2012; 
Starcke, et al., 2011). 
5.3.2.2 The parallel executive task: 2-back with pictures 
Simultaneously to the GDT and on the same computer screen (embedded into the GDT interface to the left of 
the GDT, see Figure 15), a parallel working memory 2-back task was performed (similar to Starcke, et al., 
2011).  
 
Figure 15 GDT plus 2-back task with negative pictures. 
On the right side of the screen, participants have to work on the GDT by betting which number will be thrown. On the left side participants 
continuously have to monitor the pictures presented (selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS); Lang et al., 2008) and 
have to indicate whether or not the current picture was presented two trials before. 
In contrast to the task used by Starcke and colleagues (2011) in which a 2-back task with numbers was 
used, we used pictures of three different categories as stimuli in the working memory task. In the current version 
of the 2-back task, participants had to monitor the identity of the pictures. Depending on the condition (group), 
the pictures were of negative, positive, or neutral valence (selected from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS); Lang, et al., 2008). We selected 10 pictures for each valence. Positive pictures were selected to 
be relatively high in valence (M = 7.47, SD = 0.33) and arousal (M = 4.96, SD = 0.54), but they did not contain 
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any erotic scenes. Negative pictures were selected to be relatively low in valence (M = 2.57, SD = 0.53) and 
high in arousal (M = 5.49, SD = .31), and neutral pictures were selected to be relatively low in both valence (M 
= 4.91, SD = 0.46) and arousal (M = 2.85, SD = 0.62). The pictures were presented in a pseudorandom sequence 
and participants were asked to press one of two keyboard buttons to indicate whether the currently presented 
picture was identical to the picture presented two trials before or not. The timing parameters were based on 
Schoofs, Preuss, and Wolf (2008): The stimuli were displayed for 500 ms with an inter-stimulus interval of 
2,750 ms. Thus, participants’ response time was limited to500 ms. Target stimuli were presented randomly with 
a probability of 33 % (c.f. Schoofs, et al., 2008).  
The performance on the 2-back task was computed as the percentage of correct responses as well as 
reaction time in ms. While the 2-back task had to be solved with the left hand on the keyboard, the participants 
were asked to use the mouse with their right hand to execute the GDT. 
5.3.2.3 Executive functions: Modified Card Sorting Test (MCST) 
The MCST (Nelson, 1976) was used to measure subcomponents of executive functioning such as cognitive 
flexibility, set-shifting, and categorization as well as the ability to use feedback (see Lezak, et al., 2004; Strauss, 
et al., 2006). Participants were required to sort a deck of 48 cards according to a certain predetermined rule. The 
cards were sortable in three ways: by color, number, or shape of the symbols on the cards. The possible sorting 
rule had to be learned through trial and error using the feedback (right or wrong). The sorting rule changed after 
six consecutive correct responses and subjects needed to figure out a new sorting rule. 
Following variables were used for the analysis of the MCST: the number of categories solved and the 
number of incorrect responses. Incorrect responses were broken down into perseverative errors, in which the 
participant continued to sort the cards according to the previous rule, and non-perseverative errors, in which the 
error was unrelated to the previous sorting rule. 
5.3.3 Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were asked to fill out a demographic questionnaire. Next, the MCST was administered 
followed by the GDT plus 2-back or the original version of the GDT (without parallel 2-back task). Before the 
dual task started, participants were introduced to both tasks (GDT and 2-back) and each task was practiced 
separately. Participants were instructed to work on both tasks with equal focus and to perform as good as 
possible on both tasks. Afterward, the debriefing took place. The entire procedure lasted approximately 30 min. 
5.3.4 Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses were carried out using IBM SPSS Statistics software for Windows (Release 19.0; April 18, 
2011; SPSS Inc. IBM, Chicago). To compare groups concerning gender, Pearson’s χ² test was used. The t test 
for independent samples and the One-Way-ANOVA were used to compare the performances in the GDT, the 2-
back task, and the MCST between groups. Analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) and correlations were calculated 
in order to analyze whether possible differences in GDT performance between groups were due to 2-back task 
performance. If necessary, Bonferroni correction was applied to adjust the Alpha for multiple comparisons. In 
addition, moderated regressions (J. Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 2003) were performed to analyze the 
hypothesized interaction between stimuli-valence and executive functioning in predicting GDT performance. 
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5.4 Results 
Table 10 demonstrates that the groups did not differ regarding gender, age, or executive functions as measured 
by the MCST. Post-hoc pairwise Bonferroni-corrected comparisons revealed no significant differences between 
groups for each variable of the MCST, p’s ≥ .150. 
Table 10 Between-group comparison of participants’ characteristics. 
 Groups 
F df1, df2 p η² 
Negative 
M (SD) 
Positive 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
GDT-solely 
M (SD) 
n 37 38 37 82     
Sex 
(female|male)a 18|19 20|18 18|19 43|39 0.27
b 3 .965 
 
Age 27.95 (12.52) 26.16 (8.87) 25.89 (10.00) 27.72 (9.50) 0.48 3, 190 .701 .01 
Executive functions (MCST)       
Categoriesc 5.86 (0.35) 5.58 (1.00) 5.68 (0.58) 5.52 (1.05) 1.40 3, 190 .246 .02 
Non-
perseverative 
errorsc 
3.78 (2.51) 4.76 (3.35) 4.73 (2.33) 5.23 (4.25) 1.48 3, 190 .223 .02 
Perseverative 
errorsc 
0.43 (0.65) 1.13 (1.91) 0.97 (1.30) 1.05 (1.36) 2.10 3, 190 .102 .03 
aFrequency. bChi square. cRaw score. 
Table 11 shows the average performance in the GDT plus 2-back task or the GDT solely for all groups 
(negative, positive, neutral, and GDT solely). 
5.4.1 Game of Dice Task (GDT): Comparison of the performance of the four groups (negative, 
positive, neutral, and GDT solely) 
Comparing the performance of the GDT across the four groups, an ANOVA with GDT net score as dependent 
variable and group as between-factor revealed a significant main effect of group (see Table 11). Post-hoc 
pairwise Bonferroni-corrected comparisons revealed that the positive group had a significant lower net score 
than the neutral group, p = .002, d = .67, and the GDT-solely group, p ≤ .001, d = .73. This designates that the 
participants of the positive group more often chose the disadvantageous/ high-risk options than the neutral and 
GDT-solely group. Moreover, the difference between the negative group and the GDT-solely group was 
significant, p = .033, d = .64, indicating that the negative group chose the disadvantageous/ high-risk options 
more often than the GDT-solely group. While there was no significant difference between the negative and the 
positive group, p = .937, d = .25, as well as between the neutral and the GDT-solely group, p ≥ .99, d = .07, 
there was a medium effect size (c.f. J. Cohen, 1992) for the difference between the negative group and the 
neutral group, d = .55, but the difference did not reach significance, p = .185. This suggests that the participants 
who processed positive pictures in the 2-back task chose the disadvantageous/high-risk options more often than 
participants who processed neutral stimuli and those who performed the GDT without additional task. However, 
there also seems to be at least a trend that the negative group chose the disadvantageous options more often than 
the neutral group. To ensure that the group differences in the net score were not due to working memory 
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performance, an additional ANCOVA was calculated using the percentage of correct responses in the 2-back 
task as covariate. The analysis revealed that the factor group was still significant, F = 5.25, p = .007, η² = .09. 
The covariate did not explain a significant part of the variance of the net score, F = 3.40, p= .068, η² = .03. This 
suggests that GDT performance in the groups with affective pictures is diminished due to the affective pictures 
and not because of lower working memory performance.  
Table 11 Between-group comparisons (negative, positive, neutral, and GDT-solely) of task performance. 
 Groups 
F df1, df2 p η² 
Negative 
M (SD) 
Positive 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
GDT-solely 
M (SD) 
GDT         
Net score 10.16 (6.62) 8.05 (10.11) 13.41 (5.01) 13.73 (4.39) 8.37 3, 190 ≤. 001 .12 
One single 
number 
0.65 (1.27) 2.08 (3.58) 0.41 (0.60) 0.30 (0.60) 9.70 3, 190 ≤. 001 .13 
2-back task         
Correct 
responsesa 
74.15 (12.07) 60.38 (21.41) 60.07 (22.24) - 6.54 2, 109 .002 .11 
Reaction 
timeb 
1,072.92 (285.32) 963.24 (301.89) 1,084.57 (331.60) - 1.79 2, 109 .171 .03 
Note. The comparison of the 2-back task includes only the groups negative, positive, and neutral, because the GDT-solely group performed 
the original version of the GDT without 2-back task. aIn percentage. bIn ms. 
When using one single number of the GDT options as dependent variable and group as a between-
factor, the main effect of group was significant (see Table 11). Post-hoc pairwise Bonferroni-corrected 
comparisons showed that participants of the positive group chose the riskiest option of the GDT more often than 
the neutral group, p ≤ .001, d = .65, the negative group, p = .003, d = .53, as well as the GDT-solely group, p ≤ 
.001, d = .69, indicating a difference in choice-behavior between the negative and the positive group. The other 
group comparisons did not reach significance, p’s ≥ .99, d’s ≤ .35. When controlling for working memory in an 
ANCOVA (2-back task: Percentage of correct responses) the factor group was still significant, F = 5.67, p = 
.005, η² = .10, even though the covariate was significant, F = 6.29, p= .014, η² = .06. Additional correlation 
analysis revealed a negative correlation between the 2-back task and the single die option (r = -.248, p = .008), 
indicating that good working memory leads to less frequent choices of the riskiest option. Those findings 
indicate that working memory seems to be involved in GDT performance, but is not responsible for the group 
differences. 
Analysis of the use of feedback in the GDT between groups (see Table 12) revealed significant 
differences for most feedback scores. Only the comparison regarding the “used feedback after a high-risk choice 
for a shift to a low-risk option” did not reach significance. Post-hoc pairwise Bonferroni-corrected comparisons 
demonstrated that compared to the GDT-solely group, participants of the positive group shifted less often to the 
low-risk option after receiving positive feedback (p = .032, d = .82), persisted less often on the low-risk options 
after receiving negative feedback (p ≤ .001, d = .81), and maintained low-risk options less often after receiving 
positive feedback (p ≤ .001, d = .63). When compared to the neutral group, the positive group persisted less 
often on the low-risk options after receiving negative feedback (p = .013, d = .56) and maintained low-risk 
options less often after receiving positive feedback (p = .005, d = .69). Moreover, participants of the negative 
group persisted less often on the low-risk options after receiving negative feedback than participants of the 
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GDT-solely group (p = .006, d = .76). All other post-hoc pairwise Bonferroni-corrected comparisons did not 
reach significance.  
Table 12 Analyses of the GDT feedback scores. 
 Groups 
F df1, df2 p η² 
Negative 
M (SD) 
Positive 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
GDT-solely 
M (SD) 
Used negative 
feedback after a high-
risk choice for a shift 
to a low-risk optiona 
67.09 (23.95) 
(n = 27) 
66.90 (34.81) 
(n = 27) 
81.99 (29.11) 
(n = 27) 
82.03 (32.68) 
(n = 51) 
2.52 
 
3, 128 
 
.061 
 
.06 
 
Used positive feedback 
after a low-risk choice 
for maintaining on a 
low-risk optiona 
78.56 (24.92) 
(n = 37) 
73.89 (29.95) 
(n = 37) 
89.76 (12.18) 
(n = 37) 
88.65 (13.73) 
(n = 82) 
6.59 
 
3, 189 
 
≤ .001 
 
.10 
 
Shifts to a low-risk 
option after receiving 
a gain following a 
high-risk decisiona 
72.83 (39.43) 
(n = 23) 
54.91 (42.62) 
(n = 19) 
84.33 (26.01) 
(n = 10) 
85.40 (30.94) 
(n = 29) 
3.03 
 
3, 77 
 
.035 
 
.11 
 
Persisting on a low-
risk option after 
receiving a loss 
following a low-risk 
decisiona 
78.57 (26.83) 
(n = 37) 
72.19 (36.78) 
(n = 36) 
89.29 (24.16) 
(n = 37) 
94.14 (10.71) 
(n = 82) 
8.39 
 
3, 188 
 
≤ .001 
 
.13 
 
Note. In these analyses participants are only included in case they chose the particular option (e.g., low-risk option) and received the specific 
feedback (e.g., positive feedback) at least once during the game. Thus, the number of participants entered in the analyses differs between 
variables used. aIn percentage.  
Overall, the results demonstrate that decision-making performance diminishes when participants have 
to perform a parallel executive task involving affective pictures (of positive or negative valence) simultaneously 
compared to the decision-making performance when no parallel executive task has to be performed 
simultaneously. In contrary, participants performing the decision-making task with a parallel executive task with 
neutral pictures demonstrated no different decision-making performance than the participants performing the 
decision-making task alone. Moreover, while the difference of the net scores between the positive and neutral 
group was significant and demonstrated a high effect size, the difference between the negative and the neutral 
group was not significant, but had a medium effect size. However, the comparison of selecting the riskiest 
option (one single die) between the negative and neutral group did not reach significance and did not show an 
effect. The feedback analyses revealed that participants, who were subject to the affective (negative and 
positive) stimuli in the n-back task, used feedback less often than the neutral or the GDT-solely group.  
5.4.2 2-back task: Comparison of the performance of the three groups (negative, positive, and neutral) 
Performance of the 2-back task was analyzed using an ANOVA with percentage of correct responses in the 2-
back task as dependent variable and group as between-factor revealing a significant main effect of group (see 
Table 11). Post-hoc pairwise Bonferroni-corrected comparisons showed that the participants in the negative 
group responded significantly more accurately than the participants in the positive group, p = .007, d = .79, and 
in the neutral group, p = .006, d = .79. There was no significant difference between the positive group and the 
neutral group, p ≥ .99, d = .01. When reaction time was used as dependent variable and group as between-factor, 
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the main effect of group did not reach significance (see Table 11). Post-hoc pairwise Bonferroni-corrected 
comparisons revealed no significant differences between groups, p’s ≥ .269, d’s ≤ .38. 
5.4.3 Testing the moderation hypothesis of executive functioning in the three groups with a parallel 
executive task (negative, positive, and neutral) 
To analyze whether the performance in the GDT was moderated by executive functions when the 2-back task 
with negative, positive, or neutral stimuli was performed simultaneously, we calculated potential interactions 
using a moderated regression analysis with GDT net score as dependent variable and “MCST: Perseverative 
errors” (as a measure of executive functions) and “group” (neutral vs. positive, neutral vs. negative, negative vs. 
positive) as predictor variables (variables centralized, see J. Cohen, et al., 2003). 
Table 13 Moderator analysis with group and MCST: Perseverative errors as predictor variables. 
 β T p Changes 
in F 
df1, df2 Changes 
in R 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GDT NET SCORE 
MODEL A: NEUTRAL vs. POSITIVE (n = 75) 
Main effects       
Group -.32 -2.89 .005 8.37 1, 73 .10 
MCST: Perseverative errors -.43 -4.36 < .001 18.99 1,72 .19 
Interaction       
MCST: Perseverative errors × group -.27 -2.59 .012 6.70 1,71 .06 
MODEL B: NEUTRAL vs. NEGATIVE (n = 74) 
Main effects       
Group -.27 -2.38 .020 5.65 1, 72 .07 
MCST: Perseverative errors -.16 -1.40 .166 1.96 1,71 .03 
Interaction       
MCST: Perseverative errors × group -.25 -1.83 .072 3.34 1,70 .04 
MODEL C: NEGATIVE vs. POSITIVE (n = 75) 
Main effects       
Group -.12 -1.07 .290 1.14 1, 73 .02 
MCST: Perseverative errors -.53 -5.19 < .001 26.93 1,72 .27 
Interaction       
MCST: Perseverative errors × group .02 0.13 .899 .02 1,71 < .001 
 
Table 13 contains the values of the three hierarchical regression analyses. In the first hierarchical 
regression model’s (Model A: neutral vs. positive) first step the predictor “group” explained 10 % of the 
variance of the GDT net score. In the second step the predictor “MCST: Perseverative errors” led to a significant 
increase of 19 % variance explanation. Including the interaction between both variables (“MCST: Perseverative 
errors” multiplied by group) in the third step led to additional 6 % explanation of variance, indicating a 
moderation effect of the “MCST: Perseverative errors”. The overall variance explanation of the GDT net score 
was significant as well, R² = .35, F (3, 71) = 12.82, p ≤ .001. The simple slope analysis of the interaction 
showed a negative slope for the simple regression line representing the predictor “group” that was significantly 
different from zero, t = 4.02, p < .001, when the number of “MCST: Perseverative errors” was one standard 
deviation above the mean. The slope was not significantly different from zero, t = .25, p = .803, when the 
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number of “MCST: Perseverative errors” was one standard deviation below the mean. This interaction indicates 
that participants with good performance in the MCST (as shown by a low number of perseverative errors) 
performed well on the GDT independently of whether or not the 2-back task included pictures of positive 
valence. By contrast, participants with low performance in the MCST (indicated by a high number of 
perseverative errors) showed decreased performance in the GDT when the stimuli were positive as compared to 
neutral. The interaction effect is shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 The interaction effect of the moderated regression analysis, with GDT net score as dependent variable and MCST: perseverative 
errors (as a measure of executive functions) and group (neutral vs. positive stimuli) as predictor variables. 
In the second hierarchical regression model’s (Model B: neutral vs. negative) first step the predictor 
“group” explained 7 % of the variance of the GDT net score. When entering the predictor “MCST: 
Perseverative errors” (second step), the explanation of variance did not increase significantly. By including the 
interaction between both variables (“MCST: perseverative errors” multiplied by “group”) in the third step, 
further explanation of the GDT net score variance slightly failed to reach significance (see Table 13 for details). 
In sum, the overall variance explanation of the GDT net score was significant, R² = .14, F (3, 70) = 3.76, p = 
.015. However, the simple slope analysis of the interaction showed the same pattern as before: A negative slope 
for the simple regression line representing the predictor group that was significantly different from zero, t = 
3.04, p = .003, when the number of “MCST: Perseverative errors” was one standard deviation above the mean. 
The slope was not significantly different from zero, t = .52, p = .607, when the number of “MCST: Perseverative 
errors” was one standard deviation below the mean. Even though the interaction effect slightly failed to reach 
significance, the pattern of the simple slopes indicates that participants with good performance in the MCST 
(low number of perseverative errors) performed well in the GDT independent of whether or not the 2-back task 
included pictures of negative valence. By contrast, when the stimuli were negative, participants with low 
performance in the MCST (high number of perseverative errors) showed decreased performance in the GDT. 
The interaction effect is shown in Figure 17. 
In the first step of the third hierarchical regression model (Model C: negative vs. positive) the predictor 
“group” failed to reach significance (see Table 13 for details). But in the second step the predictor “MCST: 
Perseverative errors” explained 28 % variance of the GDT net score. When including the interaction between 
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both variables (MCST: Perseverative errors multiplied by group) in the third step, further explanation failed to 
reach significance. The overall explanation of the GDT net score was significant, R² = .28, F (3, 71) = 9.37, p ≤ 
.001. Because the interaction explained less than 0.1 % of the overall variance, we did not analyze the simple 
slopes. 
 
Figure 17 The interaction effect of the moderated regression analysis, with GDT net score as dependent variable and MCST: perseverative 
errors (as a measure of executive functions) and group (neutral vs. negative stimuli) as predictor variables. 
5.5 Discussion 
The results of the current study demonstrate that a parallel executive task involving affective pictures (of 
positive and negative valance) interferes with decision-making performance in a gambling task with explicit and 
stable rules compared to decision-making performance without a parallel task, even when controlled for 
working memory performance. In more detail, performing a parallel executive task with positive affective 
pictures simultaneously to the decision-making task leads to more disadvantageous decisions than performing a 
parallel task with neutral pictures. Even though the difference between negative and neutral pictures was not 
significant, there was at least a medium effect size (c.f. J. Cohen, 1992) indicating that negative pictures 
interfere with the decision-making performance as well. However, the comparison of the riskiest option between 
the negative and the neutral group did not show such an effect. In contrast, a parallel task with neutral pictures 
does not interfere with decision-making performance when compared to a group performing the GDT without 
additional task. Additional analyses regarding the use of feedback during the GDT revealed that participants 
performing a parallel executive task involving affective pictures used the feedback in the GDT less often than 
the GDT-solely group or the neutral group. A further main result of our study was that the influence of affective 
stimuli on decision making is moderated by the participants’ executive functions. Participants with good 
executive functions are less influenced by the affective stimuli of the parallel task than subjects with lower 
executive functions. 
These results support the findings by Starcke and colleagues (2011) stating that the performance of the 
GDT diminishes when a parallel tasks produces additional load on the executive system. The current results 
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demonstrate that processing affective pictures (in particular those with positive valence, see discussion below) in 
the 2-back task interferes more strongly with the decision-making task than processing neutral pictures in the 2-
back task. Moreover, the results concerning the use of feedback in the GDT lead to the suggestion that 
processing affective pictures reduces the resources of the affective way (related to system 1; see section 3.4.1.1), 
which was shown to be involved in decision making under risk (Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; Brand, et al., 
2006; see also section 3.1.2.2). Due to the fact that the cognitive resources (related to system 2; see section 
3.4.1.1) are also reduced by the 2-back task itself, the additional load on the affective way leads to an even 
worse performance than a 2-back task with neutral pictures. Given that participants with superior executive 
functions are not affected by the affective stimuli, it seems that executive functions can compensate the negative 
impact of affective stimuli on GDT performance. Therefore, system 2 seems to be more crucial in decision 
making under risk than the intuitive-experiential system (system 1; Kahneman, 2003). This is in line with the 
findings by Starcke and colleagues (2011) as well as findings by Brand, Heinze, and colleagues (2008) and 
Brand, Laier, colleagues (2009), which also emphasize the importance of system 2 for decision making under 
risk. 
5.5.1 Decision-making performance 
Even though the results support the finding that GDT performance diminishes when a parallel executive task is 
performed simultaneously, they also demonstrate that this effect appears to depend on the stimuli included in the 
parallel 2-back task. When neutral pictures are included in the 2-back task, it does not seem to affect the 
performance of the GDT. Comparing findings on a descriptive level from studies using n-back tasks with 
different stimuli (digits vs. pictures) support this result: A recent study by Laier and colleagues (2012) found 
that performing a 4-back task with neutral pictures solely, led to an accuracy score of 80 %. In comparison, 
studies using a 2-back task (which is known to have a lower executive load than a 4-back task and thus should 
be easier to perform) with digits instead of pictures led to an accuracy score of only 66 % (mean accuracy rate: 
.66; Keeser et al., 2011) and 81 % (error rate of 17,8 %; Knops, Nuerk, Fimm, Vohn, & Willmes, 2006). These 
results imply that an n-back task with pictures is easier to perform than an n-back task with digits. This might be 
the reason for the good performance in the group with the neutral picture condition in our study. 
Furthermore, our results are in line with previous studies that showed that subjects pay more attention 
to affective than to neutral stimuli (for a review see Vuilleumier, 2005). In his review, Vuilleumier (2005) 
referred to results of studies that made him to suggest that in situations where the attentional resources are 
limited, affective information is more salient and therefore receives preferential access to attention and 
awareness. Moreover, he proposed that these effects are involuntary and reflexive. With respect to our results 
one may argue that due to the fact that participants had to perform two tasks simultaneously, the attention 
resources were limited and that the affective stimuli had prioritized access. This might explain the reduced 
performance in the GDT when affective pictures are presented in the n-back task because attention is directed to 
the parallel executive task with affective stimuli. Pessoa (2009) also pointed out that affect-laden items that are 
task-irrelevant impair performance on the main task because affective information might be directly transferred 
to control structures and receive prioritized attention. Following the arguments by Pessoa (2009) and those by 
Vuilleumier (2005), may lead to the assumption that in the current study the affective pictures in the n-back task 
negatively influenced performance in the GDT because of binding attention resources. 
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When looking at our results in more detail, we found that particularly positive affect of the pictures had 
a negative influence on decision making under risk. Participants tended to decide more disadvantageously when 
performing a parallel executive task with positive stimuli simultaneously than to a parallel task with neutral or 
negative stimuli. This is in line with studies demonstrating that when the cognitive resources for analytic 
deliberation are reduced, subjects rely more often on heuristic, affective processes (Dijker & Koomen, 1996; 
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). Moreover, it was found that positive affect led to more risk-
seeking behavior (e.g., Cheung & Mikels, 2011; Heilman, et al., 2010; Romer & Hennessy, 2007; Yuen & Lee, 
2003), whereas negative affect entails risk-aversion (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Slovic, et al., 2004). Positive 
affect leads to an underestimation of the risk factor while the estimation of the benefit increases, resulting in 
risk-seeking behavior. On the other hand, negative affect leads to an increase in the perceived risk and to a 
decrease in the perceived benefit of a decision (c.f. Finucane, et al., 2000). Thus, assuming that the affective 
pictures in our study induced the equivalent affect in the participants, the positive group engaged in more risk-
seeking behavior than the negative group resulting in inferior decision-making performance. Further support for 
our results comes from a study by Bagneux, Bollon, and Dantzer (2012) using a modified version of the GDT 
(with 30 trials instead of 18). Even though the difference slightly failed to reach significance, the data displayed, 
at least on a descriptive level, that in the last three blocks (out of five; six decisions were taken together to one 
block) participants who had watched happy video clips prior to performing the GDT more frequently chose the 
disadvantageous options than those participants who had watched angry video clips (the study is in detail 
described in section 3.4.2.2.2.). 
Concerning the model of decision making under risk (Brand, et al., 2006; see also section 3.1.1) two 
different but interacting ways to decide advantageously are suggested: the cognitive way by using a decision 
strategy and the affective way by relying on one’s intuition and experience. Assuming that the affective stimuli 
in our study led to an equivalent affect, it is possible that the positive affect reduces (executive) task 
performance such as executive capacity (Spies, et al., 1996) and planning performance (Oaksford, Morris, 
Grainger, & Williams, 1996). Since executive functions play an important role in decision making under risk, 
reductions in the executive domain lead to disadvantageous decisions (Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; 
Schiebener, et al., 2011; Starcke, et al., 2011). These findings support our data suggesting that particularly 
positive affective stimuli in the working memory task are linked to riskier performance in the GDT. 
Regarding the affective way it may be possible that the GDT-irrelevant affect of the 2-back task (due to 
the affective stimuli) interfered with affective processing in the decision-making process. This was already 
shown for decisions under ambiguity (Laier, Pawlikowski, & Brand, 2013; Preston, et al., 2007; Van den Bos, et 
al., 2009): Task-irrelevant affect created interference with task-related affect (somatic markers; for more 
information about somatic markers and the involvement in decision making see chapter 3.1) necessary for 
advantageous decisions. Furthermore, first findings indicate that stress as a task-irrelevant affect impairs 
decision-making performance, also in decision making under risk (c.f. Starcke, et al., 2008). Therefore, the 
current results seem to be in line with the study by Starcke and colleagues (2008) and may support the 
assumption of the model of decision making under risk (Brand, et al., 2006; see also section 3) that task-
irrelevant affect processing could interfere with feedback processing that lead to weakened decision-making 
performance. 
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Overall, the results demonstrate that positive affective stimuli lead to a higher frequency of the riskiest 
alternative than negative affective stimuli. However, regarding the overall performance of the GDT (GDT net 
score) this influence diminishes, leading to a reduced of GDT performance independent of affective valence. 
Additionally, both affective groups (negative and positive) seem to be impaired in feedback-processing. 
5.5.2 Working memory performance 
Working memory performance also appears to be influenced by affective stimuli. While Kensinger and Corkin 
(2003) as well as Perlstein and colleagues (2002) found better performance in an n-back task with pleasant 
stimuli, participants in our study showed superior performance in the 2-back task with negative stimuli in 
comparison with neutral and positive stimuli. In line with the current findings are studies that illustrated that 
positive affect leads to inferior performance in certain working memory processes like switching, encoding, and 
updating of information (E. A. Martin & Kerns, 2011; Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). Combined with 
the findings that positive affect reduces (executive) task performance such as executive capacity (Spies, et al., 
1996) and planning performance (Oaksford, et al., 1996) this indicates that particularly the executive domain of 
working memory is disturbed by positive stimuli. Additionally, Levens and Gotlib (2010) demonstrated that 
healthy control participants need more time to disengage from positive stimuli in comparison with neutral and 
sad stimuli. Assuming that for the GDT with parallel 2-back task switching, updating of information, and 
disengaging from pictures are required, it seems plausible that the group with negative pictures (and therefore 
faster disengaging abilities) in the 2-back task appears to show better performance in both tasks than the positive 
group, at least when looking at the choice of the riskiest option. Moreover, Erk, Kleczar and Walter (2007) 
suggest that the right dlPFC is conducive to the integration of working memory and (mainly negative) affective 
processing. Activation in this brain area was generally stronger for high cognitive load than low cognitive load 
and additionally increased when the processed stimuli had an affective context. The authors interpreted this 
effect as an effort of an executive region to avoid impaired performance. The additional effort of the executive 
region (dlPFC) could be the cause for better performance of the negative group (compared to the positive group) 
in the 2-back task as well as in the GDT, given that activation of the dlPFC is also associated with GDT-
performance (Labudda, et al., 2008). 
5.5.3 Moderation effect of executive functions 
A further important result of the current study is that the effect of affect-associated interference of decision 
making while performing a parallel task is moderated by the subjects’ general executive functioning. When 
entering the positive and the neutral group in the model of the moderated regression the interaction between 
executive functions and group reached significance, indicating that the influence of affect (in this case the 
positive affect) on the decision-making performance is moderated by executive functioning (see section 5.4.3, 
Model A). When entering the negative and the neutral group in the model of the moderated regression the 
interaction did not reach significance (see section 5.4.3, Model B). Nonetheless, the simple slopes showed a 
comparable pattern to the slopes of the interaction in Model A. This finding supports earlier results that 
executive functions play an important role in decision making under risk (Brand, et al., 2006; Brand, Laier, et 
al., 2009) and it explains inter-individual variance in the GDT (Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008). Two essential 
processes of the executive functions are selective attention and task management (E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1999; 
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for detailed information see section 3.2). Therefore, participants with superior executive functions are more 
capable of concentrating on a goal and managing two tasks simultaneously even when one of the tasks deals 
with affective pictures, which usually receive more attention (see Vuilleumier, 2005 for a review). Furthermore, 
these results indicate that executive functions can possibly compensate the affective influence and support the 
assumption that aspects of system 2 are more important for decision making under risk (Brand, Laier, et al., 
2009; Starcke, et al., 2011): Because even though the affective pictures seem to interfere with the GDT-
performance and subsequently led to disadvantageous decisions (probably by using affective processing 
resources and therefore aspects of system 1 which are thus reduced for the GDT), those participants with good 
executive functions (and therefore aspects of system 2) seem to be unaffected and demonstrate advantageous 
decision making. 
5.5.4 Limitations 
There are some limitations to our study, which should be regarded. First, even though Starcke and colleagues 
(2011) demonstrated that a parallel executive task reduces the executive resources and therefore the GDT 
performance, we found no influence of the parallel executive task with neutral pictures. As already discussed, 
we believe that an n-back task with neutral pictures leads to less executive load than an n-back task with digits, 
because it is easier to perform. However, the comparison we mentioned is only descriptive. Future studies 
should investigate this in more detail by comparing the performance of two n-back tasks with different stimuli 
(digits vs. pictures). Second, we did not measure whether the pictures led to different affect and therefore, we 
can only speculate that the pictures induced different affective states, leading to different task performance 
between groups. However, the stimuli that were used in this study are derived from a well-validated extensively 
studied stimulus set (Lang, et al., 2008), which is often used to induce affective states (e.g., Dolcos, et al., 2008; 
Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Erk, et al., 2007; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). Additionally, even though we did not 
investigate different states of affect, we could show that processing different affective stimuli diminishes the 
decision-making performance, at least when included in a parallel executive task, which is known to reduce 
executive resources for the decision-making task. 
5.5.5 Conclusion 
We conclude that processing task-irrelevant affective information interferes with decision making under risk and 
that this effect is moderated by executive functions. The results give first evidence for a mechanism that may 
explain why decisions in everyday life can become riskier for some individuals when affective stimuli divert 
attention and therefore interfere with the decision-making process. The impact of the interference seems to 
depend on the valence of the affect and on the individuals’ executive functioning. The results support the 
assumption that the cognitive and the affective route interact in decision making under risk. However, it seems 
that executive functions and therefore aspects of system 2 are more crucial for decision making under risk: 
Executive functioning can compensate the negative influence of processing affective pictures. Future studies 
may investigate this issue in more detail, for instance by inducing different affective states experimentally and 
by using other affective parallel tasks. Furthermore, investigating brain correlates in this and comparable 
paradigms (e.g., with fMRI) could further contribute to the discussion about the interaction between affect, 
decision making, and executive functions. 
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6. Study 3: Monitoring, a key function of dual tasking: Decision making under risk and a parallel 
executive task 
6.1 Abstract 
It is assumed that decision making under risk (e.g., operationalized by the GDT) loads onto the analytical-
rational system (system 2) that processes information serially. Consequently, the decision-making performance 
diminishes when performing an additional executive task simultaneously. Underlying mechanisms of the 
processes of system 2 are still unclear. Dual-tasking studies suggest that performing two tasks simultaneously 
requires executive functions, in particular a supervisory/monitoring function. The current study investigates the 
underlying executive functions of the GDT in a dual-tasking situation. Previously, simple relationships between 
GDT and executive functions were examined. To get a better understanding of the interplay of executive 
functions and dual tasking and the potential role of the supervisory/monitoring ability, a structural equation 
model (SEM) was calculated. Results support findings that executive functions are important in decision making 
and emphasize the assumption that the supervisory/monitoring function is crucial when performing an additional 
task simultaneously.  
6.2  Introduction 
Decision making is a key function in peoples’ everyday life. In some situations people need to make decisions 
while performing an additional task simultaneously. It was found that in decision making under risk, in which 
the consequences of a decision and their probabilities are clear or at least computable, the decision-making 
performance diminishes when an additional executive task has to be performed simultaneously (Starcke, et al., 
2011). In order to operationalize decisions under risk, Starcke and colleagues used the GDT (Brand, Fujiwara, et 
al., 2005; see also Table 1), which involves executive functions as well as affective processing (see section 
3.1.2.2 and 3.2.2.2). However, it was shown that although processing of the affective feedback from previous 
decisions is of value to perform well in the GDT (Brand, 2008), this relationship appears to be moderated by the 
individuals’ cognitive functioning (Brand, Laier, et al., 2009). This finding supports the assumption that, even 
though the affective and the cognitive route are involved in risky situations, a decision can principally be made 
by relying on the cognitive route alone (Brand, et al., 2006; for detailed information see section 3). 
In the study by Starcke and colleagues (2011) participants had to perform a 2-back working memory 
task simultaneously to the GDT (find a detailed description of this study in section 3.4.1.4.2). The results 
demonstrated that performing the GDT with a secondary executive task simultaneously leads to more high-
risk/disadvantageous decisions, compared to a group performing only the GDT. This result in combination with 
the previous findings of the important role of executive functions in the decision-making process (see section 
3.2.2.2), suggests that decision making under risk requires especially the system 2, which processes tasks 
serially, slowly, controlled, effortful, etc. (Kahneman, 2003; see also section 3.4.1.1 for more information about 
dual-process systems). Compared to system 1, which acts automatic, fast, parallel, effortless, etc., the capacity 
of system 2 is limited. This leads to an interference of two tasks belonging to system 2 (Kahneman, 1973; 
Pashler, 1998; for a detailed discussion about task interference and dual tasking see section 3.4.1.1). The GDT 
and the 2-back task revert to the same cognitive resource (system 2): Equally to the GDT the 2-back task is 
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associated with executive functions such as inhibition, updating, coordination/ reorganization of information, 
and comparison of stimuli (e.g., Conway, et al., 2005; Owen, et al., 2005). Thus, Starcke and colleagues (2011) 
argue that the GDT performance is decreased when a 2-back working memory task has to be performed 
simultaneously. However, even though the results by Starcke and colleagues support this assumption they also 
discovered a variance in the performance of the GDT, indicating that some peoples’ decision-making 
performance was not or at least was less affected by the additional task. This raises the question which cognitive 
ability is required to work well on both tasks (GDT and 2-back) simultaneously. 
As already mentioned, system 2 works serially (Kahneman, 2003) that means, while concentrating on 
one task set the second task set seems to be inhibited (for a review on inhibition in task switching see Koch, et 
al., 2010). Thereby, subjects’ attention is narrowed to the prioritized task and is consequently shielded from 
competing distractors (Easterbrook, 1959). However, in order to switch back to the second inhibited task if 
necessary, this control mechanism simultaneously enables monitoring for potential second-task associated 
action information (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Plessow, et al., 2011). The involvement of monitoring in in complex 
situations in which more than one task has to be done, was also postulated by D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a, 
1997b; see also section 3.4.1.1) as well as by Norman and Shallice (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991a; 1991b; see also section 3.2). They assumed that a supervisory/monitoring function has to be 
involved in demanding situations in which an adaption to changing circumstances is necessary (e.g., in dual-
tasking situations). An experimental study by D’Esposito (1995) supports this assumption by demonstrating the 
involvement of cortical areas associated with executive functions during dual tasking. However, as postulated 
by different authors (e.g., Miyake, et al., 2000; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1999) executive functions can be divided 
into different subfunctions (for detailed information about executive subfunctions see section 3.2). The question 
remains which specific executive subfunctions may be involved in dual tasking. E. E. Smith and Jonides (1999) 
differentiate between five subfunctions (attention and inhibition, task-management, planning, monitoring, and 
coding) and demonstrated that task-management appears to be involved in dual tasking. Findings of further 
studies that investigated the underlying executive functions in dual tasking indicated that control functions (De 
Jong, 1995) as well as monitoring that means, updating and controlling the actual content of working memory in 
order to determine the next step and set-shifting (Cooper, et al., 2012), appear to be involved. These findings 
lead to the assumption that in order to make advantageous decisions under risk while performing an additional 
executive task simultaneously (as was suggested by the variance of the data by Starcke et al., 2011) enhanced 
monitoring abilities are required.  
6.2.1 The current study  
The current study was conducted to investigate this assumption. To clarify the relationship between the 
performance of a decision-making dual task, executive functions, and the special role of the 
supervisory/monitoring function we used a structural equation model (SEM). Analogously to the study by 
Starcke and colleagues (2011) we used the GDT plus 2-back task. Based on the fact that in both tasks (GDT and 
2-back task) various executive functions such as comparison of information /categorization of information and 
feedback processing, are involved (e.g., Conway, et al., 2005; Euteneuer, et al., 2009), it can be assumed that 
those executive functions are involved in the GDT plus 2-back performance, too. However, to work on both 
tasks simultaneously and to do so equally well, as it is indicated by the GDT plus 2-back task, especially 
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monitoring abilities should be required: Both tasks and the current progress of each task need to be represented 
in working memory. Thereby, subjects should be able to perform one of the two tasks while the contemporary 
process of the second task should also be present simultaneously in order to switch back at an appropriate point 
in time. Taking these consideration into account, we assume that various executive functions such as 
categorization of information and feedback processing, as involved in the GDT and the 2-back task, influence 
the dual-task performance (GDT plus 2-back) directly (see the SEM-model in Figure 18). Moreover, we assume 
that those executive functions are also involved in the supervisory/monitoring process between the GDT and the 
2-back task. Therefore, a mediation model is suggested (see Figure 18): On one hand executive functions should 
influence GDT performance directly. On the other hand this effect should be mediated by a 
supervisory/monitoring function because of its assumed key function in dual tasking. Subsequently, besides 
categorization and feedback processing, the supervisory/monitoring function should explain a noteworthy 
proportion of variance of the GDT plus 2-back task. 
 
 
Figure 18 The theoretical mediation model. 
It displays the possible mediation effect of the latent dimension monitoring on the relationship between the executive functions like 
categorization and feedback processing and decision making in a dual-task situation. The arrows represent the assumed direction of the 
influence of the different variables. 
Based on the theoretical considerations above, we assume that participants with higher executive 
functions in general perform well in the GDT plus 2-back task. A substantial part of the executive functions 
should be explained by monitoring, which itself influences the GDT plus 2-back performance. However, 
because further executive functions should be involved in this dual task a partial mediation is suspected (c.f. 
Figure 18.  
6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Participants 
Overall we examined 122 right-handed participants (mean age: 31.06, SD = 13.07 years; 62 females). The 
participants were students of the University of Duisburg-Essen as well as their relatives and friends. The 
participation was voluntary and the participants received either credit points or a financial compensation at an 
hourly rate of € 10. As determined by a self-report questionnaire none of them had a history of neurological or 
psychiatric diseases. All participants demonstrated average, estimated IQ performance, measured by the subtest 
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four (reasoning) of the German intelligence test battery Leistungsprüfsystem (LPS; Horn, 1983), M = 117.03, SD 
= 11.95. Participants with an age higher than 50 were also screened for dementia with the DemTect (Kalbe et 
al., 2004). None of them had a score lower than 13, indicating no signs of mild cognitive impairment or 
dementia. All participants gave written informed consent. The study was approved by the local ethics 
committee. 
6.3.2 Instruments 
In reference to the theoretical model postulated in the introduction, the different variables were operationalized 
as followed: As a measure of decision making under risk in a dual-tasking situation the GDT plus a parallel 
executive task (2-back) was used (c.f. Schoofs, et al., 2008; Starcke, et al., 2011). In order to operationalize the 
executive functions, categorization and feedback processing the MCST (Nelson, 1976) was applied. We 
developed a new task to assess the supervisory/monitoring function that was based on the voluntary switching 
task by Arrington and Logan (2004) in order to measure not only task-switching functions but especially 
monitoring abilities. All tasks used are now described in detail. 
6.3.2.1 Dual tasking: Game of Dice Task (GDT) plus a parallel executive task (2-back) 
The same dual-task paradigm, which was used in the study by Starcke and colleagues (2011), was applied in the 
present study. It included a decision-making task with explicit and stable rules - the GDT (Brand, Fujiwara, et 
al., 2005) - and a parallel working memory 2-back task (c.f. Schoofs, et al., 2008). Both tasks were presented on 
the same computer screen: The 2-back task was embedded into the GDT interface, such that the 2-back task was 
presented on the left of the screen while the GDT was on the right side (see Figure 19). In order to work on both 
tasks simultaneously, participants had to use their left hand for the 2-back task and the right hand for the GDT. 
The participants were told perform to work on both tasks to the best of their abilities and to put equal effort into 
working on each task.  
 
 
Figure 19 GDT plus 2-back task. 
On the right side of the screen, participants work on the GDT by betting which number will be thrown next.  On the left side of the GDT 
interface, participants must solve the 2-back task. Here, they need to continuously monitor the numbers presented and have to indicate 
whether the current number was presented two trials before or not, by keyboard input. 
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The GDT is a computerized task that is often used to operationalize decision making under risk (c.f. 
Gleichgerrcht, Ibanez, Roca, Torralva, & Manes, 2010). In this task participants aimed to maximize the 
fictitious starting capital of €1,000. During the 18 trials in which one virtual die was thrown, participants were 
asked to guess which number will be thrown next. In order to comply with the aim participants were asked to 
bet on one single number or on a combination of two, three, or four numbers by clicking the respective button 
using the computer mouse. They won if the chosen number or one number out of the chosen combinations of 
numbers were thrown, otherwise they lost. The options as well as the possible gains and losses were 
permanently shown on the screen. Each option offered was associated with different winning probabilities. 
When choosing one single number (e.g., six) the winning probability was 16.67 % to gain €1,000. If one of the 
other five numbers was thrown (one, two, three, four, or five) €1,000 were lost. Choosing the combination of 
two numbers (e.g., three and four), led to a gain of €500 with a probability of 33.33 %. However, if one of the 
other four numbers was thrown (one, two, five, or six) participants lost €500. The combination of three numbers 
(e.g., one, two, and three) provided a gain of €200 with a winning probability of 50 %. If one of the other three 
numbers was thrown (four, five, or six) they lost the same amount. With a winning probability of 66.67 % the 
choice of the combination of four numbers (e.g., three, four, five, and six) led to a gain of €100 and if one of the 
other two numbers was thrown (one or two) participants would lose €100. Following each decision participants 
received visual feedback about the amount of gain (colored green) or loss (colored red). Furthermore, the 
current capital and the remaining rounds were also permanently shown on the screen. In total, the options were 
categorized into advantageous/low-risk decisions (combinations of three and four numbers with a winning 
probability of 50 % and higher) and disadvantageous/high-risk decisions (one single number and combinations 
of two numbers with a winning probability of less than 34 %). Choosing the advantageous options all the time 
statistically led to a positive outcome in the long run, given the starting capital of €1,000. Therefore, the 
combination of three numbers was also classified as low risk in accordance with other studies before (e.g., 
Bayard, Abril, et al., 2011; Brand, Pawlikowski, et al., 2009).  
The 2-back task had to be performed simultaneously to the GDT. In the small window on the left side 
of the GDT interface participants were shown numbers between 0 and 9 in succession. They were asked to 
monitor whether or not the currently presented number was identical with the number two trials before. The 
digits were displayed for 500 ms with an interstimulus interval of 2,750 ms. In the time frame of 500 ms 
participants were asked to indicate their answer by pressing one of two keyboard buttons (e.g., “c” for yes, digits 
were identical and “x” for no, digits were not identical). If no answer was given the trial was counted as a skip. 
The target stimuli, the same stimulus as two trials before, were displayed randomly with a probability of 33 % 
(adapted from Schoofs, et al., 2008).  
In order to analyze the performance in the GDT, a net score was calculated by subtracting the number 
of high-risk decisions from the number of low-risk decisions. A positive net score indicated advantageous 
decision-making performance. Moreover, the percentage of low-risk/advantageous decisions was calculated. In 
order to analyze the performance of the 2-back task the percentage of correct reactions (i.e., correct 
identification and correct refusal as a target digit) were computed. For the analysis of the overall performance of 
the GDT plus 2-back task, the mean of low-risk/advantageous decisions in the GDT in percent and the 
percentage of the correct answers in the 2-back task were computed. The overall performance of the GDT plus 
2-back task was used as a main measure of the dual-tasking performance and included in the SEM.  
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6.3.2.2 Modified Card Sorting Test (MCST): Categorization and feedback processing 
The MCST was mostly used to measure subfunctions of executive functioning, involving set-shifting, 
categorization, cognitive flexibility and the ability to use feedback (see Lezak, et al., 2004; Strauss, et al., 2006). 
In this computerized test participants were asked to sort 48 cards (one at a time) onto one of four card decks 
presented on the screen according to a particular predetermined rule that was unknown to the participants. The 
symbols on the cards differed with respect to shape, color, and amount of symbols. Accordingly, the cards were 
sortable in three ways: by the shape, the color, and the number of the stimuli on the cards. To find out which 
sorting rule to follow, participants had to figure out which rule to apply by try-and-error using the provided 
feedback (right or wrong). The rule changed after six successively correct responses. As a main measure of 
categorization and feedback processing the number of perseverative errors (when the participant continues to 
sort the cards according to the previous rule though it had been indicated that the rule had changed) was used in 
the current SEM. 
6.3.2.3 Balanced Switching Task (BST): Supervisory/monitoring function 
Based on the voluntary task switching paradigm used by Arrington and Logan (2004) we developed a Balanced 
Switching Task (BST) to assess not only task-switching functions but especially monitoring abilities. In the task 
version of Arrington and Logan participants saw numbers on a screen between one and nine. They had either to 
indicate whether the current number on the screen is odd/even or whether the number is lower/higher than the 
number five. Participants were required to only do one task during a trial, which task they could decide 
voluntarily. 
We modified the task in order to increase its load on monitoring. In this computerized task participants 
have to deal with four tasks, which they are asked to perform with equal effort. To comply with the aim 
participants had to voluntarily switch between tasks. The BST consisted of two sets of stimuli: Set A contained 
numbers from “01” to “99” and set B contained abstract geometric shapes that were diagonally hatched (see 
Figure 20 set B). In each set participants could principally work on two tasks respectively. Responses were 
made on a QWERTZ Keyboard using the keys “d” (left middle finger) and “f” (left index finger) as well as “j” 
(right index finger) and “k” (right middle finger). In set A, task 1 required to indicate whether the currently 
presented number was odd (“d”) or even (“f”), while in task 2, participants were asked to indicate whether the 
presented number was smaller (“j”) or greater (“k”) than the number 50. To avoid confusion, the number 50 
itself was not part of the stimuli. In set B, task 1 required to indicate whether the hatching of the currently 
presented shape goes left (from the right lower corner of the shape to the left upper corner) by pressing “d” or 
right (from the left lower corner of the shape to the right upper corner) by pressing “f”. In task 2 of set B, 
participants were asked to indicate whether the presented shape is oriented vertically (“j”) or horizontally (“k”). 
At the beginning of the game participants could chose with which task set they would prefer to start. Within 
each task set (A and B) only one stimulus at a time was presented and participants could voluntarily choose 
which task (task 1 or 2) they would prefer to perform by pressing the associated keys (“d” and “f” for task 1 and 
“j” and “k” for task 2). To switch between task 1 and 2 within a set, participants just needed to use the 
respective pair of keys associated with the other task. To switch between set A and set B participants were told 
to press the spacebar. Thus, participants had to process only one out of the four tasks with each presented 
stimulus. 
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Figure 20 Schematic representation of the Balanced Switching Task. 
The left side of the figure displays an example stimulus of set A and indicates which buttons participants have to use in order to perform task 
1 (even or odd) and task 2 (smaller or greater than 50) of set A. The right side shows an example stimulus of set B and indicates which 
buttons participants have to use in order to perform task 1 (hatching left or right) and task 2 (figure vertical or horizontal) of set B. To switch 
between the two sets participants have to use the spacebar indicated by “space” in the figure. 
Before the task started participants complete a practice block in which they learned how to work on the 
tasks. In this practice block, participants started to perform task 1 of set A only. This was followed by a short 
practice sequence of tasks 1 and 2 of set A in which participants could voluntarily switch between both tasks. 
Afterward, the participants practiced task 1 of set B only, followed by a practice sequence in which they could 
switch between task 1 and 2 of set B. At the end of the practice block participants had a short sequence in which 
they were asked to practice to switch between all tasks (i.e., including switching the sets via the spacebar). 
Furthermore, participants were informed about the three aims of the paradigm: to perform all four tasks in a 
balanced fashion, to classify the stimuli to the best of their ability, and to execute as many stimuli as possible in 
an unknown timeframe. Moreover, participants were informed that the switch between the two sets required a 
certain but unknown timeframe meanwhile they could not perform any of the four tasks and which was 
subtracted from the overall time. While this indicated that participants would have less time to process stimuli if 
they switched between sets too often, they did have to switch to work on all four tasks equally. The subjects 
were not informed about the overall duration of the paradigm nor the stimulus presentation times. Therefore, 
participants were not able to estimate how much time they would have to work on each task to achieve the best 
balance between all tasks. Information not given to the participants: In total, the task consisted of two blocks of 
4 min each. A stimulus was presented until the participant responded but maximally for 1,000 ms. The 
interstimulus interval was 500 ms, a switch between set A and set B lasted 1,250 ms. After the first and second 
block, participants received feedback about the equability of the tasks performances in percent, the total 
accuracy in percent, and the number of correct responded stimuli. 
In order to evaluate the supervisory/monitoring performance postulated in the SEM, the so called 
deviation score was computed for each block separately. The deviation score provides information about the 
deviation from the optimal equal performance calculated for each participant. The deviation score was 
calculated as followed:  
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For each task the amount of presented stimuli in percent were calculated (e.g., presented stimuli of task 
1 in set A divided by presented stimuli of block 1). In the formula above, this is displayed by task 1 set A, task 2 
set A, task 1set B, and task 2 set B. From each of these results the optimal value of equal performance (25 %) 
was subtracted, and the outcome was squared. We calculated the mean from this equation and then calculated 
the square root of the mean. A deviation score of 0 testified of equal adaptation of all four tasks (i.e., perfect 
performance). A deviation of 43 indicates that the participant had only performed one task out of four (i.e., 
worst performance). 
6.3.3 Statistical Analyses 
For the statistical standard analyses IBM SPSS Statistics software for Windows (Release 19.0; April 18, 2011; 
SPSS Inc. IBM, Chicago) was used. To test for zero-order relationships between two variables Pearson 
correlations were calculated. In order to test the hypothesized mediation model, SEM analysis was done using 
Mplus 6 (Muthén & Muthén, 2011). For this the maximum likelihood parameter estimation was applied. There 
were no missing data. 
The evaluation of the model fits were done by applying standard criteria (Hu & Bentler, 1995; Hu & 
Bentler, 1998; Hu & Bentler, 1999). The following fit indices were used: χ² test (non-significant values indicate 
that the data fit with the model), χ² /df (values between .00 and 2.00 indicate a good fit), root mean square of 
approximation (RMSEA; “test of close fit”; a value between .00 and .05 with a significance value between .10 
and 1.00 indicates a good fit), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR; values between .00 and .05 
indicate a good fit), comparative fit index (CFI; a value between .97 and 1.00 indicates a good fit), Tucker-
Lewis Index (TLI; values between .97 and 1.00 indicate a good fit). Due to the fact that the TLI is not normed, 
the values can sometimes be outside the range of .00 to 1.00 (Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Müller, 
2003). According to Baron and Kenny (1986) it is required that all variables included in the mediation correlate 
with each other. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Descriptive data of task performance 
Table 14 shows the mean performances of the participants in the different tasks. Compared with studies that 
used the original version of the GDT in healthy subjects demonstrating a net score around 10 (c.f. Brand, 2008; 
Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008; Brand, Laier, et al., 2009), the net score of the GDT version used here, was lower on 
a descriptive level. However, it was similar to the net score found in the study by Starcke and colleagues (2011) 
that previously used the GDT plus 2-back task. The correct responses in percent of the 2-back task performed 
simultaneously to the GDT were lower on a descriptive level than in studies in which participants had to 
perform only the 2-back task (Keeser, et al., 2011; Knops, et al., 2006). The performance in the MCST as well 
as the IQ were in a normal range (Horn, 1983; Lineweaver, Bondi, Thomas, & Salmon, 1999). The values of the 
newly developed BST were in line with the experience and findings we made in our laboratory so far 
(unpublished results). They indicate that the instructions of the tasks were understood and implemented. 
Moreover, the difficulty of the task seemed to be adequate: The mean of the deviation was about 10 % 
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indicating that on average the participants performed well on the tasks. Yet, there was variance in the 
performance (see range and standard deviation in Table 14) that suggests that some participants had difficulties 
in equal performance of the four tasks while others did not. 
Table 14 Descriptive values of task performances of the sample. 
Tests Range M SD 
GDT    
net score
a 
-18 - 18 7.03 9.57 
low-risk decisions
b
 0 - 100 69.54 26.57 
2-back task    
correct responses
b
 9.43 - 89.04 57.88 18.34 
MCST    
perseverative errors
c
 0 - 8 1.13 1.78 
BST    
deviation score block 1
d
 .00 - .43 .10 .10 
deviation score block 2
d
 .00 - .43 .09 .09 
aLow-risk decisions minus high-risk decisions. bIn percentage. cRaw score. dRelative frequencies.  
6.4.2 Correlations between dual task and executive functions 
Nearly all measures of executive functions correlated significantly with the GDT plus 2-back task and have a 
small to medium effect size (c.f. J. Cohen, 1992; see Table 15 for the results). Only the variable deviation score 
of block 2 of the BST did not correlate significantly with the GDT plus 2-back task (p = .066). 
6.4.3 The latent dimension 
The high β coefficients of the two manifest variables of the BST (deviation score block 1: β= .972, SE = .10, p ≤ 
.001; deviation score block 2: β = .806, SE = .09, p ≤ .001) revealed that the latent dimension 
supervisory/monitoring function seems to be adequately modeled. Moreover, this is supported by the significant 
correlation, p ≤ .010, of the two variables with a high effect size (see Table 15). 
Table 15 Correlations between GDT plus 2-back task and executive functions. 
  1 2 3 4 
1 GDT plus 2-back
a
 - - - - 
2 MCST
b
 -.251
**
 - - - 
3 BST (block 1)
c
 -.239
**
 .254
**
 - - 
4 BST (block 2)
c
 -.167
†
 .237
**
 .784
**
 - 
aMean of correct responses in the 2-back and low-risk decisions in the GDT (in percentage). bFrequency of perseverative errors (raw score). 
cDeviation score (deviation from the optimal value of equal performance). **p ≤ .010. †p = .066. 
6.4.4 Full structural equation model (SEM) 
Testing the proposed model with GDT plus 2-back task (i.e., the mean of low-risk/advantageous decisions in the 
GDT in percent and the percentage of the correct answers in the 2-back task) as endogenous variable revealed a 
good fit with the data. The χ² test was not significant, indicating that the data do not differ significantly from the 
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model, χ² = 0.71, df = 1, p = .400. The ratio of χ²/df was below 2.00, the RMSEA had a value of 0.00 with p = 
.468, the SRMR was .01, the CFI was 1.00 and the TLI = 1.01. 
6.4.4.1 The pathways of the full model 
Figure 21 demonstrates that in total 10 % of the variance of the GDT plus 2-back task could be explained 
significantly by the model, SE = .05, p = .031. Monitoring, measured by the BST (i.e., deviation score of block 1 
and block 2), as well as general executive functions, measured by the MCST (i.e., perseverative errors), 
explained the GDT plus 2-back variance significantly, SE’s ≤ .09, p’s ≤ .018. The β coefficients were negative 
because good performances in the MCST and BST were indicated by low values (depending on the variables 
used of these tasks: Perseverative errors in the MCST and deviation score of the BST). 
6.4.5 Mediation analysis 
In order to analyze whether or not monitoring is a key function of the executive functions explaining the 
variance of the dual-task performance (GDT plus 2-back task), a mediation analysis was computed. The indirect 
effect from MCST via the latent dimension supervisory/monitoring function on the GDT plus 2-back task was 
significant, β = -0.05, SE = .03 p = .048. The direct effect was significant as well, β = -0.20, SE = .09, p = .012, 
indicating a partial mediation effect of the latent dimension supervisory/monitoring function on the GDT plus 2-
back performance (see Figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 21 The full structural equation model.  
The oval shape indicates the latent dimension while the rectangular shapes indicate the manifest variables. Bold arrows indicate direct 
effects while the non-bold arrows display errors. ** p ≤ .001. * < .050. BST = Balanced Switching Task, measures the 
monitoring/supervisory function. MCST = Modified Card Sorting Test, measures categorization and feedback processing. GDT = Game of 
Dice Task, measure for decision making under risk. 2-back task = working memory task. 
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6.5 Discussion 
The focus of this study was to explain the underlying functions of dual-task performance that means, when 
performing a parallel executive task simultaneously to a decision-making task. Based on the theoretical 
approaches of D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a, 1997b; see also section 3.4.1.1) and Norman and Shallice 
(Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice & Burgess, 1991a; 1991b; see also section 3.2.1) we assumed that the 
supervisory/monitoring function of the executive system plays an important role in dual tasking and partially 
mediates the relationship between various executive functions (e.g., categorization of information/stimuli and 
feedback processing) and the GDT plus 2-back task. The results of the current study support our theoretical 
model: The supervisory/monitoring function partially mediated the relationship between categorization of 
stimuli and feedback processing and the performance in the GDT plus 2-back task. That means that participants 
with good monitoring abilities decided more advantageously in the GDT while simultaneously demonstrating 
good performance in the 2-back task. Indeed, monitoring seemed to lead to a better dual-tasking performance 
also in a decision-making situation. However, the results indicate that independently of the monitoring function, 
executive functions such as categorization of stimuli and feedback processing, increase the performance in both 
tasks when performed simultaneously. 
The current findings support several studies that argue that executive functions are important for dual 
tasking and that a supervisory/monitoring function plays a key role in that process (e.g., Cooper, et al., 2012; De 
Jong, 1995; D. E. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; for detailed information see section 3.4.1.2; 1997b). Moreover, the 
study at hand possibly explains the variance in the GDT plus 2-back task found in the study by Starcke and 
colleagues (2011). In their study performing an additional executive task simultaneously to the GDT led to 
disadvantageous decision making compared with performance in the GDT on its own. However, some 
participants demonstrated no diminished GDT performance. The SEM of the current study suggests that 
superior monitoring functions may account for parts of that variance. 
The fact that various executive functions influence the performance in the GDT plus 2-back task, 
independently of this monitoring function, may be explained by the circumstance that each component task is 
associated with executive functions beyond monitoring (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; Brand, et al., 2004; 
Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007; Conway, et al., 2005; Euteneuer, et al., 2009; Owen, et al., 2005). Furthermore, it 
seems plausible that in order to perform two tasks simultaneously more executive functions than monitoring are 
needed. For example, if we assume that a bottleneck appears at a certain point in a dual-tasking process, where 
only one task can be performed at a time (c.f. D. E. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b), task switching, set-shifting, 
and inhibition should be further important executive functions (c.f. Cooper, et al., 2012; Koch, et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, the current findings support the assumptions of the involvement of monitoring in task shielding, 
which is involved in serial processing (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Plessow, et al., 2011) and therefore in system 2 
(Kahneman, 2003): Superior monitoring functions enable the detection of second-task associated action 
information although the second task is inhibited while simultaneously performing the primary task. 
The important role of executive functions for decision making under risk as postulated in a decision-
making model (Brand, et al., 2006; see also section 3) becomes not only apparent in studies investigating the 
simple relationship between them (Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007; Brand, Roth-Bauer, et al., 2008; Euteneuer, et 
al., 2009); Their importance becomes more obvious in studies investigating decision making under risk in 
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demanding situations, such as a dual-tasking situations. In a recent study, participants did not only have to 
perform the GDT plus 2-back task, but were also stressed before the performance (Pabst, Schoofs, et al., 2013). 
Results demonstrated that stressed participants with superior executive functions showed better decision-making 
performance while simultaneously performing a 2-back task than stressed participants with low executive 
functions. 
Those and the current findings emphasize the important role of executive functions in decision making 
in a dual-task situation. In particular, besides the direct influence of various executive functions, the present 
study demonstrates the involvement of the supervisory/monitoring function of the executive system. This is 
crucial for advantageous decision making in situations where people have to perform other tasks simultaneously. 
Moreover, the results give further insight into the organization of executive functions: Monitoring seems to be a 
function involved in the coordination of different actions and subfunctions. Thus, the findings are in line with 
the idea that monitoring seems to be a higher-level function, which manages different lower-level functions in 
order to achieve good performance (Miyake, et al., 2000; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1999). However, at this point it 
has to be mentioned that the assumption that the assumption that the BST measures monitoring/supervisory 
functions is only theoretically: In this task participants have to remember how much time they had already spend 
on each task and to kept in mind that they would have to switch to the other three tasks to obey with the aim of 
balanced performance. According to Shallice, Stuss, Picton, Alexander, and Gillingham (2008) such ability is 
associated with monitoring. In the SEM the deviation score was used to operationalize monitoring (see section 
6.3.2.3): The deviation score computes how often a person performed each of the four tasks in dependency from 
the overall trials and how much this deviates from a perfect balanced fashion (25 % each task). Even though it is 
from a theoretical perspective assumable that the deviation score depict the ability to monitor, it is not directly 
tested. Future studies should investigate whether this score correlates with other tasks known to operationalize 
the supervisory/monitoring function. Likewise, future studies should investigate the role of executive functions 
in decision making in dual-tasking situations in more detail. It may be of interest to know which specific 
executive functions are involved in this process: The demand of performing two tasks in parallel increases more 
and more in everyday life. Making important decisions while working on another task becomes daily routine, in 
professional as well as social life. So far, there are some studies demonstrating that after a training session 
laboratory dual-task performance increases (e.g., Bherer et al., 2005; Liepelt, Strobach, Frensch, & Schubert, 
2011). Knowing which specific (executive) functions underlie the performance of decision making in parallel 
with additional tasks could help to develop dual-task trainings with more practical application in everyday life.  
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7. General discussion 
In the last three chapters each study was discussed individually in detail (see section 4.5, 5.5, and 6.5). The 
following chapter will first summarize (section 7.1) and then discuss the findings more generally and join them 
in view of the current literature with a focus on decision making under risk (section 7.2). Moreover, a general 
conclusion and a perspective for future studies will be given (section 7.3).  
7.1 Summary of the main results 
All three studies were conducted in order to gather knowledge about the interaction between affective and 
cognitive processes in decision making under risk, but each study had a slightly different focus. The first study 
(see chapter 4) investigated the neural correlates of the interaction between decision making under risk, 
additional executive load, and stress. The fMRI study revealed that, on a behavioral level, the double burden of 
stress and additional executive load did not appear to impair the decision-making performance in a risky 
situation. However, imaging data revealed that this might be due to an increased activation in the aPFC, a brain 
region that is associated with parallel processing (Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007). The simultaneous negative 
correlation between activation in a brain area associated with serial processing and cortisol increase during this 
dual task supported this assumption. These findings seem to be in line with the assumption by Plessow, Schade, 
and colleagues (2012) and Pabst, Schoofs, and colleagues (2013) that stress might trigger the shift from serial to 
parallel processing by reduced task shielding and thus might facilitate decision making while performing an 
additional executive task in stressful situations. 
The second study (see chapter 5) examined the effect of additional cognitive and varying affective load 
during decision making under risk. Therefore, participants had to perform an additional executive task involving 
affective pictures of varying valence and neutral pictures while making decisions. The results demonstrated that 
the processing of affective pictures (especially pictures of positive valence) interfered with the decision-making 
performance when compared with the simultaneous processing of neutral pictures or non-parallel processing, 
respectively. Moreover, the analyses revealed that, irrespective of the affective stimuli, executive functions 
moderate the relationship: Participants with superior executive functions appeared not to be impaired in their 
decision-making performance when performing an additional executive task involving affective pictures, while 
participants with inferior executive functions demonstrated disadvantageous decision making. These findings 
indicate that affective and cognitive processes interact in predicting decision making under risk.  
The third study focused on the question which executive functions may be involved in decision making 
in a dual-task situation that means, when an additional executive task needs to be performed simultaneously 
(operationalized by the GDT plus 2-back task). The assumption that executive functions, such as categorization 
of stimuli and feedback processing, directly influence this dual-task performance and are probably partially 
mediated by the executive function monitoring, was supported by a SEM. This finding gives insight into the 
organization of executive functions and their involvement in decisions under risk: The supervisory/monitoring 
function appears to be involved in the coordination and management of different actions and subfunctions (e.g., 
categorization of the options presented and processing of the received feedback) in the decision-making process. 
Thus, the findings are in line with the idea of higher-level and lower-level executive functions, whereby the 
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higher-level functions, manage different lower-level functions in order to achieve superior performance (Miyake 
& Friedman, 2012; Miyake, et al., 2000; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1999). 
In the next section these findings will be discussed in the light of the current literature with regard to 
the core topics of the present thesis: decision making under risk and the potential role of stress, affect, executive 
functions and dual tasking. At last a general conclusion and perspectives for future studies will be given (see 
section 7.3). 
7.2 Discussion of the presented findings  
The overall aim of this thesis was to extend the knowledge about the postulated affective and cognitive 
processes in decision making under risk (Brand, et al., 2006; see following sections for detailed information 3, 
3.1, and 3.2), in particular about their interaction. Therefore, situational effects, additionally loading onto the 
cognitive (e.g., an additional executive task) and affective route (e.g., stress or affective stimuli), were used. It 
was found that affective and cognitive processes interact in a way that they provide advantageous decision 
making in such demanding situations (Pabst, Schoofs, et al., 2013). In the present thesis it was of peculiar 
interest to examine the underlying neural correlates of this interaction and the cognitive mechanisms, possibly 
managing the decision-making process in this kind of situations. Figure 22 summarizes the findings of the three 
studies and of these the derived assumptions. Below the model will be outlined in detail.  
 
 
Figure 22 The interaction between cognitive and affective processes in decision making under risk with additional executive 
load.  
The model summarizes the discussed findings and assumptions inferred from the three studies of this thesis. It displays the 
suggested hierarchy of the executive functions (colored in grey) and their influence on decision making under risk in dual-
tasking situations (colored in blue). Moreover, the influence of affective influences such as stress and the associated neural 
mechanisms (colored in beige) are shown as well as their assumed interplay with cognitive processes.  
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A previous study demonstrated that decision-making performance under risk was reduced when an 
additional executive task was performed simultaneously (Starcke, et al., 2011). According to Kahneman (2003), 
two tasks belonging to system 2, which need to be performed simultaneously, are processed serially rather than 
parallel and interfere with each other (see section 3.4.1.1 for further information about dual-process theories). 
Therefore, Starcke and colleagues (2011) suggested that processes belonging to system 2 are particularly 
involved in decision making under risk (for detailed information about this study see section 3.4.1.4.2). 
However, when making a decision while have to perform an additional executive task in a stressful situation 
simultaneously, decision-making performance was not reduced (Pabst, Schoofs, et al., 2013; for a detailed 
discussion about this finding see section 3.4.4). This was in contrast to findings investigating the influence of 
stress on decision making under risk, demonstrating impaired performance on the same decision-making task 
but without additional cognitive demand (Starcke, et al., 2008). Pabst, Schoofs, and colleagues (2013) assumed 
that in demanding situations stress triggers a serial-to-parallel processing shift, which in turn enables superior 
task performance in both tasks (for a comprehensive discussion see section 3.4.4).  
While the behavioral findings of the first study of the present thesis at (see section 4.4.2) also 
demonstrated no differences in task performance in such demanding situations, the neuroimaging findings did. 
They revealed that neural activity in parallel processing areas (aPFC; Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007) was increased 
during stress in this kind of situations, while serial processing areas (dlPFC; Dux, et al., 2006) were associated 
with a decrease of neural activity in stressful and cognitive demanding situations. Studies investigating the 
influence of stress on cognitive task performance while simultaneously examining neural activation 
demonstrated that stress leads either to a deactivation in task-associated brain regions, which is associated with 
decreased task performance (Oei, et al., 2007; Qin, et al., 2009), or to an increased activation in task-associated 
brain regions associated with superior task performance (Henckens, Van Wingen, Joëls, & Fernández, 2011). 
The findings of the first study of this thesis suggest that it might be the interplay of increased and decreased 
activations of certain brain regions that lead to comparable behavioral performance in stress as well as non-
stressed participants. In particular, in complex and demanding situations, which involve stress as well as an 
additional cognitive demand that influences decision-making performance, an interplay between brain regions 
associated with serial and parallel processing occurs. This interplay is accompanied by a neural activation shift 
of these brain regions, which appears to be advantageously for superior decision-making performance (see the 
beige ovals in Figure 22; for a detailed discussion about this shift see section 4.5).  
In terms of dual-process theories, this interplay is in line with the assumption made by Epstein (1994) 
that all behavior is assumed to be the product of the joint operation of system 1 and system 2. He postulated that 
the relative dominance of a system depends, among other aspects, of situational variables (for more details see 
section 3.4.1.1). The dual-task situation in study one (two effortful tasks) of the current thesis would thus 
assume that system 2 related processes appear to be dominant (Epstein, et al., 1996; Kahneman, 2003). In 
contrast, the stressful influence would rather suggest activation of system 1 related processes, due to the fact that 
affective arousal is considered to shift the dominance more in the direction of system 1 (Epstein, 1994), which is 
known to be associated with affect-based processes (Epstein, et al., 1996; Kahneman, 2003). Therefore, it is 
assumable that both processes interact in such demanding situations, which might be associated with the 
assumed shift from serial to rather parallel processing (i.e., from system 2 related processing to rather system 1 
related processing).  
General discussion           Discussion of the presented findings 134 
 
However, the increased activation in the aPFC (in the first study of this thesis) leads to the suggestion 
that system 2 rather than system 1 processes appear to be more dominant because system 1 processes are more 
closely associated with brain regions associated with the limbic system (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Goel & 
Dolan, 2003; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). In contrast, the aPFC builds together with other 
prefrontal regions the apex of the executive system (Koechlin, et al., 1999; Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007). Executive 
functions were found to be involved in system 2 related processes, such as managing two concurrent tasks 
(Cooper, et al., 2012; De Jong, 1995; see section 3.4.1 for a detailed discussion). Though, due to the additional 
involvement of this area in parallel processing this region might be a platform for the interaction between 
system 1 and system 2 related processes. Moreover, it was often shown that processing of affective influences 
(system 1 related) in situations in which cognitive functions (in particular system 2 related) are also necessary, 
leads to increased activation in cognitive-related regions supporting the assumption of the interaction between 
both processing types (see section 3.1.1 for a detailed discussion). Taken together, it appears that stress 
processed by system 1 related processes triggers a shift from serial to parallel processing, which is accompanied 
by increased activation of an area associated with parallel processing but also executive functioning (system 2 
related). Executive functions are involved in dual tasking (see section 3.4.1.2) and decision making under risk 
(see section 3.2.2.2), and subsequently may facilitate the performance in the demanding decision-making 
situation (see connections between beige ovals and grey ovals in Figure 22).  
The involvement of executive processes in a decision situation with additional cognitive demand was 
shown in the third study of the current thesis (see section 6). The results suggest that in particular a supervisory/ 
monitoring function (higher-level executive function) mediates (at least partially) the performance of lower-
level executive processes (e.g., categorization of alternatives, and feedback processing) leading to increased 
decision-making performance in a situation with additional demand. This would be in line with several authors 
postulating that executive functions are distinguishable into lower-level and higher-level functions, whereby it is 
assumed that the higher-level functions manage the lower-level functions (Miyake, et al., 2000; Shallice, 
Burgess, & Robertson, 1996; Shallice, et al., 2008; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1999; Stuss, Shallice, Alexander, & 
Picton, 1995). Lower-level functions are for example, shifting and updating (Miyake, et al., 2000), attention (E. 
E. Smith & Jonides, 1999), and contention scheduling (Shallice, et al., 1996; Stuss, et al., 1995). Higher-level 
functions include functions such as planning (Miyake, et al., 2000), task management (E. E. Smith & Jonides, 
1999), and dimensions of the supervisory control framework (e.g., energization of schemas, adjusting contention 
scheduling, and monitoring the level of activity in the schemas; Shallice, et al., 2008; Stuss, et al., 1995). 
However, due to the partial mediation it is assumable that monitoring is not the only higher-level executive 
function involved in processing decision making in a dual-task situation. According to Shallice et al. (1996) and 
Stuss et al. (1995) a certain schema is activated to perform a task (including lower-level executive mechanisms). 
When two tasks need to be performed simultaneously, two schemas are activated and the supervisory control 
system is required to organize them. For example, it needs to energize the schema for one task and inhibit the 
schema of the second task while simultaneously monitoring the activation of the two schemas (Shallice, et al., 
1996; Stuss, et al., 1995). These higher-level functions may also be involved in the performance of the decision-
making task with simultaneous executive task (see grey colored ovals in Figure 22).  
In sum, the findings of the first and third study lead to the suggestion that in stressful situations with 
additional cognitive demand, advantageous decision making might still be possible, because stress activates a 
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brain area associated with parallel processing and higher-level executive functioning, facilitating the 
performance of two concurrent tasks (see the connection between beige and grey colored ovals in Figure 22). 
This kind of facilitation effect of executive functions was also demonstrated in the second study of this thesis. In 
this study, it seems that superior executive functions compensated the negative influence of affective pictures. 
By including this finding into the overall model (Figure 22) it can be assumed that a neural activation shift leads 
to an increased activation of brain areas associated with executive functions, which again moderate the affective 
influence (see the connection between beige and grey colored ovals in Figure 22).  
Finally, the combination of the three study findings of the current thesis, suggest a compensation effect. 
This might take place in decision-making situations with a double burden (additional affective influence and 
cognitive demand): Stress leads to an increased activation of a brain area associated with cognitive functions, 
facilitating the task performance in this kind of situation. Simultaneously, increasing stress level is associated 
with decreasing activation of a brain region, which in this kind of situation appears to be less supporting for task 
performance (Pabst, Schoofs, et al., 2013; Plessow, et al., 2012; for a detailed discussion see section 4.5). This 
assumption is based on studies demonstrating compensation effects in elderly people when performing cognitive 
tasks in comparison to younger adults (e.g., Bangen et al., 2012; Cabeza, 2002; Cabeza, Anderson, Locantore, & 
McIntosh, 2002; S. W. Davis, Dennis, Daselaar, Fleck, & Cabeza, 2008; Grady, 2008). In these studies it was 
found that in cases where older people show similar cognitive performance to younger people, they also 
demonstrated increased activation in brain areas associated with cognitive task performance or activation in 
areas which might compensate the regions decomposed due to aging. An increased activation of prefrontal 
regions was most commonly associated with such compensational mechanisms (Cabeza, 2002; S. W. Davis, et 
al., 2008; Grady et al., 1994). This was found across different cognitive functions when tested in elderly for 
example, in working memory (Grossman et al., 2002; Rypma & D'Esposito, 2000) and attention (Cabeza et al., 
2004; Madden et al., 2002). Recently, such compensation mechanisms were also found in adults with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Dillo et al., 2010), alcohol dependent individuals (Chanraud, Pitel, 
Müller-Oehring, Pfefferbaum, & Sullivan, 2013), and individuals suffering from schizophrenia (M. A. Kim et 
al., 2010). Therefore, the suggested serial-to-parallel shift triggered by stress might also be a compensational 
mechanism. It appears that people who have problems in cognitive processing, regardless whether this is due to 
parallel affective processing, aging, or neuropsychological and psychiatric diseases, may be able to compensate 
these influences by an activation of other or further executive brain areas which processes facilitate/support 
superior cognitive processing.  
At this point is has to be mentioned that the second study of this thesis revealed a differentiation 
between positive and negative affective influences (for a detailed discussion see section 5.5) and in combination 
with the behavioral findings of the first study (see section 4.4.2), it appears assumable that positive affective 
processing leads to inferior decision-making performance in a dual-task situation, while negative affective 
processing does not. This is in line with findings of studies investigating affective influences on decision 
making under risk (see section 3.4.2.2.2), but is in contrast to studies demonstrating that stress leads to 
disadvantageous decision under risk (see section 3.4.3.3.2). Such discrepancy might be explained by the dual-
state theory of the dopamine system. The theory constitutes that the dopamine system characteristics change 
depending on whether or not the transmission at D1 or D2-receptors dominates (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008; 
Seamans & Yang, 2004). For example, a highly activated D2-system enables multiple representations in 
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prefrontal networks and working memory, leading to increased processing capacity of these networks. While the 
D2-state is flexible and responsive, it is also susceptible to interferences. A D1-receptore dominated network is 
quite the opposite and therefore the capacities in such a network are more restricted (Durstewitz & Seamans, 
2008; Seamans & Yang, 2004; Yildiz, Chmielewski, & Beste, 2013). Several studies have shown that reward 
and punishment are differentially associated with these systems: While reward processing is more likely 
mediated via the dopamine D1-receptor system, punishment processes are mediated by the D2-receptor system 
(e.g., Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka, 2010; Ferguson et al., 2011; Hikida, Kimura, Wada, 
Funabiki, & Nakanishi, 2010; Kravitz, Tye, & Kreitzer, 2012; Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 2000). 
Transferring these findings to the results of the first and second study of the present thesis, it appears that a 
possible neural mechanisms underlying the differential influence of positive and negative affective processing 
on decision making under risk in a dual-tasking situation might also be attributed to the dopamine system: On 
one hand, stress or negative affective pictures may be comparable to an aversive condition like punishments and 
thus might lead to an increased activation of D2-receptors and a decreased activation of D1-receptors, which in 
turn triggers the assumed serial-to-parallel processing shift. On the other hand, assuming that the positive 
affective stimuli in the second study are comparable to a reward condition, may have led to an increased 
transmission of D1-receptors,which in turn led to decreased processing capacity and therefore to impaired 
decision-making performance. This assumption is in line with a study by Yildiz and colleagues (2013), who 
demonstrated a similar effect of reward and punishment on dual tasking: Compared to the CG, participants in 
the punishment group responded faster in the second task while participants of the reward group were slower. 
Moreover, the dual-state theory of dopamine might also explain the differential effect of stress on decision 
making under risk with (Pabst, Schoofs, et al., 2013) and without additional demand (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009; 
Putman, Antypa, et al., 2010; Starcke, et al., 2008): To perform a single task advantageously, tonic task 
shielding and a non-interference-prone state would be advantageously (Lehle, et al., 2009). If stress decreases 
the activation of D1-receptors and increases the transmission of D2-receptores, the activated state (vulnerable 
for interference) is not compatible with the demands of a single task. This would lead to the suggestion that 
dopamine might play a role in the suggested serial-to-parallel processing shift (see the beige ovals in Figure 22).  
However, neither Yildiz and colleagues (2013) nor the studies of the present thesis investigated such 
involvement and there are some limitations to this interpretation that need to be mentioned: Even though stress 
increases the release of dopamine (Abercrombie, et al., 1989; Hutson, et al., 2004; Morrow, et al., 2000), and 
D2-receptors are more responsive to dopamine, which is accompanied by a modulation of baseline activity of 
neurons in the PFC, the exact role of D2-receptors in stress is quite unclear (Goto & Grace, 2005; Scornaiencki, 
Cantrup, Rushlow, & Rajakumar, 2009). While an increased binding to D2-receptors due to stress was found in 
monkeys (Tsukada, Ohba, Nishiyama, & Kakiuchi, 2011), this was not the case in young adults (Wand et al., 
2007). Furthermore, the findings of neural activity in the first study of this thesis indicate an increased activation 
in the PFC in the SG compared to the CG, whereas the correlative analysis revealed a deactivation in the dlPFC 
within stressed participants. Regarding the aforementioned discussion this would indicate that there are more 
D2-receptors in the aPFC (higher transmission at D2-receptors than at D1-receptors during stress, see above) 
than in the dlPFC. But, studies investigating the differences in the distribution of D1- and D2-receptors found in 
particular differences in the striatum and the basal ganglia (e.g., Camps, Cortés, Gueye, Probst, & Palacios, 
1989; Hall et al., 1994; Khan et al., 1998). So far, little is known about the differences in the distribution of D1- 
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and D2-receptors in the cortical parts of the PFC. Therefore, even though the involvement of dopamine is 
probably due to the fact that stress elicits dopamine (Abercrombie, et al., 1989; Hutson, et al., 2004; Morrow, et 
al., 2000), the application of the dual-system theory of dopamine to the results of the first and second study of 
the present thesis is rather limited. Future studies should investigate this process in more detail.  
The following section will now give a general conclusion of the current findings and a perspective for 
future studies 
7.3 General conclusion and perspective for future studies 
The interaction between cognitive and affective processes in decision making under risk appears to be complex 
and depend on various situational and personal factors. In a simple decision situation (without additional 
affective and cognitive demands), cognitive processes dominate the decision-making process while affective 
processes are in particular relevant for the processing of (affective) feedback. The interaction in such simple 
situations might be seen in the point when the feedback information is evaluated, processed and integrated into 
the decision-making process (see sections 3, 3.1.2.2 and 3.2.2.2 for detailed information). The findings of the 
present thesis suggest that interaction become enlightening when further situational influences are present that 
cause additional affective or/and cognitive demand. Figure 22 displays the suggestions derived from the findings 
of the three studies of this thesis: In a stressful or affect-laden decision-making situation, in which an additional 
executive task has to be performed simultaneously, stressful or affective influences cause a neural activation 
shift which might be mediated by neurotransmitters such as dopamine. On one hand, this shift enables parallel 
task performance that retains decision-making performance. On the other hand, the shift is accompanied by an 
activation of higher-level executive functions. The higher-level executive functions (e.g., 
supervisory/monitoring function) in turn manage lower-level executive functions (e.g., categorization) and 
facilitate the performance of the two tasks in parallel (i.e., assumed mediation effect). This retains superior 
decision-making performance. Moreover, executive functions may also moderate the effect of affective 
influences on decision-making behavior (i.e., assumed moderation effect). 
In connection with the example from the beginning of the thesis (see section 2), it is assumable that the 
student who is delayed on his/her way for an important exam at the university (i.e., he/she might be stressed) 
may still be able to manage the situation and consider all important information (e.g., arriving time of the next 
train, duration time of the trip to university, starting time of the exam) to make a rational decision. This is 
possible due to the neural activation shift, which initiates the involvement of (executive) processes supporting 
the decision-making processes leading to an advantageous decision. However, there might be some inter-
individual differences as well as situational factors which influence the extent of performance. 
Considering the model in Figure 22, it can be assumed that the degree of the interaction between 
cognitive and affective processes in decision making in demanding situations probably depends on several 
situational and individual factors. For example, it appears to depend on the cognitive ability of a person. As 
shown in the second study of the present thesis (see section 5), only participants with superior executive 
functions were unaffected by the affective influences and demonstrated advantageous decision-making 
behavior. Additionally, as postulated by Starcke and Brand (2012) there might be a variety of mediators and 
moderators affecting the influence of stress on decision making, which might be relevant for the model assumed 
in Figure 22. For example, demographical data such as gender or age: While various studies demonstrated 
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differential decision-making performance in men and women (see section 3.4.3.3.2) during stress, the 
interaction between age and stress, as well as between age and cognitive functions, is attributed to volume 
reduction of prefrontal brain regions, which might influence task performance (Cabeza, 2001; Raz, 2000). 
Furthermore, higher age is associated with decreased effectiveness of dopamine transmission (Volkow et al., 
2000), which might possibly influence the reaction to stress and affective influences (see discussion in section 
7.2) and therefore the performance in a decision-making situation with additional affective and cognitive load. 
Besides these factors strategy application and sensitivity to reward or punishment might also affect the influence 
of stress or affective influences in general on decision making (Starcke & Brand, 2012). For example, as 
discussed in section 3.4.2.2, certain decision strategies are more compatible with a certain affective state than 
others and thus the individual preference for a decision strategy might interfere with the affective influence in 
this kind of demanding decision situations. Regarding reward/punishment sensitivity, it was found that in highly 
punishment sensitive subjects, increasing of negative affect was associated with superior punishment learning 
accuracy, while it was inversely related in less sensitive subjects (Cavanagh, Frank, & Allen, 2011). 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that whether or not a situation offers coping strategies, like affect-regulation, or 
whether a person applies them or not, determines the decision-making performance in such demanding 
situations. Heilman and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that participants applying diverse affect-regulation 
strategies display different decision-making performance: Participants in a negative affective state who applied 
cognitive reappraisal as an regulation strategy demonstrated increased risk-seeking compared to participants 
who used expressive suppression or no affect- regulation strategy (for detailed information about the findings 
see section 3.4.2.2.2). Thus, it appears that the decision-making performance in a situation with additional 
affective and cognitive demand depends on various situational and personal factors and therefore might differ 
between individuals. However, in general, humans may be able to still decide advantageously in these kinds of 
demanding situations, due to the interaction between affective and cognitive processes.  
7.3.1 Practical application  
Some of the aforementioned aspects that might influence decision-making performance in demanding situations 
provide an opportunity to intervene in order to support individuals who show deficits in facets necessary for 
superior decision-making performance in this situations, for example cognitive functions. Recent studies have 
shown that in particular cognitive functions involved in dual tasking, such as executive control and coordination 
skills, are trainable in elderly people (Bherer, et al., 2005; Bherer et al., 2008; Lussier, Gagnon, & Bherer, 2012) 
as well as kids with ADHD (Kray, Karbach, Haenig, & Freitag, 2012). Thus, it might be of special interest to 
figure out which specific cognitive functions are involved in decision situations with additional demand (see 
Figure 22). These kind of situations often occur in everyday life and might be challenging for people suffering 
from cognitive impairments like older people or people with prefrontal dysfunctions or neurological and 
psychiatric diseases, since it was shown that such individuals show deficits in for example, dual-tasking (Allen 
et al., 2002; Baddeley, et al., 1997; Hartley & Little, 1999) executive functioning (Belleville, et al., 2006; 
Collette, Van der Linden, & Salmon, 1999; Elliott, 2003), and decision making (Brand & Schiebener, 2013; 
Euteneuer, et al., 2009; Rogers, Everitt, et al., 1999; Zamarian, et al., 2010). Knowledge about the specific 
cognitive functions involved in these processes would therefore facilitate the development of apposite trainings. 
These trainings would increase the probability that individuals with cognitive deficits would be able to handle 
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demanding everyday life situations. Moreover, it was shown that maintaining good cognitive functions is 
essential to functional independence and quality of life (Depp, Vahia, & Jeste, 2010), particularly in older 
people.  
However, whether or not the benefits from these trainings are also transferable to other cognitive 
functions or tasks is still under debate: Kray and Karbach (2009) demonstrated that dual-tasking or rather task-
switching trainings are transferable to structural dissimilar executive tasks and fluid intelligence in young and 
older adults. In contrast, Strobach, Frensch, Soutscheck, and Schubert (2012) found that coordination skills are 
less transferable to new situations because they are rather task-specific. Therefore, the question remains, 
whether a cognitive training for the executive functions found to be involved in decision making with an 
additional executive load (i.e., monitoring), would be effective after all. Strobach and colleagues argued that the 
training situations in the two studies mentioned above might not have been comparable: While participants in 
the study by Karbach and Kray (2009) got information about the tasks and the sequence of the task before 
performing the switching task, participants in the study by Strobach and colleagues (2012) performed the tasks 
depending on the stimulus presented (i.e., visual stimuli indicated visual task, auditory stimuli indicated auditory 
task). Strobach and colleagues argue that the maintenance and coordination of the task sequence in the study by 
Karbach and Kray (2009) may have enhanced processes which enable transfer to structural dissimilar task 
situations. This would be in line with recent findings indicating that transfer effects improve if the training taps 
into higher-level executive functioning rather than basic processing or specific strategies (Lustig, Shah, Seidler, 
& Reuter-Lorenz, 2009; Noack, Lövdén, Schmiedek, & Lindenberger, 2009). Since, the third study of the 
present thesis revealed the involvement of higher-level executive functions; it seems likely that a cognitive 
training would be effectively. Hence, the aim for future studies should be the development and evaluation of a 
cognitive training which includes in particular higher-level executive functions required for advantageous 
decision making in a situation with additional cognitive load. This would probably enhance the transfer to for 
example, real life decision-making situations with additional demand.  
 Moreover, there is evidence that cognitive training results in increased plasticity of the associated brain 
regions (for an overview see Jones et al., 2006; Kelly & Garavan, 2005; Klingberg, 2010), which indicates a 
consolidation on neural level: While learning how to juggle leads to an increase in grey matter (Draganski et al., 
2004), cognitive trainings such as working memory trainings lead to a functional plasticity of the brain, meaning 
increased activation of the involved areas (Olesen, Westerberg, & Klingberg, 2004). Therefore, a cognitive 
training of the higher-level executive functions would possibly lead to an increased activity in the dlPFC and/or 
the aPFC after training. These are areas that are known to be involved during stress reactions (see section 
3.4.3.1) and are also involved in affective processing (see section 3.1.1). The question remains whether such 
neural changes would lead to alterations of the effect of stress and affective influences on cognitive functions 
associated with these areas (e.g., executive functions, decision making under risk). Future studies should 
investigate this in more detail. However, it has to be mentioned that the permanency of the plasticity changes 
has to be questioned. Draganski and colleagues (2004) for example, found that the induced expansion of the 
grey matter following training decreased after a training-free interval of three month. Furthermore, this research 
field is at an early stage and more studies are needed to make a meaningful statement.  
Another aspect that might give an answer to the previous question refers to the catecholamine 
dopamine, which is modulated by cognitive trainings (for a short overview see Klingberg, 2010). In a recent 
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study it was demonstrated that after a working memory training of five weeks the working memory capacity was 
significantly increased and correlated with changes in cortical D1 receptors, mostly because of a decrease of the 
density of D1-receptors (McNab et al., 2009). If cognitive training influences the catecholamine dopamine in a 
way that it affects the density of the receptors, trainings might also have a preventive quality: As mentioned 
above dopamine may also be involved in positive affect such as reward (Yildiz, et al., 2013) by increasing the 
transmission at D1-receptors, which in turn might lead to disadvantageous decision making in a dual-tasking 
situation (for detailed information see section 7.2). A decrease of the density of these receptors due to cognitive 
training of the involved executive functions might prevent such increasing transmission and prevent inferior 
decision-making performance. However, this assumption is preliminary since the causality of the findings by 
McNab and colleagues (2009) is not very clear (see Klingberg, 2010 for a detailed discussion) and neither is the 
role of the distribution of the dopamine receptors in the PFC. Therefore, the exact role of dopamine in decision 
making under affective influence remains unclear.  
7.3.2 The end 
Overall, the three studies of the present thesis extend the knowledge about the interaction between cognitive and 
affective processes in decision making in demanding situations and about the underlying neural correlates: It 
appears that an additional cognitive and affective demand in decision-making situations triggers a neural 
activation shift which enables parallel processing and activates higher-level executive functions, which again 
facilitate the decision-making performance. However, the impact of certain situational and personal factors, 
such as the application of affect-regulation strategies and demographic variables, are still unknown. Moreover, 
the role of dopamine in these processes is unclear. Future studies should consider the role of dopamine in 
decision making under risk, in affective processes and cognitive trainings and the possible resulting interaction 
in more detail. Hereby, it appears advisable to use functional and effective connectivity analysis: This might not 
only bring order into the differential findings of the influence of training on neural plasticity (Kelly & Garavan, 
2005), but might also be helpful in investigating the neural network underlying the interaction between decision 
making, affective, and cognitive processes, more detailed. Instead of comparing the neural activity differences 
of one single brain region before an intervention compared to after an intervention, this analysis considers the 
connectivity of one brain region to other brain regions and the changes in these activation patterns due to the 
intervention (for detailed information about this analysis see Büchel & Friston, 2000; Friston, 2002; McIntosh, 
1998, 1999; McIntosh & Gonzalez-Lima, 1994). This might give more insights into how the brain manages the 
compensational mechanisms like the serial-to-parallel shift in demanding decision-making situations. Outcomes 
from such studies might be promising and increase the knowledge about any issues in the brain functions of 
individuals who demonstrate disadvantageous decision making under risk in diverse situations. This knowledge 
might then be used to create corresponding and apposite interventions.  
Thus, from applied and neuropsychological perspective, the role of the interaction between underlying 
affective and cognitive processes for decision making in demanding situations, is and will stay an interesting 
and promising field of research with high relevance. 
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